Lynnette Andujar Strauss v. Rent-A-Center, Inc.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
FILED
No. 05-16401 & 06-10478 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar July 11, 2006
________________________ THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D.C. Docket No.
04-01133-CV-ORL-22KRS
LYNNETTE ANDUJAR STRAUSS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
RENT-A-CENTER, INC.,
d.b.a. Rent-A-Center,
RENT-A-CENTER EAST, INC.,
f.k.a. Rent-A-Center, Inc.,
d.b.a. Rent-A-Center,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(July 11, 2006)
Before CARNES, PRYOR and COX, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Lynnette Andujar Strauss appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to Defendants Rent-A-Center, Inc., d.b.a Rent-A-Center and Rent-A-
Center East, Inc., f.k.a Rent-A-Center, Inc., d.b.a Rent-A-Center (collectively,
“Rent-A-Center”) on all of Strauss’s claims of retaliation in violation of Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and the Florida Civil
Rights Act of 1992, Fla. Stat. § 760.01 et seq. Strauss also appeals the district
court’s denial of her Rule 60(b) motion for relief from the judgment.
The district court granted summary judgment to Rent-A-Center, holding that
Strauss’s claims were barred by res judicata, accord and satisfaction, and judicial
estoppel. We reverse.
Strauss’s retaliation claims are not barred by res judicata nor by accord and
satisfaction because her claims are distinct from those claims that were settled by
the consent decree entered by the district court in the Southern District of Illinois,
on October 11, 2002, in Wilfong, et al. v. Rent-A-Center, Civil Action No. 00-680-
DRH. As to unnamed class members, that consent decree resolves only sex
discrimination and sexual harassment claims; it does not address any retaliation
actions by unnamed class members.
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We also hold that, under the circumstances of this case, application of the
doctrine of judicial estoppel is reversible error. We do not think this is a case
where Strauss’s nondisclosure of her employment action on her Chapter 13
petition was “‘shown to have been calculated to make a mockery of the judicial
system.’” Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1285 (11th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. v. Harvey, M.D., 260 F.3d 1302, 1308 (11th
Cir.2001)). Strauss was not successful in “persuading a tribunal to accept the
earlier position, so that judicial acceptance of the inconsistent position in a later
proceeding creates the perception that either court was misled.” Burnes, 291 F.3d
at 1285 (citing New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750-51, 121 S. Ct. 1808,
1815 (2001)). This is not a case like Barger v. City of Cartersville, Ga., 348 F.3d
1289 (11th Cir. 2003), in which there was evidence that: (1) the debtor
intentionally misled the bankruptcy court as to the existence and then character of
her employment lawsuit, and (2) the debtor’s success at concealing the true
character of her lawsuit from the bankruptcy court resulted in a bankruptcy court
ordered discharge of all her debts. The bankruptcy court never entered any order
discharging any of Strauss’s debts.
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For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
Rent-A-Center is reversed and the action is remanded to the district court. We
need not address Strauss’s appeal of the denial of her Rule 60(b) motion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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