Tarmas v. Secretary of the Navy

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULY 6, 2011
No. 10-15370 JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 3:07-cv-00290-TJC-TEM
JOHN C. TARMAS,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(July 6, 2011)
Before EDMONDSON, HULL and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
John Tarmas, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of his employer, the Secretary of the Navy (Secretary)
in this disability discrimination and retaliation action. After a thorough review of
the record, we affirm.
I. Background
Tarmas, a civilian employee with the Navy for over 25 years, began
experiencing neurological symptoms, such as tingling and numbness, and periods
of insomnia in 1999. He was treated by Dr. Victor Maquera and eventually
diagnosed with delayed sleep phase syndrome and a mood disorder. In 2001,
Tarmas’s insomnia was extreme and began interfering with his scheduled work
hours. After speaking with supervisors James Russeau, Richard Reckert, and Paul
Heagney, he arranged a flexible work schedule; instead of a defined start time,
Tarmas could begin his shift at any time and work for an eight-hour period.
By 2003, however, Tarmas’s direct supervisor, who was now Andrew
Wojtyla, found that the inconsistent schedule was becoming a problem in terms of
safety issues and team effectiveness. Tarmas often did not arrive at work until
mid-afternoon. In July, Reckert met with Tarmas and informed him that the
flexible schedule needed to be changed and requested that Tarmas submit medical
documentation. Dr. Maquera submitted an evaluation in September 2003
outlining Tarmas’s diagnosis and explaining that Tarmas had no limitations in his
abilities to work. Despite Tarmas’s medical conditions and work schedule, he
2
routinely received performance awards and acceptable evaluations.
In January 2004, Reckert, Russeau, Wojtyla, and Tarmas met again to
discuss Tarmas’s schedule. Reckert and Russeau proposed a flexible schedule that
would permit Tarmas to start work as late as 10:30 a.m. when necessary, instead of
his assigned 7:30 a.m. start time. Tarmas rejected the proposal and stated that he
would use sick or annual leave to account for his hours when he arrived late. In a
follow-up email, Reckert requested that Tarmas provide more medical information
to support his request for additional flexibility in his schedule.
In May 2004, after he had used all of his available leave, Tarmas requested
the flexible schedule proposed in January, and he submitted a report from Dr.
Maquera indicating that his condition was chronic. Dr. Maquera did not, however,
identify any necessary accommodations. In a second letter, Maquera explained
that Tarmas’s condition was exacerbated by cross-country travel, which could
require altering Tarmas’s work hours following a trip. Thereafter, Tarmas’s
supervisors presented him with a flexwork agreement, setting his regular hours as
7:15 a.m. to 3:45 p.m., with the following modifications following cross-country
travel: Tarmas would start at 10:15 a.m. the first two days after travel, at 9:15 a.m.
the next two days, and at 8:15 a.m. the last day before returning to his regular
schedule. On July 1, 2004, Russeau sent Tarmas a memo setting out the flexwork
3
agreement. Tarmas believed the accommodation was insufficient because it failed
to address other medical issues that could impact his sleep disorder and cause him
to miss work.
The following month, Tarmas requested an immediate transfer to an open
position in another department; Russeau denied the request because there was no
transition plan in place for Tarmas’s current position. Tarmas sought other
transfers in October 2004 and February 2005, but each was denied because he
lacked the necessary qualifications for the new positions.
In May 2005, Tarmas traveled to California for a work project. Instead of
returning on Friday, he stayed over and flew home on Sunday. Tarmas sent
Russeau an email to verify that he did not need to take leave for the Friday
because his Sunday travel would “cancel[] out” the Friday. Russeau advised
Tarmas that he needed to take leave for the Friday. By email, Tarmas informed
Russeau that he disagreed with Russeau’s determination that he was required to
submit a leave request.1
Tarmas continued to experience difficulty arriving at work on time for his
morning shift. On August 10, 2005, Tarmas called in late, notifying Russeau at
9:39 a.m. that he was running late and would be at work by 11 a.m. Tarmas did
1
In the end, Tarmas was not charged with leave for that day.
4
not arrive until 11:30 a.m., at which point he submitted a leave request for four
hours of leave. Russeau denied the leave request because Tarmas had not called
his supervisor within two hours of his start time, as required by the call-out
procedures. On August 15, Tarmas was late and submitted a leave slip, citing
heavy traffic as the cause of his delay. Russeau denied the leave request and listed
the absence as unauthorized. Then on August 16, Tarmas was late again due to
heavy traffic. Russeau denied his leave request. Tarmas filed an informal
complaint with the EEOC, which initiated an investigation.
