United States v. Maxwell George Franklyn

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-15261 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar JUNE 9, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cr-20575-CMA-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MAXWELL GEORGE FRANKLYN,
a.k.a. Cashmore Forrester,
a.k.a. Terry Lee Taylor,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(June 9, 2011)
Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
After Maxwell George Franklyn pled guilty to illegal re-entry by a convicted
felon, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2), the district court sentenced him
to a prison term of 70 months, a sentence at the low end of the Guidelines
sentencing range. He now appeals the sentence, raising two issues: (1) whether the
district court’s statement at the sentencing hearing that the applicable Guidelines
sentencing range was “presumptively reasonable” constitutes procedural error, and
(2) whether the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence by
failing to afford adequate weight to his personal history and characteristics.
Franklyn did not object to the district court’s statement that the applicable
Guidelines sentencing range is presumptively reasonable. Thus, to prevail on that
issue, he must show that the court (1) erred; (2) the error was plain; and (3) it
affected his substantial rights. United States v. Bacon, 598 F.3d 772, 777 (11th Cir.
2010). If these elements are present, we may exercise our discretion to vacate the
district court’s judgment and remand the case for further proceedings if “the error
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id. (quotation omitted). We resolve the first issue against Franklyn,
because the error did not affect Franklyn’s substantial rights, and turn to the second
issue, whether his sentence is substantively reasonable.
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A sentence is substantively unreasonable if it “fails to achieve the purposes
of sentencing as stated in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a).” United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d
784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005). Pursuant to § 3553(a), the sentencing court must impose
a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to reflect the seriousness of
the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense,
deter criminal conduct, protect the public from future criminal conduct by the
defendant, and provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training or medical care. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The court must also consider the
nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the
defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the applicable Guidelines sentencing
range, the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to
avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to
victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7).
A district court abuses its discretion when it balances the § 3553(a) factors
unreasonably or places unreasonable weight on a single factor. United States v.
Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1192-93 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, (U.S. Apr. 4,
2010) (No. 10-727). We will remand for resentencing when “left with the definite
and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in
weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range
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of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v. Pugh,
515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted).
We find nothing in this record to indicate that the district court failed to
comply with these sentencing principles and objectives. Franklyn’s sentence is
therefore substantively reasonable.
AFFIRMED.
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