Wilson v. Dollar-Thrifty Auto Group-South Fla Transport

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
July 3, 2008
No. 07-15403 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-61207-CV-JIC
PHILIP ANDREW WILSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DOLLAR-THRIFTY AUTO GROUP-SOUTH FLA TRANSPORT,
d.b.a. Thrify Car Rental,
OFFICE OF BROWARD COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER,
Assistant Public Defender, Madeline Torres,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(July 3, 2008)
Before BLACK, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Philip Andrew Wilson appeals pro se the district court’s sua sponte
dismissal of his pro se complaint against Dollar-Thrifty Auto Group and Madeline
Torres for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). In his complaint, Wilson raised constitutional claims
under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, and state law claims
pursuant to the district court’s supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Wilson alleged Dollar-Thrifty violated his constitutional rights by falsely reporting
he had stolen a rental car when he failed to return the car on the date it was due. In
addition, he alleged Torres, a public defender who represented Wilson in the
ensuing criminal case, violated his constitutional rights by failing to provide
adequate representation. The district court dismissed his constitutional claims
against Dollar-Thrifty as barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and also
because Dollar-Thrifty was not acting under color of state law. The court
dismissed Wilson’s constitutional claims against Torres on the ground she was
entitled to qualified immunity. After dismissing the claims over which it had
original jurisdiction, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Wilson’s remaining state law claims.
Wilson asserts Dollar-Thrifty must have been acting under the color of state
law to have escaped accountability for falsely reporting he had stolen a rental car,
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and Dollar-Thrifty has contracted with the state to allow for the use of the “sun
pass system” in its rental cars. Further, he contends Torres is not entitled to
qualified immunity, because she violated his rights to effective assistance of
counsel, due process, and a jury trial. Finally, he contends the court should not
have dismissed his pendant state claims, because federal courts can intervene when
a state deprives an individual of his constitutional rights.
We review the district court’s dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) de novo,
taking as true the allegations in the complaint. Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249,
1252 (11th Cir. 2008). The court shall dismiss an in forma pauperis action at any
time “if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim
on which relief may be granted . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). “The
standards governing dismissals under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6)
apply to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).” Alba, 517 F.3d at 1252. In addition, “pro se
pleadings are held to a less strict standard than pleadings filed by lawyers and thus
are construed liberally.” Id.
“To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove (1) a
violation of a constitutional right, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law.” Holmes v. Crosby, 418 F.3d 1256,
1258 (11th Cir. 2005). “We have employed three distinct tests in determining
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whether the actions of a private entity are properly attributed to the state.” Focus
on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority, 344 F.3d 1263, 1277 (11th
Cir. 2003). These tests include: “(1) the public function test; (2) the state
compulsion test; and (3) the nexus/joint action test.” Id. (quoting Willis v. Univ.
Health Services, Inc., 993 F.2d 837, 840 (11th Cir. 1993)).
The public function test limits state action to instances where private
actors are performing functions traditionally the exclusive prerogative
of the state. The state compulsion test limits state action to instances
where the government has coerced or at least significantly encouraged
the action alleged to violate the Constitution. The nexus/joint action
test applies where the state has so far insinuated itself into a position
of interdependence with the [private party] that it was a joint
participant in the enterprise.
Id. (quotations omitted). However, “[o]nly in rare circumstances can a private
party be viewed as a ‘state actor’ for [§] 1983 purposes.” Harvey v. Harvey, 949
F.3d 1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1992). “Should we conclude that there is no State
action, we must dismiss the plaintiff’s claim without reaching the qualified
immunity issue.” Rayburn ex rel. Rayburn v. Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341, 1347 (11th
Cir. 2001). To that end, the Supreme Court has held that “a public defender does
not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as
counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”
The court did not err in dismissing Wilson’s complaint for failure to state a
claim with respect to his § 1983 claims against Dollar-Thrifty, because Wilson
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failed to demonstrate Dollar-Thrifty acted under color of state law when it reported
he had stolen a rental car. Nothing in Wilson’s original or amended complaint
suggests either that (1) Dollar-Thrifty was performing a public function, (2) the
state somehow coerced or compelled Dollar-Thrifty to report Wilson had stolen the
rental car, or (3) the state was a joint participant in Dollar-Thrifty’s rental
operations. See Focus on the Family, 344 F.3d at 1277. Accordingly, we affirm
the dismissal of Wilson’s § 1983 claims against Dollar-Thrifty.
In regard to Wilson’s § 1983 claims against Torres, the court dismissed on
the ground she was entitled to qualified immunity. However, before addressing the
issue of qualified immunity, we must first determine whether Torres was a state
actor. See Rayburn, 241 F.3d at 1347. In his original and amended complaints,
Wilson alleged Torres rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, based on his
disagreement with her handling of his criminal case. However, the Supreme Court
has held “a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing
a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”
Polk County v. Dodson, 102 S. Ct. 445, 453 (1981). As a result, Wilson has failed
to demonstrate Torres acted under color of state law in her capacity as public
defender. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of Wilson’s § 1983 claims against
Torres. See Consol. Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286, 1288 (11th Cir.
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2000) (stating this Court may affirm “on any adequate grounds, including grounds
other than those upon which the district court actually relied”).
Moreover, nothing in the record suggests the court abused its discretion in
declining to exercise jurisdiction over Wilson’s remaining state law claims against
Dollar-Thrifty and Torres, and we “have encouraged district courts to dismiss any
remaining state claims when, as here, the federal claims have been dismissed . . . .”
Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088 (11th Cir. 2004). Therefore, we
affirm the dismissal of his pendant state claims.
The district court did not err in dismissing Wilson’s constitutional claims
against Dollar-Thrifty and Torres because neither party acted under color of state
law. Moreover, the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Wilson’s remaining state law claims.1
AFFIRMED.
1
As an additional matter, Wilson also asserted claims against Dollar-Thrifty and Torres
under § 1985. The district court did not specifically address these claims in its order dismissing
Wilson’s complaint with prejudice, the order from which Wilson now appeals. Moreover, Wilson
raises no issue on appeal with regard to his claims under § 1985. Therefore, he has abandoned his
§ 1985 claims. See Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1131 n.1 (11th Cir. 2002) (concluding pro se
plaintiff waived claims he did not raise on appeal).
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