On August 18, 2005, Tarmas received a “letter of caution,” citing possible
abuse of the leave system, unauthorized absences, and failure to adhere to the
leave procedures. According to the Navy’s human resources manual, a letter of
caution is not a disciplinary action. The letter informed Tarmas that it would not
be placed in his personnel file nor would it be counted as a prior disciplinary
action for purposes of future discipline.
On September 2, 2005, Wojtyla sent Tarmas an email advising him of issues
with his job performance, specifically that there were technical errors in some of
Tarmas’s reports and that the information cited was outdated, inaccurate, or
incomplete. Wojtyla also forwarded his concerns to Russeau. Tarmas responded
with an email blaming Wojtyla for the problems. Nevertheless, Tarmas received
5
an acceptable performance rating in September 2005.2
On September 28, 2005, Tarmas filed a formal complaint with the EEOC
alleging discrimination and retaliation. On October 6, 2005, Tarmas emailed
Russeau about additional accommodations, requesting that he be allowed to work
up to two hours a day flextime when needed, receive liberal approval of leave time
for all hours beyond the flextime, and be given liberal approval of leave without
pay if medically necessary. Russeau asked Tarmas to provide medical
documentation to support his request. In November, Tarmas submitted a letter
from Maquera explaining that Tarmas’s condition was stable with medical therapy
and the accommodations for west coast travel. Maquera explained, however, that
Tarmas had recently developed bronchitis, which had aggravated his sleep
disorder. Maquera indicated that no other accommodations were generally
necessary, except if Tarmas suffered from other illnesses that would trigger the
insomnia. Based on this medical information, Russeau denied Tarmas’s requested
accommodations, but recognized that Tarmas might need to report to work up to
two hours late on occasion.
Following the EEOC investigation, Tarmas received a right-to-sue letter.
2
Notably, he would also receive performance awards in September 2006, June 2007, and
July 2008.
6
He then filed the instant complaint alleging disability discrimination and
retaliation under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Title VII.3 In his pro se
complaint, Tarmas alleged the following specific acts of discrimination and
retaliation: (1) he was denied leave on May 10, 2005; (2) he was subjected to
stricter call-out requirements than other employees on May 12, 2004 and August
10, 2005; (3) he was denied leave on August 15 and 16, 2005; (4) he received a
letter of caution on August 18, 2005; (5) he received an email citing him for poor
job performance on September 2, 2005, after he filed an informal discrimination
complaint; (6) he was denied transfers in June, August, and October 2004 and in
February 2005; and (7) he was denied reasonable accommodations in July 2004.
The district court granted the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment.
First, the court found that the only claims of disability discrimination properly
before it were the leave requests for August 10, 15, and 16, 2005, and the letter of
caution because the other claims fell outside the 45-day window and each event
was a discrete act and not part of a continuing violation. In reaching this
conclusion, the court rejected Tarmas’s claim that he was unaware the conduct
was discriminatory until August 2005. On the merits, the court found that Tarmas
3
Tarmas initially included age discrimination claims, but withdrew those claims early in the
litigation.
