United States v. Jason Jermaine Lee

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUG 1, 2006
No. 05-15228 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00031-CR-CAP-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JASON JERMAINE LEE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(August 1, 2006)
Before TJOFLAT, BIRCH and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jason Jermaine Lee appeals his convictions after pleading guilty to
possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(iii), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Lee asserts the district court abused its discretion
by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowing and
voluntary. He contends the plea was not knowing and voluntary because he did
not understand the plea agreement would subject him to the application of the
career offender guideline range. We conclude the district court did not abuse its
discretion, and affirm.
“We ‘review the denial of a request to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of
discretion.’” United States v. Brehm, 442 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2006),
(quoting United States v. Freixas, 332 F.3d 1314, 1316 (11th Cir. 2003)). A
decision regarding a plea withdrawal request is not an abuse of discretion unless it
is arbitrary or unreasonable. Id.A district court is required, before it accepts a plea of guilty, to inform the
defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands his rights relevant to
his plea of guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b). After the district court has accepted a
defendant’s plea, but before sentencing, a defendant may withdraw his guilty plea
if he “can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” Fed. R.
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Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). The provisions of this rule should be “liberally construed.”
United States v. McCarty, 99 F.3d 383, 385 (11th Cir. 1996). However, “[t]here is
no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea.” United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d
185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994). “The good faith, credibility and weight of a defendant’s
assertions in support of a motion [to withdraw] are issues for the trial court to
decide.” United States v. Buckles, 843 F.2d 469, 472 (11th Cir. 1988).
In determining if the defendant has met his burden for withdrawal, “a district
court ‘may consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea,’”
including the following factors: “‘(1) whether close assistance of counsel was
available; (2) whether the plea was knowing and voluntary; (3) whether judicial
resources would be conserved; and (4) whether the government would be
prejudiced if the defendant were allowed to withdraw his plea.’” Brehm, 442 F.3d
at 1298 (quoting Buckles, 843 F.2d at 471-72). “There is a strong presumption that
the statements made during the [plea] colloquy are true.” Medlock, 12 F.3d at 187.
Consequently, a defendant “bears a heavy burden to show his statements [under
oath] were false.” United States v. Rogers, 848 F.2d 166, 168 (11th Cir. 1988). “A
plea may be involuntary either because the accused does not understand the nature
of the constitutional protections that he is waiving . . . or because he has such an
incomplete understanding of the charge that his plea cannot stand as an intelligent
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admission of guilt.” Gaddy v. Linahan, 780 F.2d 935, 943 (11th Cir. 1986)
(quotations and citation omitted).
Under the first prong of the analysis, Lee had the close assistance of counsel
who represented him at his plea hearings and sentencing hearing and requested a
continuance after the first plea hearing to further review the plea agreement with
him. In addition, at Lee’s second change of plea hearing, the court inquired twice
whether Lee was satisfied with his attorney’s representation, and each time he
answered affirmatively.
Regarding the second prong, the plea agreement expressly states that Lee
stipulated he was a career offender. At Lee’s first change of plea hearing, the
Government summarized the plea agreement and the career offender provision. At
Lee’s second plea hearing, the Government again summarized the plea agreement
and noted that Lee stipulated he was a career offender, and that the Guidelines
range for career offenders would be applied. Additionally, Lee testified his
attorney discussed the career offender provision with him. At Lee’s sentencing
hearing, he acknowledged he understood the PSI would recommend he be
sentenced as a career offender. In sum, the record reflects Lee understood the
nature of the constitutional protections he was waiving and had a complete
understanding of the charges such that he made an intelligent admission of guilt.
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As Lee has not satisfied the first two prongs of the Buckles analysis, this Court
need not address the last two. We conclude the district court did not abuse its
discretion by denying Lee’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
AFFIRMED.
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