UA v. Cedric Duane Ryans

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-15507
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 5:15-cr-00032-MHH-SGC-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
CEDRIC DUANE RYANS,
Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
________________________
(September 27, 2017)
Before HULL, MARCUS, and WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
HULL, Circuit Judge:
Defendant Cedric Ryans appeals his convictions for conspiracy to commit
bribery, bribery, and obstruction of justice. Specifically, defendant Ryans
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challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence for his bribery conviction, (2) the
district court’s denial of his motion to extend time to file a post-verdict motion for
judgment of acquittal, and (3) the constitutionality of the relevant bribery statute,
18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2). After thorough review, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On July 29, 2014, Officer Tory Green of the Huntsville, Alabama Police
Department, while on traffic patrol, stopped Willie Leggs and searched Leggs’s
vehicle. Officer Green found about 85 grams, or three ounces, of cocaine. Officer
Green detained Leggs and then contacted Sergeant Lucas with the Strategic
Counter Drug Team (“STAC”) unit. 1
Officer Lucas arrived at the scene and spoke with Leggs, who indicated that
he would be willing to cooperate in order to avoid having charges brought against
him. Officer Green then transported Leggs to the STAC office. Leggs was
interviewed at the STAC office, was not arrested, but was released in hopes that he
would cooperate with STAC to catch criminals higher up in the chain of command
of the drug organizations. 2
1
The STAC team receives federal funding, including $141,743 from October 1, 2012
through September 30, 2013 and $130,699 from October 1, 2013 through September 30, 2014.
As a practical matter, the City of Huntsville fronts the funds to the police department, and the
federal grant money is used to reimburse the city. Thus, for the year 2014, the City of Huntsville
received over $10,000 in federal funds for the benefit of the police department.
2
Over a month later on September 8, 2014, STAC arrested Leggs on a cocaine trafficking
charge stemming from the July 29 traffic stop. Leggs faced penalties of a three-year mandatory
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Leggs was close friends with defendant Ryans. Leggs even had a key to
defendant Ryans’s house. Defendant Ryans allowed Leggs to keep money and
drugs in Ryans’s house with the money kept in various locations, such as in a
closet, shoeboxes, or napkin boxes, so that if the police walked in the house they
would not find it. The amount of money varied from $60,000 to $90,000. Leggs
identified defendant Ryans in the courtroom.
On July 30, 2014, Leggs went to defendant Ryans’s house, and they
discussed the police stopping Leggs the previous night. Defendant Ryans
suggested that he had a friend in the Huntsville Police Department with whom he
would talk and see what the friend could do. Leggs left defendant Ryans’s house,
but two hours later Ryans called Leggs and asked Leggs to return. When Leggs
returned, defendant Ryans told Leggs that he had talked to the police officer friend
and that the officer could make Leggs’s problem “disappear.” Leggs responded
that he was willing to do whatever it would take to make the case disappear and
stated: “You can’t put a cost on freedom.”
That same day (July 30), defendant Ryans sent a text message to his contact,
police officer Lewis Hall, who was at that time still a police officer with the City of
Huntsville. On July 31, 2014, Officer Hall met with defendant Ryans in person.
Defendant Ryans asked Officer Hall about the officer—Officer Green, also with
prison sentence and a fine. Leggs also had a previous federal conviction, was on supervised
release at the time of his arrest, and faced revocation of that supervised release.
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the City—who had arrested Leggs and if Hall thought that Officer Green would
“take a little money to help get the charges dropped.” Defendant Ryans told
Officer Hall that Leggs would be willing to pay $5,000 and that Ryans was
keeping drugs and money for Leggs.
That same morning Leggs again returned to defendant Ryans’s house. At
that time defendant Ryans told Leggs that it would cost $15,000 to $18,000 to get
rid of the case. Leggs agreed to pay the money, “whatever it cost.” Defendant
Ryans offered to act as a go between for Leggs and Officer Hall so that the two
never had to meet. At this point, defendant Ryans had never mentioned the
officer’s name to Leggs. The money for the bribe was to come out of Leggs’s
stash at defendant Ryans’s house.