7
could not show a prima facie case of discrimination because, even assuming he
was disabled and was otherwise qualified, he had suffered no adverse employment
action. The court then found that there was no claim for reasonable
accommodation pending because the July 2004 request was time-barred and the
October 2005 request was not included in the complaint. Finally, the court
considered Tarmas’s retaliation claim and found that the job performance letter in
September 2005 was not an adverse action. Tarmas now appeals.4
II. Standard of Review
4
The parties engaged in a lengthy and contentious discovery period, during which Tarmas
sought to compel the Secretary to complete discovery because Tarmas disputed 36 of the 71
responses. The magistrate judge granted the Secretary’s motion to strike because the motion failed
to comply with the local rules and Tarmas had failed to consult with opposing counsel in good faith
prior to filing the motion. Tarmas filed additional 90-page motions to compel discovery. The
magistrate judge reviewed the disputed interrogatories and granted, relevant to this appeal, Tarmas’s
request for resumes of those hired for the positions Tarmas sought. Thereafter, Tarmas filed a
motion to hold the Secretary in contempt for failing to comply with the motion to compel. The
magistrate judge declined to hold the Secretary in contempt but did order compliance with the
motion to compel. After the Secretary again failed to respond to Tarmas’s satisfaction, Tarmas filed
another motion for contempt for failure to comply with the court’s order. The Secretary moved to
compel Tarmas to submit to an independent medical examination. Tarmas opposed the motion and
moved in limine to exclude the Secretary’s medical expert. Tamras appealed each ruling to the
district court. At a subsequent status hearing, the court admonished both parties to end needless
filings and urged them to get to the merits of the case. The court ordered the Secretary to comply
with the pending discovery orders and denied Tarmas’s motions seeking discovery of bonuses given
to supervisors because the supervisors were not relevant comparators. The court also denied
Tarmas’s appeal of the denial in part of the motion to compel, and the denial of the motion for
contempt, but kept the sanctions issue open. The court also instructed Tarmas to undergo an
independent medical examination. Still dissatisfied with the Secretary’s discovery response, Tarmas
filed another motion to compel and motions for sanctions, citing discovery violations and spoilation
of evidence. The court denied the motion to compel and later denied the motion for sanctions.
Tarmas now appeals the district court’s discovery rulings. After a thorough review of the record, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion and affirm without further discussion.
8
We review a district court order granting summary judgment de novo,
viewing all of the facts in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. Brooks v. Cnty. Comm’n of Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1161-62
(11th Cir. 2006). “Summary judgment is appropriate when ‘there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.’” Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1085 (11th Cir.
2004) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). “A genuine factual dispute exists if the jury
could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
III. Discussion
A. Timeliness of Tarmas’s claims
Tarmas argues that all of his claims were timely under the Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act of 2009 because he was denied wages and compensation in the form
of accrued leave, and the denials continued on a daily basis until he filed his
EEOC complaint. Although he concedes that he did not raise this issue below, he
asserts that the court may consider it because it raises a question of law.
The Rehabilitation Act prohibits federal agencies from discriminating in
employment against individuals with disabilities. Mullins v. Crowell, 228 F.3d
1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted); see also 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); 42
9
U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2). A plaintiff asserting a private right of action under the
Rehabilitation Act must satisfy the exhaustion of administrative remedies
requirement in the manner prescribed by Title VII. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5,
2000e-16; 29 U.S.C. § 794a; Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455, 1459-60 (11th Cir.
1990). Under these regulations, the employee “must initiate contact with a
Counselor within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory or,
in the case of personnel action, within 45 days of the effective date of the action.”
29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). “Generally, when the claimant does not initiate
contact within the 45-day charging period, the claim is barred for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.” Shiver v. Chertoff, 549 F.3d 1342, 1344 (11th
Cir. 2008). If the employee shows that he was not notified or otherwise aware of
the time limits, then he may seek an extension of the 45-day period. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.105(a)(2). The Supreme Court has held that “filing a timely charge of
discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal
court, but a prerequisite that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver,
estoppel, and equitable tolling.”5 Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S.
5To the extent that Tarmas claims he is entitled to equitable tolling because he was unaware
of the discrimination until August 2005, that claim fails. Tarmas had been experiencing difficulties
with the call-out requirements and requests for accommodations as early as 2003. Beginning in
2003, Tarmas routinely challenged his supervisor’s decisions regarding his leave, his requested
transfers, and his requested flexible schedule. He cannot now claim that he was unaware that he
might have a claim for discrimination.
10
385, 393 (1982).
Here, Tarmas first contacted an EEOC counselor on August 15, 2005.
Thus, any employment action that occurred more than 45 days prior to August 15,
2005 is untimely. To circumvent this 45-day requirement, Tarmas alleges that the
discriminatory acts were ongoing violations. But this claim fails; the acts of which
Tarmas complains were all single and discrete acts and did not constitute
continuing violations. Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 516 F.3d 955, 970 (11th
Cir. 2008).
