Murray G. Lawrence vs City of Fairhope, Alabama, Wendell Thomas

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-11959 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar JUNE 10, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-00050-WS-C
MURRAY G. LAWRENCE,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
CITY OF FAIRHOPE, ALABAMA,
WENDELL THOMAS,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
________________________
(June 10, 2011)
Before EDMONDSON, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
On January 26, 2007, Murray G. Lawrence, an African-American male, was
walking through a neighborhood in the City of Fairhope, Alabama, with three
white male associates when Lawrence called out to a passing police patrol car. A
verbal exchange ensued; within a few minutes, Officer Wendell Thomas arrested
Lawrence for disorderly conduct and took him to jail in handcuffs. On January 29,
Officer Thomas filed a criminal complaint against Lawrence for congregating with
another person in a public place and refusing to comply with a lawful order of the
police to disperse. Lawrence was convicted in municipal court but subsequently
acquitted by a jury on appeal in a circuit court. He then brought the lawsuit that is
the subject of this appeal against Officer Thomas and Thomas’s employer, the City
of Fairhope, Alabama (collectively, “Appellants”), requesting compensatory and
punitive damages, as well as costs and attorneys’ fees.
The district court granted Officer Thomas qualified immunity with respect
to Lawrence’s constitutional claims related to false arrest, false imprisonment, and
assault and battery, but denied summary judgment based on qualified immunity
with respect to Lawrence’s constitutional claim for malicious prosecution.
Additionally, the court denied Officer Thomas’s motion for summary judgment on
the grounds of statutory immunity as to Lawrence’s state-law claims, which
include false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and assault and
battery. Further, the district court granted summary judgment in favor the City of
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Fairhope with respect to Lawrence’s state-law claims for false imprisonment,
malicious prosecution, and negligent training and supervision, but denied
summary judgment with respect to the state-law claims for false arrest and assault
and battery.
In this interlocutory appeal, Appellants argue that the district court erred by
denying summary judgment as to their defenses of (1) qualified immunity for
Lawrence’s constitutional malicious-prosecution claim against Officer Thomas
and (2) statutory immunity for Lawrence’s state-law claims of assault and battery
and false arrest against Appellants, and (3) statutory immunity for false
imprisonment and malicious prosecution against Officer Thomas.1
DISCUSSION
“We review de novo the denial of a motion for summary judgment based on
qualified immunity.” Jean-Baptiste v. Gutierrez, 627 F.3d 816, 820 (11th Cir.
2010). Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, discovery materials
on file, and affidavits fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Id. We view
the record evidence and draw all reasonable inferences from that evidence in the
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As the district court noted, Lawrence’s complaint was “not a model of clarity.” Because
“[t]he complaint contain[ed] no specific identification as to whether any given count [wa]s
brought as a state claim, a constitutional claim, or both,” the district court interpreted the claims
as described above. The parties appear to adopt the district court’s characterization of
Lawrence’s claims in their briefs, so this Court will do the same.
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light most favorable to the nonmovant so long as such inferences are supportable
by the record. Id.
1. Qualified Immunity for Constitutional Claim of Malicious Prosecution
In denying qualified immunity, the district court found that Appellants
failed to make the required threshold showing that Officer Thomas was acting
within his discretionary authority when he initiated a criminal complaint against
Lawrence. It further stated that, even if Appellants had successfully made this
showing, the evidence in the record—viewed in the light most favorable to
Lawrence—does not establish that Officer Thomas had probable cause to institute
criminal proceedings. We agree on both grounds.
“Qualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials
sued in their individual capacities if their conduct ‘does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.’” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “To receive qualified immunity,
the public official must first prove that he was acting within the scope of his
discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.” Wood v.
Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 877 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Further, “[to] determine whether an official was engaged in a discretionary
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function, [courts] consider whether the acts the official undertook are of a type
that fell within the employee’s job responsibilities.” Crosby v. Monroe Cnty., 394
F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, we find that Appellants failed to satisfy this threshold showing with
respect to Lawrence’s malicious-prosecution claim. As the district court noted,
Appellants made no assertion and showed no facts suggesting that filing the
criminal complaint three days after the arrest was within Officer Thomas’s
discretionary authority. Cf. Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1282
(11th Cir. 1998) (“A bald assertion that the [officer’s] act[ion]s were taken
pursuant to the performance of duties and within the scope of duties will not
suffice.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Merely stating that Officer Thomas
was a law enforcement officer employed by the City of Fairhope on the date of the
events at issue is insufficient. See id. Also insufficient is asserting that Officer
Thomas was acting within the scope of his authority when he arrested Lawrence.
But even assuming that Officer Thomas had established that he was acting
within his discretionary authority, he still would not be entitled to qualified
immunity because he lacked probable cause for filing the criminal complaint.
“Once the defendant establishes that he was acting within his discretionary
authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is not
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appropriate.” Wood, 323 F.3d at 877 (internal quotation marks omitted). To do
so, the plaintiff must first show facts establishing a constitutional violation. Id. A
plaintiff seeking to establish a malicious-prosecution claim after acquittal must
prove, inter alia, that the officer lacked probable cause for charging the crime in
the first place. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 258, 265–66 (2006). If the
plaintiff’s allegations taken as true establish a constitutional violation, the
question becomes whether the right was clearly established. Wood, at 323 F.3d at
878. The parties both concede that the success of Lawrence’s malicious-
prosecution claim turns on whether Officer Thomas had probable cause.
