Thurmon v. Georgia Pacific, LLC

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-15703
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cv-01407-CAP
MIKE THURMON,
in his capacity as Executor of the Estate of
William H. Thurmon, Sr., deceased,
MARY K. THURMAN,
HELEN JOHNSON,
WILLIAM H. THURMON, JR.,
GEORGE THURMON,
ESTHER RIDENHOUR,
MARK THURMON,
PATRICIA GUTHRIE,
JOAN GREENLESS,
JULIE CHAMBERS,
in their capacities as the surviving children of
William H. Thurmon, Sr., deceased,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
JIM CHAMBERS,
in his capacity as Executor of the Estate of
William H. Thurmon, Sr., deceased,
Plaintiff,
versus
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GEORGIA PACIFIC, LLC, et al.,
Defendants,
CRANE CO.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(May 27, 2016)
Before HULL and WILSON, Circuit Judges, and MARTINEZ, * District Judge.
HULL, Circuit Judge:
In this products liability action, the plaintiffs appeal the district court’s grant
of Defendant Crane Co.’s motion for summary judgment. The district court found
that the plaintiffs failed to prove that a Crane Co. product proximately caused the
decedent’s asbestos-related injuries. After careful review of the record and briefs,
and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
The relevant facts in this appeal are straightforward and undisputed. From
1954 to 1985, William H. Thurmon, Sr. worked primarily as a production shift
*
Honorable Jose E. Martinez, United States District Judge for the Southern District of
Florida, sitting by designation.
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supervisor at the Rayonier Pulp and Paper Mill (“Rayonier”) located in Jesup,
Georgia. Thurmon monitored the production equipment and supervised the line
employees, which required him to walk around all areas of Rayonier.
Oftentimes, the industrial valves at Rayonier required maintenance, which
typically involved, among other things, scraping gaskets off of the valves,
removing packing material from the valves, and replacing the removed gaskets and
packing material. Though Thurmon did not work directly on the valves, he was,
on occasion, near the valves while Rayonier employees performed routine
maintenance. Rayonier employees would also cut gasket material in close
proximity to Thurmon. From 1955 to 1985, some of the packing material and
gaskets used in the repair and maintenance of valves at Rayonier contained
asbestos.
Two co-workers testified that some of the industrial valves at Rayonier were
manufactured by Defendant Crane Co. Other than remembering that the Crane Co.
valves were “metal” or “steel,” those co-workers could not recall the specific type
of Crane Co. valves used at Rayonier, nor did they associate a specific type of
valve with Crane Co.
The Crane Co. valves, like all industrial valves, required routine
maintenance involving the removal and replacement of gaskets and packing
material. At least one co-worker testified that Thurmon would have been in close
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proximity to the Crane Co. valves while their gaskets were being replaced. The
removal and installation of gaskets from the Crane Co. valves would have created
dust, potentially containing asbestos, that Thurmon could have inhaled. There is
no evidence that Thurmon was in close proximity to any Crane Co. valve while its
packing materials were being replaced.
Crucially, no employee testified that the replacement gaskets and packing
material used to maintain and repair Crane Co. valves were manufactured or
distributed by Crane Co. 1 Rather, third-party vendors supplied Rayonier with
asbestos-containing gaskets and packing material. Moreover, there is no evidence
that the worn gaskets and packing material routinely being replaced (during
Thurmon’s tenure) were the original ones installed on the Crane Co. valves.
In November 2009, Thurmon was diagnosed with mesothelioma, an
asbestos-related cancer, and died the following month.
B. Procedural History
In April 2011, Thurmon’s estate and surviving children filed an amended
complaint in the State Court of Gwinnet County, Georgia against several
defendants, including Crane Co., alleging causes of action for negligence, products
1
As noted below, the MDL court found that no co-worker testified that Thurmon was
exposed to “Crane” gaskets or packing material and, therefore, concluded that summary
judgment in favor of Crane Co. was warranted with respect to any alleged exposure to Crane Co.
gaskets or packing material. We defer to the MDL court’s findings and conclusions regarding
this issue.