In another effort to circumvent the exhaustion time period, Tarmas argues
that his claims were timely under the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 (the
Act), Pub. L. 111-2, 123 Stat 5(2009). The Act was intended to “clarify that a
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice that is unlawful under such
Acts occurs each time compensation is paid pursuant to the discriminatory
compensation decision or other practice, and for other purposes.” Pub. L. 111-2,
123 Stat. 5 (2009). The Act was a direct response to the Supreme Court’s decision
in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), which imposed
a more restrictive interpretation of the limitations period for challenging
discrimination in pay. “The Act amends [the Rehabilitation Act] by providing that
the statute of limitations for filing an EEOC charge alleging pay discrimination
11
resets with each paycheck affected by a discriminatory decision.” Groesch v. City
of Springfield, Ill., 635 F.3d 1020, 1024 (7th Cir. 2011). Under the Act, an
“unlawful employment practice” occurs in the following situations: (1) “when a
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is adopted,” (2) “when an
individual becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or other
practice,” and (3) “when an individual is affected by application of a
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, including each time
wages, benefits, or other compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in part from
such a decision or other practice.” Id. at 1024-25 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e–5(e)(3)(A)). The Act did not, however, alter the limitations period for
discrete employment actions. See Noel v. The Boeing Co., 622 F.3d 266, 271 (3d
Cir. 2010).
Although this court has yet to address the issue, we conclude that we need
not do so here because Tarmas failed to raise the issue of discrimination in pay
before the district court. A review of Tarmas’s complaint shows that he alleged
that each denial of leave time and each refusal to transfer him was an unlawful
employment action under the Rehabilitation Act; he did not argue that each denial
impacted his compensation or benefits. See, e.g. Noel, 622 F.3d at 272-73(explaining that the Act does not apply to failure-to-promote claims). Therefore,
12
because Tarmas raises this argument for the first time on appeal, we decline to
address it.6 Accordingly, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that any
actions outside the 45-day window were untimely.
B. Discrimination Claims
When, as here, summary judgment is granted based on circumstantial
evidence, we analyze the case using the shifting framework set out in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see Wright v. Southland Corp., 187
F.3d 1287, 1305 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that the McDonnell Douglas analytic
framework applies to retaliation claims).7 Under this analysis, the plaintiff bears
the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case. Pennington v. City of
Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001). Once a plaintiff has established
a prima facie case, the employer then has an opportunity to articulate a legitimate,
6
We note that other circuits to address the issue have not applied Tarmas’s interpretation.
See Noel, 622 F.3d at 273, n.6 (holding that the Act was designed to address discrimination in
compensation but not other types of employment discrimination); see also Schuler v.
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 595 F.3d 370, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Galera v. Johanns, 612 F.3d
8, 12 n.8 (1st Cir. 2010) (discussing the timeliness of discrete acts of discrimination such as
termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, and refusal to hire). Notably, the Eleventh Circuit
has also defined “discrimination in compensation” in the same manner as the D.C. Circuit,
MacPherson v. Univ. of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766, 774 (11th Cir. 1991), implying that the Act
would not apply to Tarmas’s claims.
7
We apply the same standards under the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, and Title VII and uses
the same framework to analyze these claims as it does for a claim under Title VII. Ellis v. England,
432 F.3d 1321, 1323-24 (11th Cir. 2005); Sutton v. Lader, 185 F.3d 1203, 1207 n.5 (11th Cir. 1999).
Thus, cases involving the ADA are precedent for those involving the Rehabilitation Act. Cash v.
Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000); see also 29 U.S.C. § 794(d).
13
non-retaliatory reason for the challenged employment action. Id. If the employer
proffers such an explanation, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s explanation is merely a pretext.
Id. A claimant cannot establish pretext by simply demonstrating facts that suggest
discrimination or retaliation, but must specifically respond to each of the
employer’s explanations and rebut them. Crawford v. City of Fairburn, Ga., 482
F.3d 1305, 1309 (11th Cir. 2007). A reason is not pretextual unless it is shown
both that the reason was false, and that discrimination or retaliation was the real
reason. Brooks, 446 F.3d at 1163. If “the proffered reason is one that might
motivate a reasonable employer, an employee must meet that reason head on and
rebut it, and the employee cannot succeed by simply quarreling with the wisdom
of that reason,” or showing that the decision was based on erroneous facts.
Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
“To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the [Rehabilitation]
Act, an individual must show that (1) he has a disability; (2) he is otherwise
qualified for the position; and (3) he was subjected to unlawful discrimination as
the result of his disability.” Sutton v. Lader, 185 F.3d 1203, 1207-08 (11th Cir.
1999). To establish the third element, an individual must show that he has
suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability. Doe v. Dekalb
14
Cnty. Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1445 (11th Cir. 1998). It is not enough for a
plaintiff to demonstrate that an adverse employment action was based partly on his
disability. See McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1074 (11th Cir.