We agree with the district court that, based on Lawrence’s version of the
facts surrounding his arrest for disorderly conduct, Officer Thomas lacked
probable cause for filing the criminal complaint against Lawrence. The January
29 criminal complaint expressly charges Lawrence with a violation of subsection
(6) of Ala. Code § 13-A-11-7(a), which provides that a person who “[c]ongregates
with other person [sic] in a public place and refuses to comply with a lawful order
of the police to disperse” may be arrested for disorderly conduct. However, as the
district court noted, there is conflicting evidence as to whether Lawrence was by
himself or with two other individuals when Officer Thomas ordered him not to
move towards the patrol car. Based on Lawrence’s version of the facts
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surrounding the initial arrest, Officer Thomas could not reasonably have believed
that he had probable cause for charging Lawrence with a violation of subsection
(6).
Appellants argue that even if Officer Thomas lacked probable cause for
filing the criminal charge, no constitutional or statutory right was clearly
established at the time the events at issue occurred. “The relevant, dispositive
inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be
clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted.” Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1350 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Long before the events at issue here took place, this Court had
established “malicious prosecution as a violation of the Fourth Amendment and a
viable constitutional tort cognizable under § 1983.” Wood, 323 F.3d at 881.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Lawrence supports a conclusion
that Officer Thomas lacked reasonable grounds to file a criminal complaint based
on subsection (6) of Ala. Code § 13-A-11-7(a)—as explained above, there is
conflicting record evidence as to whether Lawrence was alone or with others when
Officer Thomas ordered him to stay away from the police car. Because a
reasonable officer would know that filing a false criminal complaint would be
unlawful, under this view of the facts, qualified immunity cannot protect Officer
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Thomas from liability for malicious prosecution. See Kjellsen v. Mills, 517 F.3d
1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating that, to avoid liability for malicious
prosecution, an officer must have probable cause “to continue a prosecution, not
just to arrest a defendant or to institute a prosecution”).
Thus, we affirm the district court’s decision to deny summary judgment
based on qualified immunity as to Lawrence’s federal constitutional claim for
malicious prosecution.
2. Statutory Immunity for State-Law Claims of False Arrest and Imprisonment,
Malicious Prosecution, and Assault & Battery
The district court denied Officer Thomas statutory immunity as to
Lawrence’s state-law claims for malicious prosecution, false arrest, false
imprisonment, and assault and battery. It also denied the City of Fairhope
statutory immunity with respect to Lawrence’s claims of false arrest and assault
and battery. For the following reasons, we affirm.
In Alabama, law enforcement officers may invoke statutory immunity from
civil suit for the “performance of any discretionary function within the line and
scope of his or her law enforcement duties.” Ala. Code § 6-5-338. Acts
performed within an officer’s discretionary function are those “as to which there is
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no hard and fast rule as to the course of conduct that one must or must not take and
those acts requiring exercise in judgment and choice and involving what is just
and proper under the circumstances.” Sheth v. Webster, 145 F.3d 1231, 1239
(11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (internal quotation mark omitted). “[A] court first
determines whether the government defendant was performing a discretionary
function when the alleged wrong occurred; if so, the burden shifts to the plaintiff
to demonstrate that the defendant[] acted in bad faith, with malice or willfulness . .
. .” Scarbrough v. Myles, 245 F.3d 1299, 1303 n.9 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)
(alteration in original) (internal quotation mark omitted).
In Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 405 (Ala. 2000), the Supreme Court
of Alabama “restate[d] the rule governing State-agent immunity.” In doing so, it
departed from the federal law governing qualified immunity by adding what
appears to be a bad-faith exception. After stating that a state agent “shall be
immune from civil liability” when acting within his discretionary functions, the
court added: “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the foregoing statement
of the rule, a State agent shall not be immune from civil liability in his or her
personal capacity (1) when the Constitution or laws of the United States . . .
require otherwise; or (2) when the State agent acts willfully, maliciously,
fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken
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interpretation of the law.” Id. (third emphasis added). The second exception to
state-agent immunity appears to be subjective; it requires an evaluation of the facts
that goes beyond merely determining whether an officer had probable cause for
the conduct at issue.
After careful review of the parties’ briefs and relevant evidence in the
record, and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Lawrence, we conclude
that Lawrence has shown facts indicating that Officer Thomas acted in bad faith,
with malice, or willfulness with respect to the remaining state-law claims. As the
district court noted, the evidence in the record of personal animosity supports a
reasonable inference that Officer Thomas acted upon personal ill will that he felt
towards Lawrence based on their ten-year history, or upon racial animosity
towards Lawrence. We agree with the district court that “[Officer] Thomas has
been all over the map as to why he arrested [Lawrence].” Further, or in the
alternative, the City of Fairhope is not entitled to immunity because Lawrence has
met his burden of showing that Officer Thomas may have acted with neglect,
carelessness, or unskillfulness. See Borders v. City of Huntsville, 875 So. 2d.
1168, 1183–84 (Ala. 2003) (denying immunity to the city where the plaintiff’s
state-law claims of excessive use of force, false arrest, false imprisonment, and
assault and battery were based on the officer’s alleged neglect, carelessness, and
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unskillfulness).
Finally, as discussed in the previous section, Lawrence has created a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Officer Thomas had probable cause
for filing the criminal complaint against Lawrence; thus, the district court properly
denied statutory immunity with respect to the state-law claim for malicious
prosecution.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment on all grounds.
AFFIRMED.
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