United States v. Priscilla Ann Ellis

Case: 15-15091 Date Filed: 04/01/2016 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-15091
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:15-cr-00320-SDM-TGW-3
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
PRISCILLA ANN ELLIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(April 1, 2016)
Before WILSON, WILLIAM PRYOR and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Priscilla Ann Ellis appeals an order that continued her detention pending
trial, as provided under the Bail Reform Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b), (e). The
district court ruled that Ellis’s associates and access to funds would enable her to
flee the country to avoid trial for conspiring to commit mail and wire fraud, id.§ 1349, and conspiring to commit international money laundering, id. § 1956(h),
and that she presented a danger to elderly and other vulnerable persons. Because
the record supports the finding that Ellis was a flight risk, we need not address the
alternative finding that she posed a danger to the public. We affirm.
The continuation of pretrial detention presents a mixed question of law and
fact. We review findings of fact for clear error and the application of law to those
facts de novo. United States v. King, 849 F.2d 485, 487 (11th Cir. 1988). The
district court has “substantial latitude in determining whether pretrial detention is
appropriate.” Id.When a district court conducts an evidentiary hearing and “finds that no
condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of [a
defendant] as required and the safety of any other person and the community,” the
defendant must be detained before trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). Either ground may
support the order of detention. King, 849 F.2d at 488. To determine whether the
defendant poses a flight risk, the district court must consider several factors,
including (1) the “nature and circumstances” of the charged offense, (2) the weight
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of the evidence against the defendant, (3) the defendant’s history and
characteristics, including her character, her family and community ties, her past
conduct, her criminal history, and her “record concerning appearance at court
proceedings,” and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the
community that would be posed by the person’s release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).
The district court did not err in determining that Ellis should be detained
because she presents a serious risk of flight. See id. § 3142(e). The district court
found that Ellis understood the consequences of her charges, having been
convicted previously of mail fraud, and that she had an incentive and ability to flee
to avoid a potential sentence of imprisonment for life. The government proffered
that emails, photographs, and travel documents established that Ellis had
relationships and resources that would facilitate her flight. Those proffers
established that Ellis had used an international counterfeiter to extend the
expiration date on her passport and to create false documents for other members of
her conspiracy; she had traveled frequently to Europe and Asia, where she had
established or had access to bank accounts; and she had professed to be worth
more than $7.8 million, with $480,000 in liquid assets. Ellis argues that the
government failed to “call . . . witnesses [or] present[] . . . actual evidence” to
satisfy its burden of proof, but she acknowledges that the government was allowed
to proceed by proffer. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f); United States v. Gaviria, 828 F.2d
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667, 669 (11th Cir. 1987). Ellis also argues that her medical condition, family ties,
and status as a veteran weighed in favor of release, but the district court was
entitled to conclude that Ellis’s “significant overseas resources and connections”
and her “criminal history and her character establish a preponderant risk of flight.”
The district court also did not clearly err in finding that no condition or
combination of conditions would reasonably assure Ellis’s appearance. See 18
U.S.C. § 3142(f). Ellis offered to surrender her passport, but that would not
eliminate the risk of flight, the district court found, because Ellis had “access to
sources world-wide to obtain false travel documents.” And the government
proffered that Ellis had misrepresented that she had not traveled internationally for
several years because travel documents established that she went abroad repeatedly
in 2014 and in 2015. The district court reasonably determined that no measure
short of detention would guarantee Ellis’s presence at trial.
We AFFIRM the decision to continue Ellis’s pretrial detention.
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