1996). Rather, under the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must prove that he
suffered an adverse employment action “solely by reason of” his handicap. 29
U.S.C. § 794(a). An adverse action is one that causes a “serious and material
change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” and is viewed from
whether a reasonable employee would find the action to constitute a serious and
material change. Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1238–39 (11th Cir.
2001).
In this case, the district court properly concluded that Tarmas had not shown
discrimination in connection with the call-out requirement on August 10, 2005, the
denial of leave of August 15 and 16, 2005, and the letter of caution.8 Even
assuming that Tarmas has a disability,9 the events of which Tarmas complains
8
We may affirm on any grounds supported by the record, even if those grounds differ from
those given by the district court. CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, 325 F.3d 1236, 1244
(11th Cir. 2003).
9
Under the ADA, a person is disabled if, inter alia, he suffers from a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B); Garrett v. Univ.
of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trustees, 507 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007). The statute does not
define major life activity, but the EEOC regulations list tasks such as walking, talking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). In 2009, Congress
passed amendments to the ADA, known as the ADAAA, which expanded coverage. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102. Although Tarmas urges this court to apply the ADAAA’s definition of disability, this court
15
were not adverse actions or were not based on his disability. The record shows
that the Secretary gave Tarmas liberal leave to accommodate his medical
condition, but that Tarmas was dissatisfied with the schedule imposed. Tarmas’s
supervisors explained that the decision to discuss leave time with Tarmas and the
basis for their concern that he was abusing leave was related to the inability of the
department to schedule meetings because there was no certainty as to when
Tarmas would be at work. Thus, the decision to shift Tarmas back to a definite
work schedule, when viewed from the reasonable employee perspective, was not a
serious and material change to Tarmas’s working conditions.
As to the letter of caution, the Navy’s own handbook indicates that a letter
of caution is non-disciplinary. And the letter Tarmas received explicitly stated
that it was non-disciplinary and would not be considered in any future disciplinary
actions. Tarmas did not experience any changes in the terms or conditions of his
employment as a result of this letter. In light of this, it cannot be said that the
letter was an adverse employment action.
B. Retaliation
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff may show that:
has never held that the ADAAA is retroactively applicable. Other circuits have concluded that the
amendments are not retroactively applicable. See Kemp v. Holder, 613 F.3d 231 (5th Cir. 2010);
Becerril v. Pima Cnty. Assessor’s Office, 587 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2009).
16
(1) he engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) he suffered a materially
adverse employment action; and (3) there was some causal relationship between
the two events. Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1277 (11th Cir.
2008). There is no dispute that the filing of a claim with the EEOC is a
“statutorily protected activity.” See id.Regarding an adverse action, a “plaintiff must show that a reasonable
employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse.” Burlington
N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006). The acts must be
material and significant and not trivial. Id. at 68. In addition, a materially adverse
action is one that “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination.”10 Id. (quotation omitted). Further, “the
significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the particular
circumstances. Context matters.” Id. at 69.
To show a causal relationship, Tarmas must show that the decision-maker
was aware of the protected activity, and that the protected activity and the adverse
action were not wholly unrelated. Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 587
(11th Cir. 2000).
10
The term adverse action is broader in the retaliation context than in the racial
discrimination context. Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 973–74 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)).
17
Here, we conclude that Tarmas failed to satisfy the prima facie case.
Tarmas has not shown that the email citing poor job performance was a materially
adverse action. Receiving this email did not dissuade Tarmas from filing and
pursuing his discrimination complaint. Moreover, considering the letter in
context, there was nothing retaliatory about a supervisor notifying an employee of
problems with his work. In any event, after he received the letter, Tarmas also
received an acceptable performance review, and he has since received several cash
bonuses.
Additionally, Tarmas cannot establish a causal connection. Although the
general rule is that close temporal proximity between the protected activity and the
adverse action is sufficient to establish the causal connection, Brungart v.
BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 799 (11th Cir. 2000), Tarmas still must
show that the decision-maker was aware of his protected activity. Here, there was
no evidence that Wojtyla knew of Tarmas’s EEOC complaint when he sent the
September email. Thus, although Tarmas received the email only about two
weeks after he spoke with the EEOC, there is no evidence in the record that
Wojtyla knew of the complaint.11
11
It appears from the record that the EEOC counselor did not contact Wojtyla until
September 13.
18
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court.
AFFIRMED.
19