United States v. Ronnie Lee Williams

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
_____________________________U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 9, 2006
No. 05-13699
THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar
CLERK
____________________________
D.C. Docket No. 97-00003-CR-5
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RONNIE LEE WILLIAMS,
a.k.a. “Too Death”,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
_______________________________________
(May 9, 2006)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, CARNES and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant-Appellant Ronnie Williams, a federal prisoner, appeals pro se the
district court’s denial of his post-conviction motion requesting grand jury
transcripts. No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
Williams was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1997 for a drug conspiracy
offense. We affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. In September
2000, Williams filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate sentence; that motion
was denied.1
Williams filed the instant motion requesting grand jury transcripts pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (the Jencks Act)2 and Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(3)(E).3 Williams
stated that he needed the requested grand jury testimony of certain named
government witnesses so that he could “file a second/successive [§ 2255 motion],
1
A claim raised in Williams’s section 2255 motion asserted ineffective assistance of counsel
based on his trial counsel’s failure to cross-examine and impeach witnesses who, according to
Williams, presented false testimony. The section 2255 motion was denied: the district court
concluded that trial counsel’s decision was a permissible tactical decision. We refused to issue
Williams a certificate of appealability in his habeas proceeding. The grand jury transcripts sought
by Williams in the instant motion is for witness testimony that Williams focused upon in his
unsuccessful section 2255 ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
2
Williams’s reliance on the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, is misplaced. The Jencks Act governs
demands for production of witness statements and reports in a criminal proceeding. The purpose of
the Jencks Act is to enable the defense in a criminal proceeding to impeach a government witness
during cross-examination. See United States v. Prieto, 505 F.2d 8, 11 (5th Cir. 1974).
3
Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(3)(E) authorizes disclosure of grand jury matters under narrowly prescribed
circumstances.
2
and/or a [Fed.R.Civ.P.] 60(b) motion, which [would] allow [him] to move forward
in his litigation.” According to Williams, these witnesses presented false
testimony before the grand jury and at trial.
The general rule is that grand jury proceedings are to be kept secret. See
United States v. Aisenberg, 358 F.3d 1327, 1346 (11th Cir. 2004). Limited
exception to the general rule may apply when the grand jury matter is sought
“preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding.” Fed.R.Crim.P.
6(e)(3)(E)(i). A party seeking grand jury transcripts bears the burden of showing
that (1) the material sought is needed to avoid a possible injustice in another
judicial proceeding; (2) the need for disclosure outweighs the need for continued
secrecy; and (3) the request is structured to embrace only necessary material.
Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 99 S.Ct. 1667, 1674 (1979);
United Kingdom v. United States, 238 F.3d 1312, 1320-21 (11th Cir. 2001)
(quoting the Douglas Oil Co. standard). “These same demanding standards apply
even after the grand jury has concluded its operations.” Aisenberg, 358 F.3d at
1348. The defendant seeking grand jury material must show a “particularized
need;” generalized allegations will not suffice. United States v. Burke, 856 F.2d
1492, 1496 (11th Cir. 1988).
3
The district court concluded that Williams’s motion satisfied his burden on
none of the criteria applicable to his request. We agree. We need only address the
first: whether the materials sought were needed to avoid injustice in another
judicial proceeding. As the district court noted, Williams is involved in no other
judicial proceeding. And, even accepting that Williams claims to need these
materials to seek post-conviction relief, Williams fails to show how the requested
information supports the availability of such relief. To file a second or successive
habeas petition, authorization is required from the Court of Appeals, 28 U.S.C. §
2244(b)(3), and such authorization may only be granted upon a showing of (i)
newly discovered evidence sufficient to establish that no reasonable jury would
have convicted Defendant; or (ii) a new rule of constitutional law made
retroactively applicable on collateral review. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Williams made no
showing that the grand jury materials -- which involved no newly discovered
evidence4 and implicate no new rule of constitutional law -- could make available
to him permission to file a second or successive habeas petition.
Williams’s reliance on Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) also is unavailing. “Rule 60(b)
simply does not provide for relief from judgment in a criminal case.” United
4
The government represents that copies of the grand jury transcripts were supplied to Williams’s
trial counsel in 1997 as part of the government’s discovery disclosures; the transcripts are not “newly
discovered” evidence.
4
States v. Fair, 326 F.3d 1317, 1318 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations and
citation omitted). Williams misapprehends Gonzalez v. Crosby, 125 S.Ct. 2641(2005), when he argues that, in Gonzalez, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
availability of Rule 60(b) relief from a criminal judgment. Instead, under very
limited circumstances, Gonzalez recognizes the availability of Rule 60(b) to
challenge a civil judgment in a habeas case. Williams proposes to use the
requested grand jury transcripts to challenge his underlying criminal conviction;
Rule 60(b) has no application.
AFFIRMED.
5