Edward Eugene King v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections

Case: 15-13695 Date Filed: 11/28/2016 Page: 1 of 3
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-13695
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:15-cv-14194-RLR
EDWARD EUGENE KING,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondents-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(November 28, 2016)
Before TJOFLAT, JILL PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 15-13695 Date Filed: 11/28/2016 Page: 2 of 3
Edward Eugene King, proceeding pro se, appeals from the dismissal of his
28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition as an unauthorized second or successive
collateral attack. After review, 1 we affirm the district court’s dismissal.
A state prisoner who wishes to file a second or successive habeas corpus
petition must move the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the
district court to consider such a petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). We may
grant such authorization only if the proposed petition contains claims premised on
either (1) “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral
review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable,” or (2) a “factual
predicate” that “could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of
due diligence” and that, “if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole,
would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for
constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty
of the underlying offense.” Id. § 2244(b)(2)(A), (B). Absent such an order, the
district court is obligated to dismiss a successive petition, as the district court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the motion. Hubbard v. Campbell, 379 F.3d
1245, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004).
The district court did not err by denying King’s § 2254 petition as
impermissibly successive. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (providing, subject to two
1
Whether a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is second or successive is a question we
consider de novo. Stewart v. United States, 646 F.3d 856, 858 (11th Cir. 2011).
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Case: 15-13695 Date Filed: 11/28/2016 Page: 3 of 3
exceptions, that “[a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus
application under section 2254 . . . shall be dismissed”). Both King’s initial § 2254
petition and his current § 2254 petition challenged the September 30, 2003,
judgment pertaining to his Florida convictions for first-degree murder, aggravated
assault, and armed burglary of a dwelling. See Insignares v. Sec’y, Florida Dep’t
of Corr., 755 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating the phrase “second or
successive” applies to habeas petitions, not to the claims they raise). Though King
purports to raise new claims, the bar to successive applications is not claim-
specific. See id. Lastly, though § 2244 provides an exception for claims that rely
on newly discovered evidence, such claims may be brought only after this Court
has granted authorization to do so. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i), (b)(3)(A).
Because King failed to obtain authorization from this Court to pursue his claims,
the district court did not err by dismissing them for want of jurisdiction. See
Hubbard, 379 F.3d at 1247.
AFFIRMED.
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