United States v. Quinton K. Copeland

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUL 11, 2006
No. 05-14480 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-00094-CR-FTM-33-DNF
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
QUINTON K. COPELAND,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(July 11, 2006)
Before BLACK, BARKETT and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Quinton K. Copeland appeals his conviction and sentence for conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute Methylenedioxymethamphetamine, (“MDMA” or
“ecstasy”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. On appeal, Copeland first
argues that the district court erred when it admitted his co-defendant Ryan Martin’s
testimony that Martin had previously distributed cocaine and marijuana for
Copeland, and that when he became indebted to Copeland as a result of those prior
dealings, he agreed, at Copeland’s request, to receive a package of MDMA for
Copeland. Copeland argues that this testimony was overly prejudicial, was not
necessary to the government’s case, and that it only served to associate him with
cocaine, which biased the jury against him.
Second, Copeland argues that the district court erred by allowing the
government to cross-examine him regarding his knowledge of the club scene in
Miami and the presence there of ecstasy. Specifically, Copeland argues that the
testimony introduced a stereotype about Miami that biased the jurors against him
unfairly and may have caused them to convict him on that basis. He further argues
that there was no evidence that Fort Myers, where the offense conduct occurred,
could not have provided sufficient demand for the shipment of ecstasy.
Finally, Copeland argues that the district court erred by attributing 300
additional ecstasy pills to him where this drug amount was based solely on
Martin’s testimony which was unreliable, as it was “erratic” and Martin admitted
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to “puffing” his numbers for the authorities.
I.
We review challenges to the district court’s rulings on admission of evidence
for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Jiminez, 224 F.3d 1243, 1249 (11th
Cir. 2000).
Evidence showing “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would [otherwise] be” is “[r]elevant evidence,” and “[a]ll relevant evidence is
[generally] admissible” at trial. Fed. R. Evid. 401 & 402. While Federal Rule of
Evidence 404 restricts the admission of evidence of “other crimes committed
outside of those charged[,] . . . other crimes evidence may be admissible if it is
inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense.” United
States v. Fortenberry, 971 F.2d 717, 721 (11th Cir. 1992).
Evidence, not part of the crime charged but pertaining to the chain of
events explaining the context, motive and set-up of the crime, is
properly admitted if linked in time and circumstances with the
charged crime, or forms an integral and natural part of an account of
the crime, or is necessary to complete the story of the crime for the
jury.
United States v. Williford, 764 F.2d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir. 1985). This evidence is
nevertheless inadmissible “if its probative value ‘is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice’” under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Fortenberry,
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971 F.2d at 721 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403).
Copeland challenges Martin’s testimony that detailed Martin’s version of
how he met Copeland and how he claimed to have received a package of ecstasy
pills meant for Copeland. Martin could not have clearly described his relationship
with Copeland, his own drug dependency, and the reason that he became indebted
to Copeland without discussing Copeland’s alleged trafficking of marijuana,
cocaine, and ecstasy. Accordingly, the district court properly found that this
testimony was inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged
offense.
Further, this testimony was highly probative. The court analyzed the issue
and found that it was not unfairly prejudicial. Accordingly, the district court did
not err by admitting this evidence.
II.
We review the district court’s management of cross-examination for clear
abuse of discretion. United States v. Jones, 913 F.2d 1552, 1564 (11th Cir. 1990).
“Cross-examination should be limited to the subject matter of the direct
examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The court may, in
the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct
examination.” Fed. R. Evid. 611(b). “The trial court has broad discretion under
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Rule 611(b) to determine the permissible scope of cross-examination . . . .” Jones,
913 F.2d at 1564.
On cross-examination, Copeland admitted that Miami had more clubs than
Fort Myers, that clubs tended to have more drugs, and that, accordingly, Miami
was a larger drug market. Copeland, however, denied knowing anything about
ecstasy, denied knowing if ecstasy was prevalent at clubs, and denied ever selling
ecstasy. This testimony was relevant to the issue of Copeland’s intent to distribute
the MDMA Martin had received because both Copeland and Martin had testified
that Copeland was from Miami and had ties to that city, and Martin testified that
Copeland had sold ecstasy in Miami. The court did not abuse its discretion by
allowing the cross-examination.
Moreover, Copeland’s argument that the information would prejudice him
was that it would associate him, in the minds of the jurors, with negative
stereotypes about Miami. Such a stereotype, however, would not have been
necessary for the jury to convict Copeland. Martin’s testimony was that Copeland
was an ecstasy dealer in Fort Myers and Miami. The jury also heard the secret
recording of Martin’s conversation with Copeland, suggesting that Copeland was
involved in narcotics. Further, the government presented evidence of Copeland’s
attempt to get Martin’s father to encourage Martin to keep quiet after Martin’s
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arrest. Finally, Copeland admitted to being a drug dealer. Thus, even if the court
did err, that error was harmless and would not warrant reversal. See Fortenberry,
971 F.2d at 722.
III.
We review a determination of drug quantity for clear error. United States v.
Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2935, 162 L.
Ed 2d 866 (2005). “Although sentencing may be based on fair, accurate, and
conservative estimates of the quantity of drugs attributable to a defendant,
sentencing cannot be based on calculations of drug quantities that are merely
speculative.” United States v. Zapata, 139 F.3d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 1998) (per
curiam). Additionally, “[t]he credibility of a witness is in the province of the
factfinder and this court will not ordinarily review the factfinder’s determination of
credibility.” United States v. Copeland, 20 F.3d 412, 413 (11th Cir. 1994) (per
curiam).
In addition to the full weight of the second, seized package of ecstasy, the
PSI attributed “at least 300 MDMA pills that Martin received from a previous
shipment” to Copeland. Copeland argued that the 300 pills should not be added
because of Martin’s unreliability as a witness. The government, responding in
kind, told the court that even if Martin’s numbers had fluctuated, a conservative
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estimate based upon Martin’s testimony supported a finding of 300 additional pills.
Finally, when the court asked the probation officer about the number, her response
was that she had used the “conservative amount” represented in the discovery
materials. Accordingly, the court overruled Copeland’s objection.
Although the court did not specifically address the reliability of Martin’s
testimony, its ruling used the smallest quantity that Martin claimed to have been in
the first shipment. In combination with the known amount of the seized package,
this was a “fair, accurate, and conservative” estimate of the ecstasy properly
attributable to Copeland and was not speculative. Zapata, 139 F.3d at 1359.
Therefore, the district court did not err. See Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1294, 1297
(affirming sentence for 30,000 ecstasy pills based on testimony that 25,000 to
50,000 pills had been involved in the offense).
AFFIRMED.
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