United States v. Reinier Gonzalez Caballero

USCA11 Case: 22-10078 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/21/2022 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10078
Non-Argument Calendar
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
REINIER GONZALEZ CABALLERO,
ALEXEIS NAPOLES MANRESA,
Defendants- Appellants.
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Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20111-CMA-3
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10078
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Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, NEWSOM, and GRANT, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Reinier Gonzalez Caballero and Alexeis Napoles Manresa
appeal their convictions for conspiring to commit money launder-
ing, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), and for money laundering, id.§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). At trial, the district court instructed the jury that
it could find that Caballero and Manresa possessed the requisite
“knowledge” for the offenses if the defendants “one, actually knew
that the money or properties involved in the financial transactions
were the proceeds of some kind of unlawful activity, or, two, had
every reason to know but deliberately closed his eyes.” Caballero
and Manresa argue that the district court erred in giving this delib-
erate ignorance instruction. We disagree and affirm.
We review a challenge to a jury instruction on deliberate ig-
norance de novo. United States v. Stone, 9 F.3d 934, 937 (11th Cir.
1993). District courts have broad discretion in formulating a jury
charge as long as “the charge as a whole accurately reflects the law
and the facts.” United States v. Arias, 984 F.2d 1139, 1143 (11th Cir.
1993). As a result, our review of jury instructions is deferential, and
we “will only reverse if we are left with a substantial and eradicable
doubt as to whether the jury was properly guided in its delibera-
tions.” United States v. Crabtree, 878 F.3d 1274, 1289 (11th Cir.
2018).
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22-10078 Opinion of the Court 3
We have long recognized deliberate ignorance as an alterna-
tive to actual knowledge when “a party has his suspicion aroused
but then deliberately omits to make further enquiries, because he
wishes to remain in ignorance.” United States v. Hristov, 466 F.3d
949, 952 (11th Cir. 2006). A deliberate ignorance instruction is
proper if “the facts support the inference that the defendant was
aware of a high probability of the existence of the fact in question
and purposely contrived to avoid learning all of the facts in order
to have a defense in the event of a subsequent prosecution.” United
States v. Steed, 548 F.3d 961, 977 (11th Cir. 2008). The instruction
should not be given when the evidence points only to actual
knowledge, instead of deliberate avoidance. Id.The district court did not err in instructing the jury on delib-
erate ignorance because numerous facts pointed toward conscious
avoidance. Both Caballero and Manresa knew Alfredo Ruiz, the in-
dividual who recruited them to open sham corporations in their
names so that he could clean money obtained through Medicare
fraud, only by “Maik.” They each had an initial meeting with
“Maik” in a parking lot and were told that the corporations they
would open were not real businesses, but that their skills would be
matched to the businesses in case the banks asked any questions.
In exchange, “Maik” would pay them $100 per day plus utilities and
some of their personal living expenses. But Caballero and Manresa
never asked “Maik” where the money came from or “Maik’s” real
name or business.
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10078
And the suspicious circumstances of their day-to-day busi-
ness dealings with “Maik” further support the inference that they
were on notice but avoided actual knowledge of the illegality of the
operation. The evidence established that after money was depos-
ited into the sham business accounts, Caballero and Manresa were
instructed to make cash withdrawals under $10,000 to avoid raising
a “red flag” and to visit different banks if they had multiple with-
drawals to make in the same week. After withdrawing the cash,
they would meet “Maik,” who was well-dressed and drove luxury
cars, in restaurants and “random parking lots,” where they would
hand envelopes containing the cash and receipt to “Maik” through
his car window. Apart from withdrawing and delivering the cash—
totaling about $111,000 for Caballero and $112,000 for Manresa—
they never performed any work. And their corporations, which
had no other employees, never completed any work in exchange
for the sizeable checks. In sum, we have no doubt that a reasonable
factfinder could have found that their suspicions were aroused and
that their failure to make inquiries was the result of deliberate ig-
norance. So the instruction was properly given.
And we reject Caballero and Manresa’s argument that the
instruction effectively allowed the jury to convict them on a basis
akin to a standard of negligence. The district court instructed the
jury that “negligence, carelessness or foolishness is not enough to
prove the Defendant had the requisite proof of knowledge.” Be-
cause we presume that a jury follows its instructions, United States
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22-10078 Opinion of the Court 5
v. Brown, 983 F.2d 201, 202 (11th Cir. 1993), we are satisfied that
the instruction did not lower the government’s burden of proof.
We AFFIRM Caballero’s and Manresa’s convictions.