United States v. Miguel Angel Morales-Velazquez

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-15022 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar APRIL 13, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 8:10-cr-00240-RAL-EAJ-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MIGUEL ANGEL MORALES-VELAZQUEZ,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(April 13, 2011)
Before TJOFLAT, HULL and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Miguel Angel Morales-Velazquez appeals his concurrent prison sentences
of 12 months for being found in the United States after having been deported to
Mexico, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § § 1326(a), and for unlawful entry into the
United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § § 1325(a)(1) and 1329. He argues that his
sentences, which constituted an upward variance from the prescribed Guidelines
sentencing range, is procedurally unreasonable because the district court digressed
from the legal standard prescribed by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) when it stated that it
was imposing a sentence that was “more than sufficient” to comply with the
statutory purposes of sentencing, and because the court failed to explain its
reasons for imposing the upward variance. He also argues that his sentences are
substantively unreasonable because the court only considered the need for
deterrence to the exclusion of the other § 3553(a) sentencing factors, i.e.,
purposes, and sentences within the Guidelines sentencing range—two to eight
months’ imprisonment—would have been sufficient to achieve § 3553(a)’s
purposes.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence, including when it is the result
of a § 3553(a) variance, under the abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597, 169 L. Ed. 2d 445 (2007). We “first
ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as
failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the
Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a
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sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the
chosen sentence-including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines
range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. at 597; United States v. Livesay, 525 F.3d
1081, 1093 (11th Cir. 2008). A district court need not expressly discuss each and
every § 3553(a) factor at the time of sentencing, but need only note that it has
considered the defendant’s arguments along with § 3553(a)’s factor. United States
v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786 (11th Cir. 2005). Nevertheless, the court “should set
forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’
arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking
authority.” United States v. Agbai, 497 F.3d 1226, 1230 (11th Cir. 2007)
(quotation omitted). “Sometimes the circumstances will call for a brief
explanation; sometimes they will call for a lengthier explanation.” Rita v. United
States, 551 U.S. 338, 357, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2468, 168 L. Ed. 2d 203 (2007).
Second, we must determine whether the sentence imposed is substantively
reasonable based on the factors in § 3553(a). Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. at
597. Gall instructs that the district court “must make an individualized assessment
based on the facts presented.” Id. at 50, 128 S.Ct. at 597. “The weight to be
accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion
of the district court,” absent a clear error of judgment. United States v. Clay, 483
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F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). However, “a district court’s
unjustified reliance upon any one § 3553(a) factor [may be] a symptom of an
unreasonable sentence.” United States v. Crisp, 454 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir.
2006) (internal quotations omitted) (holding a sentence of five hours’
imprisonment unreasonable when the district court “focused single-mindedly on
the goal of restitution to the detriment of all of the other sentencing factors”).
Moreover, the district court must impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but
not greater than necessary,” to comply with the purposes of sentencing of §
3553(a)(2), namely, to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for
the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, protect the public
from further crimes by the defendant, and provide the defendant with appropriate
correctional treatment or medical care. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). Additionally,
the court must also consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the
history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the
applicable guideline range, the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing
Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to
provide restitution to victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7).
Here, the record reflects that Morales-Velazquez’s sentences are
procedurally reasonable because, despite the district court’s purported
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misstatement—that the sentences were “more than sufficient”—the court applied
the correct legal standard under § 3553(a), and it adequately explained its reasons
for varying upward from the Guidelines sentencing range based on the § 3553(a)
sentencing purposes. The sentence was substantively reasonable because it met
the goals encompassed within § 3553(a), and the record does not indicate that the
court “single-mindedly” focused on the need for deterrence to the detriment of all
the other § 3553(a) factors. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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