Brooks v. Secretary, Department of Corrections

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCT 23, 2006
No. 06-11170 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00057-CV-J-32-MMH
FRED LORENZO BROOKS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
FLORIDA ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondents-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(October 23, 2006)
Before BLACK, CARNES and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Florida prisoner Fred Lorenzo Brooks appeals the district court’s denial of
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as
barred by the one-year statute of limitations of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996),
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). On May 25, 2000, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed
Brooks’ conviction, but remanded the case for resentencing. Brooks’ § 2254
petition only attacked his original conviction, not his resentencing.
Brooks asserts the district court erred in calculating the statute of limitations
under the AEDPA from the date the Florida Supreme Court decision became final.
Brooks contends the statute of limitations should have been calculated beginning
with the date of his resentencing. The district court granted a certificate of
appealability (COA) limited to this specific issue.
We review de novo the district court’s determination that a petition for
habeas corpus was time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Jones v. Nagle, 349
F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 2003). The one-year statute of limitations for filing a
writ of habeas corpus runs from the latest of four triggering dates, including “the
date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the
expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). A state
prisoner’s conviction becomes final when the U.S. Supreme Court denies
2
certiorari or issues a decision on the merits, or when the 90-day period in which to
file a certiorari petition expires. Bond v. Moore, 309 F.3d 770, 773-74 (11th Cir.
2002). This time period is tolled during the pendency of a properly filed motion
for post-conviction relief in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). “When a
petitioner who has been resentenced brings an application challenging only his
original judgment of conviction, the one-year statute of limitations under the
AEDPA runs from the date the original judgment of conviction became final and
not the date the resentencing judgment became final.” Rainey v. Sec’y for the
Dep’t of Corr., 443 F.3d 1323, 1326 (11th Cir. 2006).
This case is controlled by our decision in Rainey. Because Brooks’ habeas
petition challenged only his judgment of conviction, without any challenge to his
resentencing judgment, the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations began when
his judgment of conviction became final. Id. Measuring the limitations period
from that date, Brooks’ habeas petition was untimely. We decline to consider any
other argument Brooks attempts to raise on appeal because those arguments fall
outside of the scope of the COA. See Murray v. United States, 145 F.3d 1249,
1251 (11th Cir. 1998).
AFFIRMED.
3