Defendant Ryans later told Leggs that on July 31, 2014 he gave $5,000 to
Officer Hall. Defendant Ryans also informed Leggs that he would need to make
three more payments out of the money stash. On two more occasions defendant
Ryans would tell Leggs that Ryans needed to make an additional $5,000 payment
in order to bribe the other police officers, and Leggs agreed to make the payments.
On that same day, July 31, 2014, Officer Hall contacted Officer Green to
meet up. Officers Hall and Green met up outside the precinct early that afternoon.
Officer Hall asked Officer Green to take off the recording device he wears with his
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uniform. Officer Hall then asked Officer Green about his “good lick,” or arrest, of
Leggs.
Officer Hall told Officer Green that Hall’s “boy” knows Leggs and “could
give [Green] five stacks.” One “stack” is $1,000, and “five stacks” is $5,000.
Officer Green at first thought Officer Hall was joking, but Hall then said “you
don’t hear me. Five stacks. That’s a lot of cheese.” Officer Hall explained that he
wanted Officer Green to say that his search of Leggs’s vehicle was illegal because
that would get the case against Leggs thrown out.
According to Officer Green, he told Officer Hall that he needed to think
about it, but, instead, Green reported the conversation to his superiors, Sergeant
Lucas, and two Internal Affairs investigators. Officer Green and the Internal
Affairs investigators developed a plan to investigate Officer Hall.
Officer Hall testified that Officer Green agreed to accept the bribe when they
met at the precinct because “he needed the money.” Officer Hall reported back to
defendant Ryans that Officer Green was “good to go,” “would do it,” and “would
get back with” Hall about it.
Later that night, Officer Hall met up with Officer Green at Green’s part-time
job. Hall asked if Officer Green was “wearing a wire,” to which Green responded
that he was not. Officer Green was, in fact, wearing a wire. Officer Hall told
Officer Green that to get paid Green needed to contact Sergeant Lucas and, if
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necessary, the district attorney to let them know that Green had violated Leggs’s
rights. Officer Hall reported back to defendant Ryans about their meeting, telling
Ryans that “everything was good to go” and that they were “just waiting on
[Ryans] to get the money.”
A few days later, Officer Hall called Officer Green, and Green informed
Hall that he had contacted Sergeant Lucas and that Lucas was very upset with
Green about his “illegal” search of Leggs’s car. In reality, none of that was true,
and Officer Green was only furthering the investigation into Officer Hall.
At some point in early August, Officer Hall met with defendant Ryans, who
gave him $6,000 to bribe Officer Green.
On August 11, 2014, Officer Green again told Officer Hall that he had
cooperated and contacted Sergeant Lucas. In response, Officer Hall stated that
another officer got to Leggs first, meaning that Officer Green would not get paid.
Officer Hall said that his “boy” was still going to try to get a “stack” for Officer
Green. Officer Green encouraged this, suggesting that he “need[ed] something”
and that “if it was not for [him], none of this would be happening, anyway.”
Officer Hall responded that he would get Officer Green some money even if he
had to pay it out of his own pocket.
The next day, August 12, 2014, Officer Green sent a text message to Officer
Hall about needing the money before an upcoming meeting. Officer Hall called
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back and was upset about Officer Green putting that sort of information in a text
message because someone could be watching their phones.
Later that night, Officer Green met up with Officer Hall after briefing and
preparing the sting operation with the investigators. Officer Hall handed Officer
Green a stack of $20 bills in a rubber band and said “this [is] out of my own
pocket.” Officer Hall gave Officer Green $1,000 out of the $6,000 that defendant
Ryans had given him.
Officer Hall later told defendant Ryans that Officer Green had said that
Leggs was a drug dealer and could come up with more money for a bribe.
Defendant Ryans sent a text message to Officer Hall explaining that Leggs only
had $2,000 more.
On August 24, 2014, Leggs made one final payment after exchanging text
messages with defendant Ryans. Defendant Ryans said Leggs owed Officer
Hall—this time Ryans used the name Hall—the remaining $3,000 of the $18,000
Leggs initially had agreed to pay. Leggs did not have $3,000 but came up with
$2,000, which he gave to defendant Ryans. Defendant Ryans met with Officer
Hall that night and gave Hall the $2,000. Officer Hall kept the money.
In sum, defendant Ryans gave Officer Hall $8,000, but Hall gave Officer
Green only $1,000. Officer Hall spent the remaining money on fixing his cars.
