Randal P. Fornes v. Osceola County Sheriff's

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
May 4, 2006
No. 05-14681 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-01124-CV-ORL-31-DAB
RANDAL P. FORNES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
OSCEOLA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(May 4, 2006)
Before ANDERSON, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Randal P. Fornes appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
the Osceola County Sheriff’s Office (“OCSO”) in his Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”) action, which was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of OCSO based on its
finding that Fornes could not meet the first prong of his prima facie case by
showing that he had a disability. On appeal, Fornes first asserts that he met the
first prong of his prima facie case for the following reasons. Fornes argues that he
was substantially limited in the major life activity of “caring for himself” and
“running.” Fornes contends that his impairment, chronic inflammatory
demyelinating polyneuropathy (“CIDP”), substantially limited these major life
activities because his impairment is permanent or long term. Also, Fornes argues
that OCSO “regarded” him as having a disability and that it had a “record of his
disability.” Second, Fornes contends that he met the second prong of his prima
facie case–that he was a “qualified individual”–because he could perform the
essential functions of a “technical service sergeant,” and was not required to
perform the essential functions of a “law enforcement agent” generally.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
viewing the materials presented and drawing all factual inferences in a light most
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favorable to the non-moving party.” D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d
1220, 1225 (11th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is properly granted when “there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact” and “the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). “The movant bears the burden
of demonstrating the satisfaction of this standard, by presenting pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any that establish the absence of any genuine, material factual
dispute.” D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1225 (quotation omitted).
II. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Background
The ADA provides that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). For claims under the ADA, a
burden-shifting analysis is used. Hilburn v. Murata Elecs. N. Am., Inc., 181 F.3d
1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 1999).
Since the district court granted summary judgment at the first stage of the
burden-shifting procedure–the prima facie case–we will focus only on that stage of
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the analysis. To establish a prima facie case under the ADA, the employee must
show “that (1) he has a disability, (2) he is a ‘qualified individual,’ which is to say,
able to perform the essential functions of the employment position that he holds or
seeks with or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) the defendant unlawfully
discriminated against him because of the disability.” Reed v. Heil Co., 206 F.3d
1055, 1061 (11th Cir. 2000).
B. First Prong of the Prima Facie Case – Disability
The ADA defines disability as: “(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual; (B) a
record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). The term “major life activities” is defined as
“functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). The
Supreme Court has held that these terms need to be interpreted strictly to create a
demanding standard for qualifying as disabled. Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky,
Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197, 122 S.Ct. 681, 691, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002).
The district court held that Fornes failed to establish this first prong of the
prima facie case. Fornes argued that he was substantially limited in the major life
activity of running. The district court held that running was not a major life
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activity. We need not decide this issue, because even if running is a major life
activity, Fornes fails to establish the second prong, that he is a “qualified
individual.”1
C. Second Prong of the Prima Facie Case – “Qualified Individual”
For the second prong of a prima facie case, the ADA prohibits employment
discrimination against a “qualified individual with a disability,” defined as an
“individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual
holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). If the individual “is unable to perform an
essential function of his . . . job, even with an accommodation, he is, by definition,
not a ‘qualified individual’ and, therefore, not covered under the ADA.” Davis v.
Fla. Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000). “In other words,
the ADA does not require [the employer] to eliminate an essential function of [the
plaintiff’s] job.” Id. (citation omitted).
“Whether a function is essential is evaluated on a case-by-case basis by
examining a number of factors.” Id., 205 F.3d at 1305. In making this
determination, the statute provides, “consideration shall be given to the employer’s
1
In reviewing a district court’s grant of summary judgment, we may affirm on any
adequate ground, regardless of the ground the district court relied upon. See Parks v. City of
Warner Robins, 43 F.3d 609, 613 (11th Cir. 1995).
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judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has
prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the
job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the
job.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); see also Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, 112 F.3d
1522, 1526 (11th Cir. 1997). Factors to consider under the ADA include,
(1) the amount of time spent on the job performing the function, (2)
the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the
function, (3) the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, (4) the
work experience of past incumbents in the job, and (5) the current
work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.
Davis, 205 F.3d at 1305 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)).
Fornes and OCSO skirmish over whether this court should look to the job
requirements of a deputy sheriff generally, or to those of a technical services
sergeant, which was Fornes’s particular assignment when he was terminated.
Fornes, however, cannot establish that he is a “qualified individual” even if the
essential functions of his job are limited to those of a technical service sergeant.
Fornes contends that the essential functions of his job are limited to those of
technical service sergeant as described in OCSO’s job description. Fornes is
correct that the job description used by OCSO should be given consideration in
determining the essential functions of a position. See Holbrook, 112 F.3d at 1526.
However, Fornes’s focus on only part of the job description–the limited
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importance of running–is misplaced. Regardless of the low import of running,
there are essential functions in the job description he could not perform, namely,
standing for a prolonged period and heavy lifting. In the official job description
standing received an “extremely-important” ranking and heavy lifting received an
“important” ranking. According to Dr. Littel’s note, based on information that
Fornes provided him, Fornes could not perform these activities. Dr. Littel’s note
stated that Fornes was restricted from running, standing for long periods, heavy
lifting, and repetitive actions. Therefore, even assuming that Fornes need only
perform the essential functions of a technical service sergeant, he still could not
perform all of these functions.
In conclusion, looking at the record in the light most favorable to Fornes, we
conclude that Fornes’s inability to run, stand for prolonged periods, or lift heavy
objects shows he was not a qualified individual with a disability. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.2
2
Appellant’s request for oral argument is DENIED.
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