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liability, and wrongful death arising from Thurmon’s alleged asbestos exposure
while working at Rayonier. On April 29, 2011, a defendant removed the action to
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. On May 16,
2011, pursuant to an order from the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation, the action was transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (“the
MDL court”) as part of MDL No. 875.
In a September 17, 2012 order, the MDL court granted in part and denied in
part Crane Co.’s motion for summary judgment. First, the MDL court found no
evidence of Thurmon’s alleged exposure to “Crane” gaskets or packing material.
Accordingly, the MDL court granted summary judgment in favor of Crane Co.
with respect to Thurmon’s alleged exposure to gaskets and packing material
manufactured or distributed by Crane Co.
Next, the MDL court found that (1) Crane Co. valves were used at Rayonier;
(2) the third-party component parts on Crane Co.’s valves contained asbestos;
(3) Rayonier employees performed routine maintenance on Crane Co. valves,
specifically gasket replacement, in close proximity to Thurmon; and (4) a
reasonable jury could conclude that Thurmon inhaled asbestos fibers during the
replacement of gaskets on Crane Co. valves. However, the MDL court further
found that there was (1) no evidence demonstrating that Thurmon was exposed to
the original asbestos-containing component parts of the Crane Co. valves, and
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(2) no evidence demonstrating that the replacement asbestos-containing component
parts were manufactured or supplied by Crane Co. Accordingly, the MDL court
concluded that “[Crane Co.] could only be liable for this exposure if Georgia law
does not recognize the so-called ‘bare metal defense.’” 2
Unaware of any decisions from the Georgia appellate courts discussing the
availability of the bare metal defense, and noting that whether Georgia law
recognizes the defense “is a matter of policy,” the MDL court determined that
remand to a court in Georgia was necessary to determine the availability of the
bare metal defense under Georgia law. The MDL court denied Crane Co.’s motion
for summary judgment in part, with leave to refile for summary judgment in the
Northern District of Georgia after remand.
In a January 23, 2014 order, the MDL court remanded the case to the
Northern District of Georgia. In the district court, Crane Co. moved for summary
judgment on the grounds that it was entitled to the bare metal defense because
there was no evidence demonstrating that Crane Co. manufactured, supplied, or
designed any of the replacement asbestos-containing gaskets or packing material to
which Thurmon was exposed. In a November 21, 2014 order, the district court
2
The MDL court defined the bare metal defense as follows: “whether . . . a valve
manufacturer [is] liable for injury arising from asbestos-containing component parts used in
connection with its valve, but which it did not manufacture or supply.”
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granted Crane Co.’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Georgia
law supports the application of the bare metal defense. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
all the evidence, and drawing all reasonable factual inferences, in favor of the non-
moving party. Stephens v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 749 F.3d 1318, 1321 (11th
Cir. 2014). We may affirm on any ground that finds support in the record.
Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007).
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Although all justifiable inferences are to be
drawn in favor of the non-moving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law when the non-moving party fails to make a sufficient showing of
an essential element of the case. Manor Healthcare Corp. v. Lomelo, 929 F.2d
633, 636 (11th Cir. 1991).
The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the court, by reference
to materials in the record, that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
that should be decided at trial. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256,
1260 (11th Cir. 2004). The moving party’s burden is discharged merely by
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pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support an
essential element of the non-moving party’s case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2554 (1986). Once the moving party has
adequately supported its motion, the non-movant then has the burden of showing
that summary judgment is improper by coming forward with specific facts showing
a genuine dispute. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986).
This case requires us to examine issues concerning the substantive law of
Georgia. In rendering a decision based on state substantive law, a federal court
must decide the case the way it appears the state’s highest court would. Ernie
Haire Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 260 F.3d 1285, 1290 (11th Cir. 2001). Where
the state’s highest court has not spoken to an issue, a federal court must adhere to
the decisions of the state’s intermediate appellate courts absent some persuasive
indication that the state’s highest court would decide the issue otherwise. Id.
