James Belcher vd Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Florida Attorney General

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 20, 2011
No. 10-14870
JOHN LEY
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 3:07-cv-00665-MMH-JBT
JAMES BELCHER,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Petitioner - Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
FLORIDA ATTORNEY GENERAL,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Respondents - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(May 20, 2011)
Before CARNES, BARKETT and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
James Belcher, a Florida prisoner on death row, appeals from the district
court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254. This court granted a certificate of appealability on three issues
concerning Belcher’s trial counsel’s performance:
1. Whether Belcher’s trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective
for failing to object to prosecution statements in violation of
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
2. Whether Belcher’s trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective
for failing to object to prosecution questions during the penalty
phase aimed at proving a non-statutory aggravating
circumstance—that prison life was not harsh—unrelated to the
crime or the defendant.
3. Whether the combined effect of these instances of
ineffectiveness cumulatively denied Belcher effective
assistance of counsel.
After careful review of the record and the parties’ arguments, and with the benefit
of oral argument, we affirm.
I. Procedural History
James Belcher was charged in Duval County, Florida, with first degree
murder and sexual battery. The evidence at trial indicated that Belcher entered the
victim’s home, sexually assaulted her, and killed her by strangling and drowning
her in the bathtub. The jury found Belcher guilty of first degree murder on the
theories of both premeditation and felony murder, and guilty of sexual battery.
After a penalty phase hearing, the jury voted, nine to three, in favor of a death
sentence. The trial court followed the jury’s recommendation and imposed a death
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sentence for first-degree murder and sentenced Belcher to twenty-five years
imprisonment for sexual battery. 1 The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed
Belcher’s convictions and the death sentence on direct appeal. Belcher v. State,
1
The Florida Supreme Court on direct appeal summarized the findings at sentencing as
follows:
The trial court found that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt the following
aggravators in support of Belcher’s death sentence: (1) the defendant has been
previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to some
person (great weight); (2) the capital felony was committed while the defendant was
engaged in the commission of the crime of sexual battery (great weight); and (3) the
capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) (great weight). The
trial court found that all of the mitigating factors that were presented were proven
sufficiently for the Court to give them consideration. The mitigating factors in this
case, all of which were nonstatutory, were: (1) in his relationship with family
members, Belcher is considerate, generous and concerned; (2) Belcher loves his
parents, brother, sisters, cousins, aunts, and uncles, and they love him; (3) Belcher
has not lured anyone else in his family into trouble with the law, he has actually
discouraged family members from engaging in criminal behavior and used himself
as an example as to why they should not get involved in criminal activity; (4) Belcher
has done many kind things for his family; (5) in spite of personal problems, Belcher
has encouraged his cousins to do well; (6) Belcher has often been a mentor and a role
model of integrity to his relatives; (7) Belcher has maintained contact with relatives
even while in prison and continues to provide them advice and counsel, sometimes
over the phone; (8) Belcher was raised in a high crime area in New York and was
evidently unable to resist the temptations of crime; (9) Belcher was sent to adult
prison at an early age and it affected his development; (10) Belcher has never abused
alcohol or drugs; (11) Belcher has shown concern for younger inmates at Appalachee
Correctional Institute (ACI) and has had a positive effect on their lives by being a
tutor, basketball coach, a good listener, a counselor to young inmates, and a
peacemaker; (12) Belcher can continue to help other inmates in the future, as
evidenced by those who testified at the penalty phase; (13) Belcher has not been a
discipline problem either in prison or in the pretrial detention facility for the period
of his recent incarceration; (14) Belcher displayed proper behavior during trial; and
(15) Belcher displayed appropriate remorse and genuine concern for the distress
caused to his family and the victim’s family during the Spencer hearing. The
sentencing order indicates that the trial court assigned “some weight” to all of the
mitigators, except for (11) and (12), to which it assigned “greater weight.”
Belcher v. State, 851 So. 2d 678, 681-82 (Fla. 2003) (footnote omitted).
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851 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 2003). Belcher’s petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme
Court of the United States was denied. Belcher v. Florida, 540 U.S. 1054 (2003).
Belcher then filed, in state court, a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851. Belcher raised fourteen claims, nearly all of which
concerned defense counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness. The state trial court held an
evidentiary hearing and subsequently denied the motion for post conviction relief.
The Florida Supreme Court again affirmed and denied an additional state habeas
petition filed by Belcher. Belcher v. State, 961 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 2007). The
Supreme Court again denied certiorari. Belcher v. Florida, 552 U.S. 1026 (2007).
Belcher then filed the instant petition, which was also denied and from
which he now appeals.
II. Standard of Review and Legal Test
Belcher’s habeas petition is governed by the standards of review set forth in
28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996. Because Becher’s claim was adjudicated on the merits in his state
post-conviction proceedings, § 2254(d) allows federal habeas relief only if the
state court adjudication
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted
in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
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28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).2
Belcher’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must be reviewed
under the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
“Strickland requires a petitioner to show both that his counsel’s performance was
deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced his defense.” Philmore v. McNeil,
575 F.3d 1251, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009). Counsel’s performance is deficient only if
it “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
688. We will find prejudice only if “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694.
Thus, we will grant relief only if we find that the Florida Supreme Court’s
decision, affirming the trial court’s denial of his ineffective assistance claims, was
contrary to or an unreasonable application of U.S. Supreme Court law.
2
A decision is “contrary to” federal law if it contradicts the Supreme Court on settled law
or gives a different holding than the Court’s on a set of materially indistinguishable facts—in
short, it is a decision “substantially different from the [Supreme Court’s] relevant precedent . . .
