Linda Cone Selensky v. Judge Whiddon

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-16217 APR 26, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 09-00592-CV-CG-C
LINDA CONE SELENSKY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JUDGE WHIDDON,
BAYOU BEND APTS, LLC,
POLICE DEPARTMENT OF MOBILE,
ANIMAL CONTROL,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
_________________________
(April 26, 2010)
Before MARCUS, WILSON and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Linda Cone Selensky appeals the dismissal of her pro se complaint, against
Judge Whiddon, Mobile Animal Control, Bayou Bend Apartments, L.L.C., and the
Mobile Police Department, which the district court dismissed based on a lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. On appeal, Selensky argues that the federal courts have
jurisdiction over her claims because she cannot obtain a fair disposition of her case
in state court. After careful review, we affirm.
We review the subject-matter jurisdiction of the district court de novo.
Gottfried v. Germain, 578 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2009).
A plaintiff must affirmatively set forth the basis for the court’s subject-
matter jurisdiction in her complaint. Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th
Cir. 1994); Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1). Absent diversity of citizenship, a plaintiff must
present a “substantial” federal question in order to invoke the district court’s
jurisdiction. Wyke v. Polk Co. Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560, 566 (11th Cir. 1997). A
district court will have federal question jurisdiction over any civil action “arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 1331.
Thus, federal question jurisdiction exists only when the complaint, standing alone,
establishes either that a federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s
right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal
law. Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466, 1472 (11th Cir. 1997).
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A court must accept a plaintiff’s well-pled facts as true and make reasonable
inferences in her favor, but the court is not required to accept the plaintiff’s legal
conclusions or draw her inferences. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252,
1260 (11th Cir. 2009). In addition, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent
standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will be liberally construed. Miller
v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008).
Even giving liberal construction to Selensky’s complaint, she has failed to
present any basis for the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. For starters,
Selensky did not set forth the basis for the court’s jurisdiction in her complaint.
Taylor, 30 F.3d at 1367; Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1). Moreover, Selensky has conceded
that diversity jurisdiction did not exist.
Thus, reading her pro se complaint liberally, Selensky appears to base her
claims upon federal question jurisdiction. Selenksy’s complaint asserts that she
was discriminated against based on her disability and gender, but she provides no
factual allegations to support these claims. Indeed, accepting all facts and
inferences in Selensky’s complaint as true, she has failed to show any correlation
between her harms and any gender or disability discrimination. Because her
complaint does not establish that federal law creates a cause of action, or that her
relief in the dispute over her cats and her pending eviction depend on the resolution
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of a question of federal law, federal question jurisdiction does not exist. Baltin,
128 F.3d at 1472. Further, Selensky’s claim that jurisdiction is proper because she
cannot obtain adequate relief in state court is without merit. See 28 U.S.C. §§
1330-1369.
In short, Selensky’s complaint has failed to establish subject-matter
jurisdiction, and we affirm the district court’s dismissal.
AFFIRMED.
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