Sophocleus v. Alabama Department of Transportation

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APR 7, 2010
No. 09-11809 JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 00-00652-MHT-WC
JOHN SOPHOCLEUS,
THERESA SOPHOCLEUS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
STATE OF ALABAMA DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION,
REESE & HOWELL. INC. et al.,
Defendants,
PAUL BOWLIN, individually and
in his official capacity,
JIMMY BUTTS, individually and
in his official capacity,
DEJARVIS LEONARD,
MARGIE CHAMPION TODD HOPPER,
individually and in her official capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
_________________________
(April 7, 2010)
Before EDMONDSON, MARCUS and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiffs-Appellants John and Theresa Sophocleus appeal the grant of
summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees, employees of the Alabama
Department of Transportation (“ALDOT”) and the denial of relief on Plaintiffs’
section 1983 claim. No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
This litigation has a ten-year history. The underlying facts are set out in two
district court opinions and two opinions of this Court; we will state them only
briefly here. In 1997, ALDOT notified Plaintiffs that their land was needed in
order to widen a highway. In May 1998, the State commenced condemnation
proceedings in the probate court; the probate court entered a condemnation decree
and valued Plaintiffs’ property at $85,000. Plaintiffs refused to vacate their
property and appealed the condemnation award to the state trial court for a trial de
novo. In December 1998, in a separate proceeding in state trial court, the State
sought to evict Plaintiffs. In that proceeding, Plaintiffs complained that ALDOT
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intended to use their house for non-public purposes; no current need for the
property existed, and ALDOT had no intention of razing the house. After trial, on
12 January 1999, a writ of eviction issued and possession of the property was
granted to the State. Plaintiffs filed no appeal of this decision and vacated their
house. Plaintiffs’ appeal of the probate court’s condemnation order was still
pending in state trial court.
On 11 August 1999, Plaintiffs filed an “Amended Appeal” in the still
pending appeal of the condemnation order. In this pleading, Plaintiffs complained
that -- contrary to ALDOT’s earlier representations of immediate need -- the State
failed and refused to destroy Plaintiffs’ home and to use the condemned property to
expand the highway. On that same date, Plaintiffs filed documents complaining
about the State’s use of the property during the period since Plaintiffs were evicted.
In September 1999, just before the condemnation proceeding was scheduled for a
de novo trial in state circuit court, the parties settled the matter: Plaintiffs agreed to
the condemnation, and the State agreed to pay them $145,000. The house was
razed in November 1999, and a highway now sits in its stead.
The dispute entered the federal court system in May 2000 when Plaintiffs
brought this section 1983 action claiming they were forced out of their home from
January through August 1999 so that contractors could use their property for office
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and living space. Plaintiffs contended that such use constituted a private use in
violation of their Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court
concluded it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 44 S.Ct. 149 (1923), and District of Columbia Court
of Appeals v. Feldman, 103 S.Ct. 1303 (1983). Sophecleus v. Alabama Dept. of
Transportation, 305 F.Supp. 2d 1238 (M.D. Ala. 2004). In an unpublished
opinion, we affirmed, 116 Fed.Appx. 246 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. granted and
judgment vacated by 126 S.Ct. 37 (2005); the Supreme Court vacated and
remanded for further consideration in the light of Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
Basic Industries Corp., 125 S.Ct. 1517 (2005), wherein the Supreme Court
clarified the scope and applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. We, in turn,
vacated the district court’s opinion and remanded for the district court to consider
its jurisdiction in the light of the Supreme Court’s Exxon Mobil opinion. 170
Fed.Appx. 608 (11th Cir. 2005).
On remand, the district court concluded Rooker-Feldman was no bar to its
subject-matter jurisdiction; applying Alabama’s law of preclusion,1 the district
court concluded the suit was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We agree.
1
In determining the res judicata effect of an earlier state court judgment, we apply the res
judicata doctrine of the state whose decision is set up as a bar to further litigation. See Green v.
Jefferson County Com’n, 563 F.3d 1243. 1252 (11th Cir. 2009).
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For res judicata to apply under Alabama law, these essential elements must
be shown:
(1) a prior judgment on the merits, (2) rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction, (3) with substantial
identity of the parties, and (4) with the same cause of
action presented in both suits.
Hughes v. Allenstein, 514 So.2d 858, 860 (Ala. 1987). And “[i]f these essential
elements are met, any issue that was or could have been adjudicated in the prior
action is barred from further litigation.” Id. (empasis in original). Plaintiffs’
argument on appeal chiefly focuses on satisfaction of the fourth element: whether
the state and federal suits present the same cause of action.2
Applying res judicata under Alabama law, we have made this observation:
the principal test for comparing causes of action is
whether the primary right and duty or wrong are the same
in each action. Res judicata applies not only to the
2
The district court said that Plaintiffs raised no challenge to the third element --
substantial identity of the parties -- but Plaintiffs argue that they raised the privity issue in their
brief. Plaintiffs do little more than assert that the privity challenge was made below; the issue is
set out on appeal in only the most cursory and conclusory fashion. We conclude that a sufficient
identity of interest exists between the parties in the state and federal actions to satisfy Alabama’s
substantial identity of the parties requirement. See Gonzalez, LLC v DiVincenti, 844 So.2d
1196, 1203 (Ala. 2002) (“Judgments can bind persons not party (or privy) to the litigation in
question where the nonparties' interests were represented adequately by a party in the original
suit. A person may be bound by a judgment even though not a party to a suit if one of the parties
to the suit is so closely aligned with his interests as to be his virtual representative. Moreover, if
a party has a sufficient laboring oar in the conduct of the litigation, then the principle of res
judicata can be actuated.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also, N.A.A.C.P. v.
Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1560-61 (11th Cir. 1990).
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precise legal theory presented in the prior case, but to all
legal theories and claims arising out of the same nucleus
of operative fact.
N.A.A.C.P. v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1560-61 (11th Cir. 1990) ( internal quotations
and citations omitted). So, too, the Alabama Supreme Court has said, “[i]f a claim,
which arises out of a single wrongful act or dispute, is brought to a final conclusion
on the merits, then all other claims arising out of the same wrongful act or dispute
are barred, even if those claims are based on different legal theories or seek a
different form of damages....” Equity Resources Management, Inc. v. Vinson, 723
So.2d 634, 638 (Ala. 1998).
In the state-court condemnation proceeding, Plaintiffs alleged improper
non-public use of their property.3 Nonetheless, Plaintiffs contend that, even though
their pleadings referenced the state’s improper use of their property for non-public
purposes, they never asserted a federal just-compensation constitutional claim in
the state proceedings. “Claim preclusion bars the litigation of matters that could
3
Plaintiffs argue that the non-public use of their property post-dated the commencement
of the probate and condemnation proceedings and, therefore, those proceedings can be no barrier
to this federal suit. See In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 244 F.3d 1289, 1298 (11th Cir. 2001) (res
judicata has no application where facts giving rise to claim post-date original pleading in earlier
litigation). Under Piper a plaintiff is not obliged to supplement the pleadings by adding an after-
acquired claim. Id. But Plaintiffs did supplement the pleadings; they set out their allegation of
non-public use of their property in their amended appeal of the condemnation order and in
pretrial submissions. Unlike the situation in Piper, the facts underlying Plaintiffs’ non-public use
claims actually were raised as the case unfolded. See id. at 1298-99.
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have been litigated in an earlier suit.” Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1501
(11th Cir. 1991). As this Court and the district court have now each said twice, the
arguments made by Plaintiffs in this action were or could have been raised in the
Alabama condemnation proceedings.
AFFIRMED.
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