.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). A decision unreasonably applies federal law if
it identifies the correct governing legal principle as articulated by the United States Supreme
Court but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the petitioner’s case, “unreasonably
extends [the] principle . . . to a new context where it should not apply, or unreasonably refuses to
extend [it] to a new context where it should apply.” Id. at 407.
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III. Discussion
On appeal, Belcher argues that his trial counsel were constitutionally
ineffective for two reasons. We address each in turn.
A. Failure to Make Caldwell Objection
First, Belcher asserts that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object
to the prosecutor’s repeated references to the jury’s sentence recommendation as
advisory, which Belcher claims violates Caldwel1 v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320(1985), and that the failure to object prejudiced him.
In Caldwell, the Supreme Court ruled in a partially divided opinion that the
Eighth Amendment is violated when a jury is “led to believe that responsibility for
determining the appropriateness of a death sentence rests not with the jury but
with the appellate court which later reviews the case.” 472 U.S. 320, 323.
Caldwell involved a death sentence in Mississippi, where the jury had the sole
responsibility for imposing the sentence and appellate courts reviewed the
sentence with a “presumption of correctness.” See Id. at 331-32. Because only
four Justices joined part of the majority’s analysis in Caldwell, the Court in
Romano v. Oklahoma3 adopted Justice O’Connor’s Caldwell concurrence as
3
512 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1994). The Romano court addressed the related question of whether
admitting irrelevant evidence of a defendant’s death sentence for another murder “impermissibly
undermine[d] the sentencing jury’s sense of responsibility for determining the appropriateness of
the defendant’s death.”
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limiting the case’s reach:
Caldwell [is] relevant only to certain types of comment—those that
mislead the jury as to its role in the sentencing process in a way that
allows the jury to feel less responsible than it should for the
sentencing decision. Thus, [t]o establish a Caldwell violation, a
defendant necessarily must show that the remarks to the jury
improperly described the role assigned to the jury by local law.
512 U.S. 1, 9 (1994) (citations and quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in
Romano).
The capital sentencing scheme in Florida, unlike that in Mississippi and
Oklahoma, treats the jury’s verdict as advisory, albeit one carrying great weight
that a judge can override only if “virtually no reasonable person could differ” as to
the correct result. Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975). In Davis v.
Singletary, 119 F.3d 1471, 1482 (11th Cir. 1997), this Court applied Caldwell and
Romano to Florida’s sentencing scheme, noting that Romano required that the
comments misstate the law on the jury’s responsibility. In Davis, the jury
instructions and prosecutor’s comments contained “references to and descriptions
of the jury’s sentencing verdict . . . as an advisory one, as a recommendation to the
judge, and of the judge as the final sentencing authority.” Id. We held that such
comments “accurately characterize the jury’s and judge’s sentencing roles under
Florida law” and so “are not error under Caldwell.” Id. Thus, defense counsel here
could have validly objected only if the prosecutor inaccurately stated the jury’s
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role in such a way that would “allow[] the jury to feel less responsible than it
should for the sentencing decision.” Romano, 512 U.S. at 9.
Having reviewed the record, we cannot say that the state misrepresented the
law regarding the jury’s role. The remarks made by the prosecutor, viewed in
context, accurately portrayed the relationship between the judge and jury and did
not denigrate the jury’s role in the proceedings. Indeed, the prosecutor repeatedly
stressed that the jury’s recommendation held “great weight” in the judge’s
decision. Thus, counsel’s performance in declining to object was not deficient,
and we cannot say the Florida courts’ denial of his ineffective assistance claim on
this ground was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law.
B. Failure to Object to Non-Statutory Mitigator
Belcher also alleges that counsel was deficient in failing to object when the
government elicited testimony from Belcher’s mitigation witnesses about
prisoners’ leisure activities, meals, and opportunities to work outside prison walls
and on legal filings. Belcher had presented witnesses who described him as a man
who coached a basketball team, tutored inmates seeking equivalency diplomas,
mentored younger inmates to encourage them to avoid violence and disciplinary
problems, and generally lived a life worth sparing. The trial court noted that this
evidence of Belcher’s life in prison and his future potential to be the most
persuasive of the fifteen mitigating circumstances he found.
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On cross-examination, the state sought at times to elicit a view of prison life
as relatively pleasant. Defense counsel did not object and instead asked questions
on re-direct to show that prison was in fact an unpleasant place in which people
would not want to live. Belcher claims the decision not to object constituted
ineffective assistance. Even assuming that Belcher’s reliance on the evidence of
his life in prison as a mitigator did not open the door to these questions on cross-
examination, we cannot say that counsel’s decision to address the issues on re-
direct without objecting “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. One of Belcher’s trial counsel at the post-conviction
hearing testified that he decided as matter of strategy that it would be better not to
object because he found the cross-examination “silly.” As a result, he thought he
could more effectively address the issues on redirect. For example, the
prosecution elicited testimony on cross-examination of one witness about how
some minimum-security inmates can work outside the prison walls supervised by a
guard who has no gun. On re-direct, counsel clarified that some inmates’
convictions, no matter how well behaved they may be in prison, prevent them from
moving beyond “close custody” status—thus preventing them from ever working
off the prison grounds or without an armed guard. Counsel similarly rebutted
suggestions about the alleged desirability of the food served and circumstances in
which prisoners receive visitors. To prove deficient performance, Belcher “must
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overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action
might be considered sound trial strategy.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Belcher
has not shown that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision—that the presumption of
“sound trial strategy” was not overcome—was contrary to or an unreasonable
application of Supreme Court law.4
Accordingly, we find no reversible error and so affirm the district court’s
denial of Belcher’s petition for habeas corpus.
AFFIRMED.
4
Not having found deficient performance on either of Belcher’s claims, we need not
address his cumulative error argument.
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