United States v. Roberto Carlos Dominguez-Reyes

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-15672 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 15, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 08-00268-CR-TCB-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ROBERTO CARLOS DOMINGUEZ-REYES,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(June 15, 2010)
Before WILSON, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Robert Dominguez-Reyes appeals his 34-month sentence imposed after
pleading guilty to illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. After thorough
review, we conclude that Dominguez-Reyes has not demonstrated that his below-
Guidelines sentence was substantively unreasonable. Therefore, we affirm.
I.
Dominguez-Reyes was convicted of conspiracy to commit assault in aid of
racketeering in 2004 and sentenced to 33 months in prison. Upon his release from
prison in 2005, he was immediately deported to Mexico. Approximately three
years later, Dominguez-Reyes was stopped for a potential traffic violation in
Gwinnett County, Georgia. As part of a gang enforcement initiative, information
he provided during that traffic stop was sent to Immigrations and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) agents, who determined that he had illegally reentered the
country. He was arrested a short time later at his residence and indicted for having
illegally reentered the Untied States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326.
Dominguez-Reyes later pleaded guilty to the indictment without a plea
agreement. At sentencing, the district court adopted the presentence investigation
report (“PSR”) as the findings of the court. The district court calculated
Dominquez-Reyes advisory Guidelines range under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, assigning a
base offense level of 8 and adding 16 levels because Dominguez-Reyes had been
previously deported following a conviction for a crime of violence. The district
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court then awarded a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, which
resulted in a total offense level of 21. With the defendant’s Criminal History
Category of II, Domingquez-Reyes’s Guidelines range was 41 to 51 months in
prison.
Dominguez-Reyes requested a downward variance sentence of 18 months in
prison. He urged the district court to consider that he initially came to this country
at the age of 3, had suffered physical abuse at the hands of his stepfather, and had
only reluctantly returned to the Untied States after his deportation to assist his
mother with the care of his siblings. He also argued that he had been fully
rehabilitated, was attending church regularly and volunteering there, and had little
incentive to remain in the United States following his release because his family
had returned to Mexico and needed his help there.
After hearing argument from the parties and the defendant’s allocution, the
district court found the 18-month sentence Dominquez-Reyes requested
insufficient to meet the purposes and objectives of sentencing. Instead, the district
court imposed a downward variance sentence of 34 months in prison and three
years supervised release. In reaching its decision, the district court stated that it
had carefully reviewed and taken into consideration all of the factors set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), particularly referencing the nature and circumstances of the
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offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the need for the
sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, afford adequate
deterrence, and protect the public. Both the government and the defendant
objected to the district court’s below-Guidelines sentence.
II.
Dominguez-Reyes claims that his sentence was substantively unreasonable
because it is greater than necessary to achieve the objectives of sentencing.1
We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of
discretion, taking into account the totality of the circumstances. United States v.
Jennings, 599 F.3d 1241, 1255 (11th Cir. 2010). “Our reasonableness review is
deferential, requiring the court to determine ‘whether the sentence imposed by the
district court fails to achieve the purposes of sentencing as stated in section
3553(a).’” United States v. Langston, 590 F.3d 1226, 1236 (11th Cir. 2009)
(quoting United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005)). “The
burden is on the party challenging the sentence to show that the sentence was
unreasonable in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors.” Id.
Pursuant to § 3553(a), the sentencing court shall impose a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
1
Dominguez-Reyes does not assert that the district court committed any procedural error
in his sentencing.
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promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense, deter criminal
conduct, protect the public from future crimes of the defendant, and provide the
defendant with needed educational or vocational training. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
The sentencing court should also consider the following factors in determining a
particular sentence: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the kinds of sentences available; (3) the
Guidelines range and the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing
Commission; (4) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and (5) the
need to provide restitution to victims. Id. at § 3553(a)(1), (a)(3)–(7). “‘The weight
to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound
discretion of the district court, and we will not substitute our judgment in weighing
the relevant factors.’” Langston, 590 F.3d at 1237 (quoting United States v.
Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 832 (11th Cir. 2007)).
Dominguez-Reyes has failed to demonstrate that his 34-month below-
Guidelines sentence was substantively unreasonable. Dominguez-Reyes’s
argument, in essence, is that the district court gave too much weight to the need for
deterrence and too little weight to the mitigating factors he presented at sentencing,
such as his background, cultural assimilation, and rehabilitation. But “[w]e do not
reweigh relevant factors . . . unless the district court committed a clear error of
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judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence outside the
range of reasonable sentences.” Langston, 590 F.3d at 1237. And we cannot say,
on this record, that the district court’s downward variance sentence was outside the
range of reasonable. This is particularly true where, as here, the district court’s
decision to vary downward (over the government’s request for a Guidelines
sentence) clearly demonstrates that it considered Dominguez-Reyes’s arguments in
favor of a reduced sentence.
It may be true that reasonable minds could differ as to the appropriate
sentence in this case, given the defendant’s history and characteristics, the nature
and circumstances of his illegal reentry, as well as the need to deter this defendant
and others with prior violent felony convictions from illegally reentering the
country following their deportation. But in our view the district court’s sentence in
this case falls squarely within the range of reasonable sentences. That being so, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a 34-month sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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