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On September 2, 2014, the police arrested Leggs for trafficking cocaine in
connection with the July 29, 2014 traffic stop that started all of this. 3 In the present
case, Leggs pled guilty to conspiracy to commit bribery.
In December 2014, agents arrested Officer Hall on charges of bribery,
conspiracy, obstruction, and filing a false statement. Officer Hall initially told the
agents that he received only a $1,000 bribe. Eventually, Officer Hall admitted that
he had received $8,000. Officer Hall pled guilty to conspiracy to commit bribery.
This appeal involves only the charges against defendant Ryans.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Specifically, on February 27, 2015, a federal grand jury indicted defendant
Ryans on charges of (1) conspiracy to commit bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 371, (“Count One”); (2) aiding and abetting bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 666(a)(2) and 2, (“Count Two”); and (3) aiding and abetting the obstruction of
justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) and 2, (“Count Three”).
On December 10, 2015, after a four-day trial, the jury found defendant
Ryans guilty of all three counts.
At the close of the government’s case, defendant Ryans moved for a
judgment of acquittal on all counts. Defendant Ryans argued that the testimony of
the convicted felons “was incredible as a matter of law” and that the government
3
Leggs also testified that he paid an additional $15,000 to another STAC agent who was
pursuing Leggs and Leggs’s son.
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“failed to establish a prima facie case as to each and every count.” The district
court denied the motion, explaining that credibility determinations are typically left
for the jury.
On December 17, 2015, seven days after the jury verdict, defendant Ryans
moved for an extension of time of 45 days from December 17 to file a post-
judgment motion for judgment of acquittal or new trial. Defendant Ryans stated
that he needed the trial transcripts to prepare his motion. The district court granted
that motion in a docket order, which made defendant Ryans’s motion now due on
February 1, 2016.
On February 12, 2016, the trial transcripts were put on the district court’s
docket. Nonetheless, for five months from February 12 to July 15, counsel for
defendant Ryans did not file a motion for judgment of acquittal.
On July 15, 2016 during a telephone conference, counsel for defendant
Ryans orally requested an additional 30 days to file a motion for judgment of
acquittal, and the district court rejected that request.
On July 21, 2016, defendant Ryans then filed a written motion for
reconsideration of the district court’s oral denial of Ryans’s request for an
additional 30-day extension of time to file a motion for judgment of acquittal. In
the motion, defendant Ryans’s counsel explained that she (1) had been busy with
another complex federal bankruptcy trial with an obstructionist client; (2) had
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needed to wait until the trial record in this case was received to work on the motion
for acquittal; and (3) had no access to client files from April 28, 2016 until May
18, 2016. That same day, defendant Ryans’s counsel also filed a written motion
for judgment of acquittal of Ryans under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.
The district court denied both motions without explanation.
On August 1, 2016, the district court sentenced defendant Ryans to a 30-
month prison term on each of Counts One through Three, to be served
concurrently. Defendant Ryans timely appealed.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Denial of the Motions for Extension of Time and Untimely Motion for
Judgment of Acquittal
We construe defendant Ryans’s brief as challenging the district court’s
denial of all three of his motions: (1) his July 15, 2016 oral motion for extension of
time, (2) his July 21, 2016 motion for reconsideration of the denial of his oral
motion for extension of time, and (3) his July 21, 2016 motion for judgment of
acquittal.4 The district court did not abuse its discretion in not granting defendant
Ryans additional time, and his post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal was
untimely. Alternatively, even if we consider the post-trial motion for judgment of
acquittal as timely, that motion fails on the merits as discussed later. Defendant
4
We review the district court’s decision on excusable neglect for an abuse of discretion.
Advanced Estimating Sys., Inc. v. Riney, 77 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
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Ryans thus suffered no prejudice from the district court’s denial of any of the three
motions.
As to timeliness, a motion for judgment of acquittal is due within 14 days
after a guilty verdict. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(1). Thus, defendant Ryans’s motion
for judgment of acquittal was initially due on December 24, 2015. The district
court granted a 45-day extension (from December 17, 2015) of time to file such a
motion, making the motion due on February 1, 2016. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
45(a)(1)(C) (extending the deadline from Sunday to Monday). Defendant Ryans,
however, did not even ask the district court for more time until over five months
later during a July 15, 2016 telephone conference.