B. The “Bare Metal Defense” Under Georgia Law
According to the asbestos MDL court, the “bare metal defense” stands for
the proposition that a valve manufacturer is “not liable for injuries caused by
asbestos products, such as insulation, gaskets, and packing, that were incorporated
into their products or used as replacement parts, but which they did not
manufacture or distribute.” Conner v. Alfa Laval, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 2d 791, 793
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(E.D. Pa. 2012). As such, the “bare metal defense” is, essentially, a causation
argument.
No controlling Georgia authority unequivocally recognizes the bare metal
defense. In fact, the phrase “bare metal defense” has never appeared in Georgia’s
case law. Nevertheless, we are tasked with resolving this appeal, which involves
substantive questions of Georgia law, in a manner it appears the Georgia Supreme
Court would. Ernie Haire Ford, Inc., 260 F.3d at 1290.
In doing so, we need not determine whether the Georgia Supreme Court
would adopt the “bare metal defense” as a bright-line rule of law that would
automatically insulate from liability an entire category of defendants in asbestos
cases. Rather, as demonstrated below, application of Georgia’s well-established
products liability law to the particular facts of this case leads to a clear resolution
of this appeal.
C. Relevant Georgia Products Liability Law
Under Georgia law, whether proceeding under a strict liability or a
negligence theory, proximate cause is a necessary element of any product liability
action. Hoffman v. AC & S, Inc., 548 S.E.2d 379, 382 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). Thus,
under Georgia law, to survive summary judgment, an asbestos victim must present
evidence that he or she was exposed to asbestos-containing products for which the
defendant is responsible. Id. Specifically, a plaintiff must present evidence that a
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particular defendant’s asbestos-containing product was used in proximity of that
plaintiff. Id. Such evidence may include testimony of co-workers who can
identify a plaintiff by name as having worked with or around a particular
defendant’s asbestos-containing products. Id. at 382-83.
The Georgia Court of Appeals has stressed that the plaintiff must link a
particular defendant’s product to his injury in order to survive a motion for
summary judgment. See Talley v. City Tank Corp., 279 S.E.2d 264, 269 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1981) (“A manufacturer has the absolute right to have his strict liability for
injuries adjudged on the basis of the design of his own marketed product and not
that of someone else” (emphasis added)). Georgia law requires plaintiffs to prove
exposure to a particular defendant’s product in order to establish proximate cause
because Georgia courts have refused to impose market-share or industry-wide
liability upon asbestos manufacturers. See Ga. Code Ann. § 51-1-11(d)
(“Irrespective of privity, a manufacturer shall not be held liable for the
manufacture of a product alleged to be defective based on theories of market share
or enterprise, or other theories of industry-wide liability”); see also Hoffman, 548
S.E.2d at 382.
D. Replacement Gaskets Not Manufactured By Crane Co.
Here, we cannot say that the district court erred in granting Crane Co.’s
motion for summary judgment under the particular facts of this case. There is
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evidence that industrial valves manufactured and supplied by Crane Co. were
present at Rayonier during Thurmon’s tenure as a shift supervisor. The component
parts of the Crane Co. valves, namely the gaskets and packing material, often
contained asbestos. These asbestos-containing component parts required routine
maintenance that would have created airborne asbestos fibers. One co-worker
testified that Thurmon was in close proximity to Crane Co. valves while gasket
maintenance was being performed. No co-workers testified that Thurmon was in
close proximity to Crane Co. valves while packing materials were being replaced.
Thus, at best, Thurmon’s exposure was to gaskets during routine replacement and
maintenance. Accordingly, a reasonable jury could conclude that Thurmon was
exposed to asbestos-containing dust from gaskets being replaced and used in
connection with Crane Co. valves.
