Robert M. Cobb v. State of Florida

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
September 11, 2008
No. 08-11413 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 08-00187-CV-ORL-19-DAB
ROBERT M COBB,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
STATE OF FLORIDA,
COUNTY OF BREVARD ,
CHARLIE CRIST,
FLORIDA PROBATION COMMISSION,
MONICA DAVIS,
Chairperson, Fla. Probation Commission,
et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(September 11, 2008)
Before TJOFLAT, ANDERSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Robert Cobb, a prisoner, appeals the dismissal of his pro se civil rights
action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On appeal, he argues the district
court erred in sua sponte dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim under
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Cobb asserts his complaint is not barred by Heck v.
Humphreys, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2372, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994),
because his challenge is to the process used by the State of Florida to determine
whether he violated his probation, not the validity of his probation revocation.
This court reviews a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a suit for failure
to state a claim for relief under § 1915A(b)(1) de novo. Harden v. Pataki,
320 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2003). The complaint’s “[f]actual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007); see also Watts v. Florida
Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007). “The Supreme Court’s most
recent formulation of the pleading specificity standard is that ‘stating such a claim
requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest’ the
required element.” Watts, 495 F.3d at 1295 (quoting Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at
1965). This rule does not “impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage.”
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Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965. Instead, the standard “simply calls for enough fact
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of the
required element. Id. “It is sufficient if the complaint succeeds in ‘identifying
facts that are suggestive enough to render [the element] plausible.’” Watts, 495
F.3d at 1296 (quoting Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965). In reviewing the dismissal
of a complaint under the 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), this court accepts allegations in
the complaint as true, and pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Brown v.
Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1350 (11th Cir. 2004).
A plaintiff cannot win relief under § 1983 if “a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.”
Heck 512 U.S. at 487, 114 S.Ct. at 2372; see Abella v. Rubino, 63 F.3d 1063,
1064-1065 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding, in an action under Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29
L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971), that plaintiff’s argument that the defendants fabricated
testimony was barred under Heck because “[j]udgment in favor of Abella on these
claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.” (quotation
omitted)). A plaintiff may only proceed after showing “that the conviction or
sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
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question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S.
at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. at 2372. However, the plaintiff may proceed under § 1983
when “the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity
of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff . . . in the absence of
some other bar to the suit.” Id., 114 S.Ct. at 2372-73; see Hughes v. Lott,
350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining that “an illegal search or arrest
may be followed by a valid conviction, [and therefore] a successful § 1983 action
for Fourth Amendment search and seizure violations does not necessarily imply the
invalidity of a conviction.”).
Upon review of the district court record and Cobb’s brief, we discern no
error. The district court correctly dismissed Cobb’s complaint because the
necessary implication of a grant of relief would be that Cobb’s probation
revocation is invalid. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED
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