Michael Anderson v. Al Solomon

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 9, 2006
No. 05-15616 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 03-00257-CV-5-MMP-EMT
MICHAEL ANDERSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
AL SOLOMAN,
Warden,
CHARLIE CRIST,
Respondents-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(June 9, 2006)
Before BLACK, BARKETT and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Anderson appeals pro se the denial of his petition for writ of habeas
corpus. The district court granted a certificate of appealability on the issue of
whether Anderson “was afforded an adequate opportunity to present his witnesses
at the disciplinary hearing.” Because we find Anderson failed to show the decision
of the state court was “contrary to” or “an unreasonable application of” Supreme
Court precedent, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), we affirm.
On July 15, 2002, Anderson, a prisoner of the state of Florida, was issued a
disciplinary report for disobeying the verbal order of a corrections officer while on
a work assignment. In preparation for his disciplinary hearing, Anderson requested
that several witnesses to the incident be interviewed. Before the hearing,
corrections officers collected short statements from the inmates identified by
Anderson. Several of these statements were favorable to Anderson’s defense that
the corrections officers singled him out, but others supported the officers’ position.
At the disciplinary hearing, Anderson was found guilty of the charge. As
punishment, Anderson received 30 days of disciplinary confinement, and he
forfeited 30 days of “gain time.”
Anderson filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in Florida state court that
sought to invalidate the decision of the disciplinary board and to restore his gain
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time. Among other things, Anderson argued that the prison officials denied him
the opportunity to interview witnesses because the officers who collected the
statements “harassed and/or hurried” the witnesses. Anderson alleged that the
corrections officers watched over the witnesses while they wrote their statements,
made comments to them about what they wrote down, and limited their statements
to two or three sentences. The state court denied Anderson’s petition, and a
Florida appellate court affirmed.
Anderson then filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district
court. The magistrate judge found that the procedures used by the corrections
officers to collect statements satisfied the requirements of Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 94 S. Ct. 2963 (1974). Anderson objected on the ground that the
state court failed to apply Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 105 S. Ct. 2192 (1985), but
the district court adopted the findings of the magistrate judge. The district court
granted Anderson a certificate of appealability on the question whether the
allegedly inadequate procedure for taking witness statements violated Ponte.
When reviewing the denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus, we review
“the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions and
mixed questions of law and fact de novo.” Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d 1288, 1295
(11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Fugate v. Head, 261 F.3d 1206, 1215 (11th Cir. 2001)).
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Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, a writ of habeas corpus
may not issue unless the state court adjudication “resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “resulted in a
decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Anderson argues that, because the state court failed to apply Ponte, its decision was
“contrary to” or “an unreasonable application of” Supreme Court precedent. We
disagree.
Ponte does not govern this appeal. In Ponte, the prisoner called several
witnesses to testify at his disciplinary hearing, but the board “declined to call” all
but one of those witnesses. 471 U.S. at 493, 105 S. Ct. at 2194. The Court held
that “prison officials may be required to explain, in a limited manner, the reason
why witnesses were not allowed to testify.” Id. at 497, 105 S. Ct. at 2196(emphasis added).
In this appeal, Anderson was not denied the opportunity to call witnesses.
As Anderson concedes, statements were taken from several witnesses at his
request, and these statements were considered as evidence at his disciplinary
hearing. Several of these statements were favorable to his defense. The decision
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of the Florida courts that Anderson had not been denied due process was not an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d);
Hawkins v. Alabama, 318 F.3d 1302, 1306-07 n.3 (11th Cir. 2003). The order of
the district court that denied Anderson’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is
AFFIRMED.
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