However, the record tells us that Rayonier purchased the replacement
gaskets from third-party vendors. The record does not support a finding that any of
the replacement asbestos-containing gaskets to which Thurmon was exposed were
manufactured or distributed by Crane Co. While a co-worker was able to place
Thurmon in close proximity to gasket maintenance being performed on Crane Co.
valves, there was no evidence that the replacement gasket material was
manufactured or supplied by Crane Co. Moreover, no co-worker testified that the
gaskets being removed on such occasions were the original component parts of the
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Crane Co. valves. Thus, while the plaintiffs could show that Thurmon was
exposed to asbestos-containing gaskets manufactured and supplied by third-party
vendors and installed on Crane Co.’s industrial valves, the plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate that Thurmon was exposed to any specific asbestos-containing gaskets
manufactured or supplied by Crane Co. As such, Thurmon’s injuries were not
caused by any asbestos-containing gaskets manufactured or supplied by Crane Co.
Hoffman, 548 S.E.2d at 382.
E. Negligent Design and Failure to Warn
The plaintiffs nevertheless contend that the district court erred by granting
Crane Co.’s motion for summary judgment for two reasons: (1) Crane Co. is still
liable for Thurmon’s injuries because it negligently designed its industrial valves
by requiring that they use asbestos-containing component parts to function
properly, and (2) Crane Co. is still liable for Thurmon’s injuries because it failed to
warn Thurmon of the dangers associated with removing and replacing the asbestos-
containing component parts of its industrial valves. Both of these arguments fail.
Georgia courts recognize a cause of action for injuries sustained on account
of a manufacturer’s negligent product design. See Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield,
319 S.E.2d 470, 476 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984). Specifically, “if in the normal
functioning of the product as designed, such function creates a danger or peril that
is not known to the user or bystander, then the manufacturer is liable for injuries
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proximately caused by such danger.” Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, to
prevail in a so-called “negligent design” claim, the plaintiff must still demonstrate
that “the proximate cause of [his] injuries . . . was the original defective design.”
Talley, 279 S.E.2d at 269; see also Hall v. Scott USA, Ltd., 400 S.E.2d 700, 703
(Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (“[T]he injury must be the proximate result of a defect in the
product which existed at the time sold”) (quotation marks omitted); Carmical v.
Bell Helicopter Textron, 117 F.3d 490, 494 (11th Cir. 1997) (“To prevail in a
Georgia products liability action, whether based on negligence or strict liability, a
plaintiff must show that the proximate cause of the injury was a defect which
existed when the product was sold”). When there is no evidence that the
defendant’s originally designed product was defective, and there is no evidence
that an injury-causing post-sale modification was required for the defendant’s
original product to function, then summary judgment in favor of the defendant is
warranted. See Hall, 400 S.E.2d at 703-04.
The plaintiffs cannot prevail in their negligent design claim because they
failed to come forward with evidence establishing causation, which is an essential
element of any products liability action. Hoffman, 548 S.E.2d at 382.
Specifically, the plaintiffs failed to present evidence indicating that Thurmon’s
injuries were caused by a negligently designed Crane Co. valve. As explained
below, the plaintiffs’ failure to do so proves fatal to their claim.
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To iterate, in order to prevail in a negligent design claim under Georgia law,
the plaintiff’s injury must be the proximate result of a defect in the product which
existed at the time sold. Talley, 279 S.E.2d at 269; see Hall, 400 S.E.2d at 703.
Plaintiffs allege that Crane Co.’s industrial valves were defective as sold because
the design of the valves required the use of asbestos-containing gaskets to function
properly. Thus, in order to survive summary judgment, the plaintiffs had to offer
some evidence that Thurmon’s injuries were caused by a Crane Co. valve that
required the use of asbestos-containing gaskets to function properly. See Hall, 400
S.E.2d at 703-04; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct. at 1356.
Put another way, the plaintiffs had to offer some evidence that Thurmon was
exposed to a negligently designed Crane Co. valve. The plaintiffs failed to meet
their burden.
