United States v. John David Castleberry

Case: 15-10415 Date Filed: 12/30/2016 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-10415
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D.C. Docket No. 3:14-cr-00059-RV-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
JOHN DAVID CASTLEBERRY,
MARK DOUGLAS STOKES, et al.,
Defendants - Appellants.
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Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(December 30, 2016)
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Before WILLIAM PRYOR and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges, and
UNGARO, * District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
Following oral argument and review of the record, we reject the
arguments advanced by the Appellants and affirm in all respects. Because
we write for the parties, we set out only what is necessary to explain our
decision.1
Appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion by
denying their motion for a mistrial based on the court’s questioning of a
witness.2 Trial judges are explicitly vested with the authority to examine
witnesses. Fed. R. Evid. 614(b); see also, United States v. Day, 405 F.3d
1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2005). Furthermore, even without the judge’s singular
question, the record contained sufficient independent evidence of
Appellants’ guilt. See United States v. Capers, 708 F.3d 1286, 1298 (11th
Cir. 2013). Reviewing for abuse of discretion, we find no reversible error in
the trial court’s denial of the motion for a mistrial. Id.
*
Honorable Ursula Ungaro, United States District Judge for the Southern District
of Florida, sitting by designation.
1
As to issues not specifically addressed, we affirm without discussion.
2
The trial judge asked Shauna Henline, an employee of the Internal Revenue
Service’s Frivolous Return Program, a single question during the course of her cross
examination. See ECF 458, at 183-85.
2
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Appellants Castleberry and Mark Stokes argue that the district court
gave an erroneous good-faith defense instruction to the jury, and Mark
Stokes also appeals the willful-blindness jury instruction. In addition,
Appellant Castleberry takes issue with the district court’s Original Issue
Discount (“OID”) instruction to the jury. The trial court’s good-faith defense
instruction was a combination of this Court’s Pattern Jury Instruction
(Special Instruction 9 (2010 Criminal)) and an excerpt from the good-faith
instruction approved by this Court in United States v. Dean, 487 F.3d 840,
850 (11th Cir. 2007). Consequently, we find that the good-faith defense
instruction was a correct statement of the law.
Appellant Mark Stokes provides no legal authority for his claim that
the willful-blindness instruction misstated the law. Further, while Appellant
argues to the contrary, there was sufficient evidence in the record that the
jury could have interpreted as acts of willful blindness by the Appellant. See
United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1570 (11th Cir. 1991).
Appellant Castleberry also provides no legal authority for his
contention that the OID instruction was misleading to the jury. Furthermore,
Appellant conceded during trial that the OID definition provided to the jury
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was correct. 3 ECF No. 467, at 112. Appellant Castleberry also argues that a
definition of OID should not have been provided to the jury at all. 4
However, Appellant conceded that the jury had heard the definition from
multiple witnesses throughout the trial and that there was “no confusion as
to what the OID forms were designed to do.” 5 Id. Therefore, reviewing all
three instructions de novo, we find no reversible error in the district court’s
jury instructions. See United States v. Bender, 290 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th
Cir. 2002).
Appellants Baum and Castleberry argue that the district court erred in
two evidentiary rulings during the testimony of Beverly Hunt, an Internal
Revenue Service Officer. However, Appellants failed to demonstrate that
either ruling substantially influenced the outcome of the trial. United States
v. Khanani, 502 F.3d 1281, 1292 (11th Cir. 2007). After conducting an
3
Defendant Baum’s attorney appeared to be speaking on behalf of all Defendants
when he stated, “None of the defendants have – or actually, all of the defendants that
testified conceded, and we’ve conceding [sic] in our questioning, in essence, in our
argument, that essentially we agree with what the Government describes to be the OID.”
ECF No. 467 at 112:1-5.
4
Though Appellant Castleberry conceded the Government’s description of OID
during trial, Appellant argues that the instruction tracked the Government’s version of the
facts and thus signaled to the jury that an OID was what the Government said it was.
5
Defendant Baum’s attorney appeared to be speaking on behalf of all Defendants
when he stated, “The IRS witnesses have testified. It’s not contested. There’s no
confusion as to what the OID forms were designed to do. The IRS witnesses were very
clear on that.” ECF No. 467, 112: 14-16.
4
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abuse of discretion review, we find no reversible error in the trial court’s
evidentiary rulings. Id.
AFFIRMED.
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