Jonathan Benton Clark v. St. Joseph/Candler

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
April 4, 2007
No. 06-14903 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00119-CV-4
JONATHAN BENTON CLARK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ST. JOSEPH/CANDLER HEALTH SYSTEMS,
THE MATTHEW REARDON CENTER ADVANCE ACADEMY,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
_________________________
(April 4, 2007)
Before ANDERSON, BARKETT and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jonathan Benton Clark, pro se, appeals the district court’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of St. Joseph/Candler Health System, Inc. (“St.
Joseph/Candler”) and The Matthew Reardon Center, Inc. (“MRC”) on Clark’s
sexual and racial harassment and retaliation claims, brought pursuant to Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1) and 2000e-3(a) (“Title
VII”).
Clark was employed by MRC, which operates a non-profit school for
neurologically impaired children. Throughout Clark’s employment, St.
Joseph/Candler provided MRC with space on one of its hospital campuses to
operate the school. St. Joseph/Candler also provided payroll services to MRC and
permitted MRC employees to participate in St. Joseph/Candler’s employee benefits
plans.
The district court granted summary judgment after it determined that MRC
was not an “employer” as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), because it did not
employ fifteen or more employees for twenty or more weeks in any year.
Additionally, the district court ruled that MRC and St. Joseph/Candler could not be
considered either a single, integrated employer or joint employers to satisfy the
employee-numerosity requirement.
After review, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary
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judgment to MRC and St. Joseph’s/Candler. The undisputed evidence establishes
that MRC did not employ fifteen or more employees for twenty or more weeks in a
given year. See Llampallas v. Mimi-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1243 (11th
Cir. 1998) (defining “employee” under Title VII as one who receives compensation
from an employer). Furthermore, even construing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Clark, a jury could not reasonably conclude that MRC and St.
Joseph/Candler were “highly integrated with respect to ownership and operations”
such that they could be counted as one employer. See Lyes v. City of Riviera
Beach, 166 F.3d 1332, 1341 (11th Cir. 1999). Nor could a jury reasonably
conclude that St. Joseph’s/Candler retained sufficient control over the terms and
conditions of Clark’s employment such that MRC and St. Joseph’s/Candler were
Clark’s joint employer. See Virgo v. Riviera Beach Assocs., Ltd., 30 F.3d 1350,
1359-60 (11th Cir. 1994). Because Clark failed to establish that his employer
employed the threshold number of fifteen employees, the district court did not err
in granting summary judgment.1
AFFIRMED.
1
We also reject as meritless Clark’s argument that the district court abused its discretion
by consolidating Clark’s Title VII harassment action with his Title VII retaliation action. See
Wright v. Dougherty County, 358 F.3d 1352, 1354 (11th Cir. 2004).
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