The record demonstrates that, at some point, Rayonier would replace gaskets
in some of its valves and Thurmon was exposed to a Crane Co. valve while its
third-party asbestos-containing gaskets were being replaced. However, the record
does not reveal the type of Crane Co. valve to which Thurmon was exposed or
what that valve was used for, let alone whether the design of that valve specified
and required asbestos-containing gaskets to function properly. The mere fact that
the gaskets on Crane Co. valves were replaced with asbestos-containing gaskets
from third party vendors does not mean that Crane Co. designed and specified the
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use of only asbestos-containing gaskets for those valves, or that those valves
required asbestos-containing gaskets to function. See Talley, 279 S.E.2d at 269
(“[I]f the design of [a] product has been independently altered, eliminated and
replaced by a third party after the sale and injuries then result, those injuries cannot
be traced to or be the proximate result of the manufacturer’s original design which
did not exist at the time of injury”). Without evidence demonstrating that Thurmon
was exposed to a negligently designed Crane Co. valve (i.e. a valve that required
asbestos-containing gaskets to function properly), a jury would be forced to
speculate that Crane Co.’s negligence proximately caused Thurmon’s injuries.
However, “[s]peculation does not create a genuine issue of fact.” Cordoba v.
Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005).
The plaintiffs attempt to close this causation gap by asserting that all
industrial valves manufactured by Crane Co. during the relevant time period
required asbestos-containing gaskets to function properly and, therefore, one can
reasonably infer that Thurmon must have been exposed to a negligently designed
Crane Co. valve. But the record does not support the plaintiffs’ assertion. Just the
opposite. Crane Co.’s corporate representative testified that, during the relevant
time period, Crane Co.’s valves did not require asbestos-containing gaskets to
function properly. Moreover, the plaintiffs’ own submissions contain a Crane Co.
brochure specifying that gaskets for “most,” but not all, “bronze and iron . . .
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valves are cut from compressed sheet packing comprised of asbestos fiber,” and
that other valves, depending on their function, contained gaskets made of
“tetrafluoroethylene” or “corrugated soft steel.” Another Crane Co. catalogue
submitted by the plaintiffs states that “[g]askets are made of various materials:
rubber, asbestos composition, and metals.” Thus, evidence from both parties
affirmatively demonstrates that some of Crane Co.’s industrial valves were
perfectly capable of functioning without the use of asbestos-containing gaskets.
The plaintiffs’ attempts to otherwise raise a genuine issue of fact are
unavailing. The plaintiffs repeatedly point to evidence that Crane Co. may have
incorporated asbestos-containing packing material into the overall design of all of
its valves during the relevant time period. But the record only demonstrates that
Thurmon was potentially exposed to asbestos during the replacement of gaskets,
not packing material, on Crane Co. valves. Thus, the plaintiffs’ packing material
evidence is irrelevant.
The sole piece of record evidence that the plaintiffs cite to actually
discussing gaskets is a March 9, 1981 internal Crane Co. memorandum. The
memorandum appears to involve a correspondence regarding the availability of
non-asbestos substitutes for certain valves that would otherwise require asbestos-
containing component parts. The memorandum does not help the plaintiffs
because it only concerns a specific category of iron and steel valves, not all valves,
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and it does not identify a type of valve or model specifically sold to Rayonier or
encountered by Thurmon.
According to the dissent, the 1981 memorandum contains two phrases that,
by way of inference, establish a triable issue of fact as to whether “Crane Co.
generically specified that asbestos gaskets be used in all its industrial valves that
utilized gaskets.” (emphasis added). However, the inferences that the dissent
attempts to draw from these phrases are speculative and unreasonable. See Ave.
CLO Fund, Ltd. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 723 F.3d 1287, 1294 (11th Cir. 2013) (“All
reasonable inferences arising from the undisputed facts should be made in favor of
the nonmovant, but an inference based on speculation and conjecture is not
reasonable.”).
The dissent first points to the third paragraph of the 1981 memorandum,
which states, “If there was a corporate prohibition on asbestos gaskets . . ., then all
the [Crane Co.] valve plants would be in trouble.” Even read in the light most
favorable to the plaintiffs, this language only reasonably supports an inference that
valves utilizing asbestos-containing gaskets were manufactured at all of Crane
Co’s. valve plants. It does not, without resorting to speculation, support the
broader inference that all valves manufactured by Crane Co. utilized asbestos-
containing gaskets. In fact, the record affirmatively demonstrates that Crane Co.
