Adams v. Fulton County, GA

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
________________________
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-11359 SEPT 28, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:08-cv-03451-WSD
JANET ADAMS,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
FULTON COUNTY, GEORGIA,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellee.
_______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(September 28, 2010)
Before EDMONDSON, BLACK and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Janet Adams appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
of Fulton County (County) in her employment discrimination suit claiming race
and gender discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Adams claims the
district court erred in finding she did not establish pretext in response to the
County’s proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for failing to promote
her to Deputy Director of Fulton County Department of Health (Department).
After review,1 we affirm the district court’s order granting the County’s motion for
summary judgment.
Adams claims she is the more qualified candidate for the position based in
part on prior positions held within the Department, including her experience as
interim Deputy Director. She also contends the deviation from the standard hiring
procedure was sufficient evidence of pretext and created a leeway for the
promotion of another candidate, raising a genuine issue of material fact. Finally,
Adams argues her supervisor, Dr. Steven Katkowsky, had sole authority in the
1
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
legal standard used by the district court. Shiver v. Chertoff, 549 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir.
2008). If the movant for summary judgment satisfies the burden of production showing there is
no genuine issue of material fact, “the nonmoving party must present evidence beyond the
pleadings showing that a reasonable jury could find in its favor.” Id. at 1343 (internal quotations
omitted). The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.2
hiring and termination of employees within the Department, and as a result, the
County is liable under § 1983.2
Section 1981 protects individuals from racial discrimination during the
making of contracts and creates a federal right of action. Webster v. Fulton
County, Ga., 283 F.3d 1254, 1256 (11th Cir. 2002); 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Section
19833 “provides every person with the right to sue those acting under color of state
law for violations of federal constitutional and statutory provisions.” Williams v.
Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282, 1299 (11th Cir. 2007).
Both §§ 1981 and 1983 contain the same elements of proof and analytical
framework as a Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, claim in the employment context.
Rice-Lamar v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., 232 F.3d 836, 843 n.11 (11th Cir.
2000). A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination supported by circumstantial evidence. Brown v. Ala. Dep’t of
Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 1174 (11th Cir. 2010) (Title VII claim). If the employer
articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, then the plaintiff, in order to
2
Adams also claims evidence of Dr. Katkowsky’s alleged discriminatory animus, by
reference to an unrelated suit, is sufficient to raise a jury question as to the County’s liability for a
constitutional violation under § 1983. Because Adams did not previously raise this argument in
the district court, we decline to address it here. See Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ala. v. Weitz,
913 F.2d 1544, 1549-51 (11th Cir. 1990).
3
Section 1983 provides the sole remedy against state actors for violations of rights
contained in § 1981. Butts v. County of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891, 892 (11th Cir. 2000).
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survive the motion for summary judgment, must show the reason proffered by the
defendant was not the true one, but was more likely a pretext for discrimination.
Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1981).
The plaintiff may demonstrate pretext “by revealing such weaknesses,
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies or contradictions in [the
employer’s] proffered legitimate reasons for its actions that a reasonable factfinder
could find them unworthy of credence.” Springer v. Convergys Customer Mgmt.
Group Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1348 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). A plaintiff
cannot prove pretext by simply arguing or even by showing that she was better
qualified than the individual who received the promotion. Brooks v. County
Comm’r of Jefferson County, Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006). Further,
“[D]isparities in qualifications must be of such weight and significance that no
reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial judgment, could have chosen the
candidate selected over the plaintiff for the job in question.” Cooper v. Southern
Co., 390 F.3d 695, 732 (11th Cir. 2004) (overruled in part on other grounds, Ash
v. Tyson Foods, 546 U.S. 454 (2006)) (quotations omitted).
An employer’s violation of its own normal hiring procedure may be
evidence of pretext. Bass v. Board of County Commissioners, Orange, County,
Fla., 256 F.3d 1095, 1108 (11th Cir. 2001) (overruled in part on other grounds
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Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961 (11th Cir. 2008)). This is true when an
employer disregards all but one of the factors and qualifications generally taken
into consideration and relies solely on a factor which is designed to create
“leeway” for the promotion of people of a certain race. Id.Adams failed to present evidence establishing the legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons proffered by the County for promoting a different
candidate over her were pretexts for race or gender discrimination. First, Dr.
Katkowsky provided a number of legitimate reasons for choosing the other
candidate over Adams, none of which were shown to be motivated by race or
gender. See Chapman v. A.I. Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1034 (11th Cir. 2000) (“A
subjective reason is a legally sufficient, legitimate, non-discriminatory reason if
the defendant articulates a clear and reasonably specific factual basis upon which
it based its subjective opinion.”). Further, Adams failed to demonstrate that no
reasonable person could have chosen the other candidate over her for the
promotion. See Cooper, 390 F.3d at 732. Second, even if the interview process
was altered, it is merely a scintilla of evidence which does not show the proffered
reasons for not promoting Adams were pretexts for discrimination. There is no
evidence to suggest in adding the second round of interviews, the County
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disregarded any factors or qualifications and relied on any sole factor in order to
create a leeway to hire the other candidate. See Bass, 256 F.3d at 1108.
Finally, with respect to Adam’s assertion that the County is liable under §
1983, it was reasonable for the district court to deem the failure to show pretext to
support her § 1981 race discrimination claim as tantamount to a failure to show
intentional gender discrimination as well. See Lee v. Conecuh County Bd. Of Ed.,
634 F.2d 959, 962 n.3 (5th Cir. Jan. 1981) (noting that McDonnell Douglas factors
may be used to establish a prima facie case of intentional race discrimination
under § 1983 regardless of whether Title VII is used as a parallel remedy).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order granting the County’s motion for
summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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