United States v. Ramirez

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APR 4, 2011
Nos. 10-12785, 10-13249 JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 6:09-cr-00045-MSS-KRS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllll lPlaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LUCIO RAMIREZ,
l llllllllllllllllllllDefendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(April 4, 2011)
Before BARKETT, PRYOR and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Lucio Ramirez appeals his convictions for structuring financial transactions
to evade reporting requirements. 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3), (d). Ramirez argues that
the district court abused its discretion in its answer to a question submitted by the
jury. The United States cross-appeals and argues that the district court erred in
failing to order Ramirez to forfeit the entire amount “involved in” his structuring
crime, 31 U.S.C. § 5317(c)(1)(A). We reject the arguments of both Ramirez and
the United States, and we affirm Ramirez’s convictions and the order of forfeiture.
Ramirez argues that an answer of the district court to a question submitted
by the jury was “confus[ing],” but we disagree. During its deliberations, the jury
sent the district court a note that asked whether “structuring mean[t] that
[Ramirez] had to know what a [Currency Transaction Report] form was.” The
district court responded by identifying the statute that Ramirez was accused of
violating, referencing the specific reporting requirement, and naming the form that
banks are obligated to file with the government. See United States v. Elso, 422
F.3d 1305, 1311 (11th Cir. 2005). The district court stated that “Section
5324(a)(3) makes it a federal crime . . . to knowingly evade a currency transaction
reporting requirement”; “Section 5313(a) . . . require[s] domestic financial
institutions and banks . . . to file reports with the government called Currency
Transaction Reports, Form 4789, disclosing” all financial transactions “involving
more than $10,000 in cash or currency”; and Ramirez had to have “knowledge of
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the currency transaction reporting requirements as set forth in . . . Section
5313(a).” The district court did not abuse its discretion in answering the question
of the jury.
The United States argues in its cross-appeal that the district court selected
arbitrarily an amount for Ramirez to forfeit and ignored the requirement that he
forfeit the amount “involved in” his crime, 31 U.S.C. § 5317(c)(1)(A), but we
disagree. The district court considered the amount “involved in” Ramirez’s
structuring crime and determined that a forfeiture of the entire $967,100 would
violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Although the
district court stated that it had “not ma[de] an Eighth Amendment analysis”
because “the [Eighth] Amendment is not drawn on the case until and unless the
Court imposes a fine that violates the [Eighth] Amendment,” the district court
explained that the Eighth Amendment had “informed” its decision “with respect to
what is proper and what is improper.” That this constitutional concern guided the
decision of the district court is apparent from its comments during the forfeiture
hearing and at sentencing. At the conclusion of the forfeiture hearing, the district
court stated that “really the only question” remaining was whether “the
forfeiture/judgment [would be] unconstitutional,” and the district court
commenced the sentencing hearing by stating that it had rejected the “demand for
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forfeiture [of $967,100 that] the [United States] s[ought]” based on how “the
constitutional question inform[ed] the Court’s decision.”
The district court correctly considered whether the amount of forfeiture
sought by the United States would constitute an excessive penalty. The Supreme
Court held in United States v. Bajakajian that a “forfeiture . . . constitutes
punishment and is . . . a ‘fine’ within the meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause”
and should be examined to determine “whether it is excessive.” 524 U.S. 321,
334, 118 S. Ct. 2028, 2036 (1998). In Bajakajian, although the forfeiture statute
mandated that the defendant forfeit “any property . . . involved in” his crime, 18
U.S.C. § 982(a)(1), the Court held that a forfeiture of the entire amount that the
defendant had failed to declare he intended to transport outside the United States
would have been “grossly disproportional to the gravity of his offense.”
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 339–40, 118 S. Ct. at 2039. The Court reasoned that a
forfeiture of $357,144 was unconstitutionally excessive because Bajakajian’s only
crime was failing to report the currency, the currency was not connected to any
illegal activity, Bajakajian faced a maximum sentence of six months and a $5,000
fine under the Sentencing Guidelines, and his crime affected only the ability of the
government to know that the currency had left the United States. Id. at 337–39,
118 S. Ct. at 2038–39.
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The district court did not err when it determined that a forfeiture of the
entire $967,100 involved in Ramirez’s structuring crimes would be excessive and
unconstitutional. Like the defendant in Bajakajian, Ramirez committed a
reporting offense and faced a mandatory forfeiture of “all property . . . involved in
[his] offense,” 31 U.S.C. § 5317(c)(1)(A), but a forfeiture of that magnitude would
be grossly disproportional to Ramirez’s crime. Ramirez structured his financial
transactions to evade reporting requirements, but he did not attempt to conceal his
wrongdoing and his money was not connected to any illegal activity. In addition,
Ramirez faced a fine under the Sentencing Guidelines about 12 times less than the
amount demanded by the forfeiture statute and his crime affected only the Internal
Revenue Service by depriving it of reports from banks about the amounts of
Ramirez’s deposits. The forfeiture of the entire $967,100 would have violated the
Excessive Fines Clause.
We AFFIRM Ramirez’s convictions and the order of forfeiture.
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