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manufactured valves that utilized gaskets made of various materials such as rubber,
asbestos, metals, tetrafluoroethylene, and corrugated soft steel.
The dissent also points to the last paragraph of the 1981 memorandum,
which states, “Until we locate acceptable alternates, . . . we are forced to continue
specifying the proven asbestos material in our products.” Even read in the light
most favorable to the plaintiffs, this language only reasonably supports an
inference that asbestos works well in the products that incorporate asbestos-
containing component parts, and that it will be difficult to find asbestos substitutes
for those specific products. Like the first phrase cited by the dissent, it does not,
without resorting to speculation, support the broader inference that all valves
manufactured by Crane Co. utilized asbestos-containing gaskets. Indeed, the
memorandum does not state that Crane Co. would be forced to continue specifying
the proven asbestos material in all of its products.
Without resorting to speculation, which we may not do at the summary
judgment stage, the 1981 memorandum, at best, supports the narrow, undisputed
assertion that Crane Co. specified asbestos-containing gaskets for use in some of
the industrial valves it manufactured in 1981. It does not support the much broader
claim that Crane Co. specified the use of asbestos-containing gaskets in all
industrial valves manufactured by Crane Co. during the relevant time period.
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Having cited no other record evidence in support of their assertion that all
valves manufactured by Crane Co. during the relevant time period required
asbestos-containing gaskets to function, the plaintiffs failed to come forward with
“specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” regarding this issue. 3
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct. at 1356.
In sum, the plaintiffs’ entire negligent design theory of liability is premised
on the wholly unsubstantiated assertion that every single industrial valve
manufactured by Crane Co. during the relevant time period required asbestos-
containing gaskets to function properly. If anything, the available record evidence
affirmatively belies this assertion. As such, the record does not reveal whether
Thurmon was exposed to a negligently designed Crane Co. valve. Without any
evidence that Thurmon was exposed to a Crane Co. valve that was negligently
designed when sold to Rayonier, summary judgment in favor of Crane Co. is
warranted. Hall, 400 S.E.2d at 703-04.
Additionally, there is no merit to the plaintiffs’ claim that they could still
recover under a failure-to-warn theory of liability. Under Georgia law, “the
manufacturer of a product which, to its actual or constructive knowledge, involves
3
Additionally, there is no evidence that Rayonier, due to high heat conditions, purchased
only valves that required asbestos-containing gaskets to function properly such that Thurmon
must have been exposed to those certain Crane Co. valves with designs specifying and requiring
asbestos-containing gaskets. At least one co-worker testified that he stocked the Rayonier
storeroom with rubber gaskets, which are not suitable for high heat applications. Additionally, a
Crane Co. brochure proffered by the plaintiffs indicates that “[m]etallic gaskets are used for
intermediate and high temperatures.”
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danger to users, has a duty to give warning of such danger.” Chrysler Corp. v.
Batten, 450 S.E.2d 208, 211 (Ga. 1994) (quotation marks omitted). Despite the
distinct duty imposed, a failure-to-warn claim, whether grounded on a strict
liability or negligence theory, requires proof that the defendant’s allegedly
defective product proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries. See Wilson Foods
Corp. v. Turner, 460 S.E.2d 532, 533-34 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). As described above,
plaintiffs’ claims lack the crucial element of causation, and, therefore, the plaintiffs
cannot prevail. In other words, our conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate that a product manufactured by Crane Co. proximately caused
Thurmon’s injuries is a case dispositive determination that necessarily extinguishes
a necessary element of any failure-to-warn claim.
III. CONCLUSION
Because the plaintiffs failed to produce evidence that Thurmon’s injuries
were proximately caused by a product manufactured, supplied, or negligently
designed by Crane Co., their claims fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, we affirm
the district court’s grant of summary judgment. 4
AFFIRMED.
4
In light of our disposition, all pending motions are denied as moot.
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WILSON, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the Majority’s decision not to insert the “‘bare metal defense”
into Georgia’s case law on behalf of the State of Georgia. According to the
complaint, William H. Thurmon, Sr. “was diagnosed with, and later died from,
complications associated with malignant pleural mesothelioma,” which “is a
rapidly debilitating and fatal form of cancer affecting the lining of an individual’s
lungs, the only known cause of which in North America is asbestos exposure.”
The bare metal defense would “automatically insulate from liability an entire
category” of manufacturers of asbestos-containing products in such cases. See
Maj. Op. at 9. There are a number of “impracticalities complicating any attempt
[by a federal court] to develop federal common law in asbestos litigation.”
Blackston v. Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co., 764 F.2d 1480, 1485–86 (11th Cir.
1985). Unless future Georgia courts explicitly or clearly adopt the bare metal
defense—which is essentially a policy statement about the quantity and type of
defendants Georgia wishes to hold liable—this federal court should not do so for
Georgia.
Although I also agree with the Majority that “Thurmon was exposed to
asbestos-containing dust from [third-party asbestos-containing] gaskets being
replaced and used in connection with Crane Co. valves,” Maj. Op. 11–12
(emphasis added), we disagree regarding whether Crane Co. may be held liable for
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that exposure. The Majority frames the issue on appeal as whether Thurmon was
exposed to a defectively designed Crane Co. valve that required asbestos-
containing gaskets to function properly and that proximately caused Thurmon’s
injuries. See Maj. Op. at 12–19. However, the relevant question on appeal is
simply whether Thurmon was exposed to an asbestos-containing product for which
Crane Co. was responsible. See Blackston, 764 F.2d at 1481.
In order to survive summary judgment under either a negligent design or
failure to warn theory of liability, the plaintiffs must show that Thurmon was
exposed to a product manufactured by Crane Co., see id. at 1481–82, which they
may do by showing that Crane Co. designed a product system in which it specified
asbestos-containing component parts. A corporate entity is legally responsible for
a product in which it “ha[s] an active role in the . . . design . . . of [the] product[].”
See Buchan v. Lawrence Metal Prods. Inc., 607 S.E.2d 153, 156 (Ga. Ct. App.
2004); Davenport v. Cummins Ala., Inc., 644 S.E.2d 503, 508 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)
(describing a manufacturer as one who “actively participate[s] in the conception,
design, or specification of the [product]”). 1 Therefore, the plaintiffs may satisfy
1
No Eleventh Circuit or Georgia precedents squarely address a defendant’s liability in
Georgia for asbestos-related injuries arising in connection with a product it manufactured and
into which a third-party component part was inserted post-sale. Therefore, we must look to
Georgia products liability principles from outside the asbestos context. See, e.g., Fletcher v.
Water Applications Distribution Grp., 773 S.E.2d 859, 863–65 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015) (citing
general products liability concepts from outside the asbestos context within the asbestos context),
cert. granted, CertainTeed Corp. v. Fletcher, No. S15G1903 (Ga. Jan. 11, 2016).
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their burden by showing that Thurmon was exposed to an asbestos-containing
product designed by Crane Co.
Additionally, the plaintiffs must show that Thurmon was exposed to Crane
Co.’s product, as originally designed. Georgia courts look to a product’s “design
specifications” to determine a product’s “original design.” See Banks v. ICI Ams.,
Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 673–75 & n.3 (Ga. 1994); cf. Fletcher, 773 S.E.2d at 863–64.
The record supports the conclusion that Crane Co. designed a valve-gasket
system in which it specified asbestos gaskets that would have to be routinely
replaced. In the March 9, 1981 internal Crane Co. memorandum, Crane Co.’s
representative clearly stated: “Until we locate acceptable alternates, or until there is
a prohibition on the use of asbestos gaskets and packings (either by OSHA/EPA or
customer preferences), we are forced to continue specifying the proven asbestos
material in our products.” (emphasis added). The representative also stated: “If
there are corporate prohibitions on asbestos gaskets and packing in Crane plants,
then all the valve plants are in trouble.” 2 Viewing these statements in the light
most favorable to the plaintiffs, the memorandum establishes, for purposes of
surviving summary judgment, that as late as March of 1981 Crane Co. generically
specified that asbestos gaskets be used in all its industrial valves that utilized
2
Both statements fall within the last four paragraphs of the memorandum, which,
contrary to the Majority’s reading, discuss asbestos gaskets and packing, generally. The first
paragraph is the only one to refer to iron or steel valves and merely discusses “data circulated . . .
for grafoil stem packing,” as opposed to specifications for gaskets.
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gaskets. 3 Consequently, these memorandum statements make clear that, by
original design, Crane Co.’s valve-gasket system was an “asbestos-containing
product[].” See Blackston, 764 F.2d at 1481. Additionally, it is undisputed that the
relevant “Crane Co. valves . . . required routine maintenance involving the removal
and replacement of gaskets and packing material.” Maj. Op. at 4. Thus, a jury
could find that Crane Co.’s product, as originally designed, was an asbestos-
containing valve-gasket system in which the gaskets would require routine
replacement. That third-party vendors supplied some of the asbestos gaskets does
not remove Crane Co.’s potential liability because Thurmon was still exposed to
Crane Co.’s valve-gasket system, as originally designed.4
Accordingly, there remains a triable issue of fact in this case as to whether
Thurmon’s exposure to Crane Co.’s asbestos-containing product resulted in
Thurmon’s injuries. A manufacturer may be liable under Georgia law in a
3
This evidence should be weighed against other evidence in the record by a jury, not by
this court on summary judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.
Ct. 2505, 2513 (1986); see also Ont. Sewing Mach. Co. v. Smith, 572 S.E.2d 533, 536 (Ga. 2002)
(“[I]t is axiomatic that questions regarding proximate cause are undeniably a jury question and
may only be determined by the courts in plain and undisputed cases.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
4
More specifically, Rayonier’s use of asbestos gaskets was not an alteration, elimination,
or replacement of Crane Co.’s original design—or a redesign of the asbestos gaskets within that
original design—because Crane Co. specified, generically, that asbestos gaskets be used in its
valve-gasket system. See Carmical v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 117 F.3d 490, 494 (11th Cir.
1997) (manufacturer may be liable for negligent design so long as “the product[’s] design has
[not] been independently altered, eliminated or replaced by a third party after the sale of the
product”); cf. Talley v. City Tank Corp., 279 S.E.2d 264, 269–71 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981)
(manufacturer may be liable for negligent design where the “product’s original design has been
merely slightly or somewhat modified” or for failure to warn where “an integral component of a
product” has not been “totally redesigned and replaced”).
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negligent design claim for “intended or foreseeable uses” of its product. Chrysler
Corp. v. Batten, 450 S.E.2d 208, 211 (Ga. 1994). A manufacturer also may be
liable for failure to warn when “the normal use of its product” could result in some
“nonobvious foreseeable danger[].” Thornton v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.,
22 F.3d 284, 289 (11th Cir. 1994). Here, the Crane Co. valve-gasket system
allegedly caused Thurmon’s injuries when asbestos dust was released during
routine maintenance, which was part of the system’s normal, intended, and
forseeable use. Therefore, it remains for the jury to determine whether Crane Co.
is liable for Thurmon’s injuries.
In sum, I would hold that (1) Georgia does not recognize the bare metal
defense; (2) the product for which Crane Co. is legally responsible is the asbestos-
containing valve-gasket system it designed; and (3) there exists a material issue of
fact as to whether Thurmon’s injuries arose from his exposure to Crane Co.’s
product under either a negligent design or failure to warn theory of liability.
Accordingly, I would reverse the district court’s entry of summary judgment for
Crane Co. and remand for a jury to determine whether Crane Co.’s product was the
proximate cause of Thurmon’s injuries.
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