A district court may for “good cause” extend a deadline after the deadline
has expired “if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Crim.
P. 45(b)(1). The determination of excusable neglect “is at bottom an equitable one,
taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s omission.”
Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395, 113
S. Ct. 1489, 1498 (1993). The relevant circumstances include (1) “the danger of
prejudice,” (2) “the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial
proceedings,” (3) “the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the
reasonable control of the movant,” and (4) “whether the movant acted in good
faith.” Id.11
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Defendant Ryans has failed to demonstrate that the district court erred by not
finding excusable neglect. None of the first three factors support defendant
Ryans’s position. First, there is no prejudice to defendant Ryans as the issues
raised in his untimely post-judgment motion for judgment of acquittal are the same
as those raised in the remainder of this appeal, such as his challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. While counsel did not file a
timely post-trial motion for acquittal, counsel did move for an acquittal at the close
of the evidence and preserved the sufficiency of the evidence issue. As discussed
later, there is ample evidence to support defendant Ryans’s convictions, and thus
he cannot show prejudice from counsel’s failure to file a timely post-trial motion
for judgment of acquittal. Thus defendant Ryans suffered no prejudice from the
denial of his motions for extension of time or his untimely post-trial motion for
judgment of acquittal, which, even if timely, would fail on the merits.
Second, the length of the delay was significant—five months after the
expiration of an already extended deadline. Third, defendant Ryans’s counsel has
not established that the reasons for the delay—another difficult case and the need
for trial transcripts—were outside of her reasonable control. The trial transcripts
were available in February 2016, and counsel could have moved for another
extension at a much earlier date when it became apparent that her other case would
be time consuming. Even if there is no evidence of bad faith by defendant Ryans,
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his trial counsel’s good faith alone is insufficient in this case to find that the trial
court abused its discretion. The district court thus properly denied defendant
Ryans’s motions for an extension of time.
To the extent defendant Ryans contends that the district court should have
addressed his motion for judgment of acquittal because he raised a jurisdictional
challenge that would not be time barred, we reject this argument. First, defendant
Ryans’s motion challenged only the sufficiency of the evidence as to the value of
the city’s business under 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) and not as to whether the City of
Huntsville received $10,000 in federal benefits under § 666(b). See United States
v. McLean, 802 F.3d 1228, 1240 (11th Cir. 2015) (describing the § 666(b)
receiving federal benefits requirement as the “jurisdictional element”). Defendant
Ryans conceded that the evidence established that the City of Huntsville received
more than $10,000 in federal benefits, satisfying § 666(b) the jurisdictional
element. Second, as discussed below, the evidence at trial was more than
sufficient to prove the necessary elements of § 666. The district court thus did not
err in denying defendant Ryans’s motions for an extension of time or his post-trial
motion for judgment of acquittal.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) allows for the imprisonment of whomever:
corruptly gives, offers, or agrees to give anything of value to any
person, with intent to influence or reward an agent of an organization
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or of a State, local or Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof,
in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions
of such organization, government, or agency involving anything of
value of $5,000 or more.
18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2). 5 In other words, defendant Ryans violated § 666(a)(2) if he
(1) gave a City of Huntsville employee anything of value (2) with the corrupt
intent to influence or reward them (3) in connection with any business, transaction,
or series of transactions of the City of Huntsville involving anything of value of
$5,000 or more. United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1186 (11th Cir. 2010).
Defendant Ryans contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove the
third element—that the bribes were “in connection with any business, transaction,
or series of transactions of such organization, government, or agency involving
anything of value of $5,000 or more.” 6
The phrase “anything of value” includes “intangibles, such as freedom from
jail.” United States v. Townsend, 630 F.3d 1003, 1011 (11th Cir. 2011)
(interpreting the phrase “any thing of value” under 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B), the
companion to § 666(a)(2) that prohibits demanding or soliciting a bribe); United
5
The relevant organization, government, or agency must also receive over $10,000 from
the federal government in any one year period. 18 U.S.C. § 666(b). Here, testimony at trial
clearly showed that the City of Huntsville and the STAC unit received over $100,000 in grants
from the federal government and that Officer Green was an employee of the City of Huntsville.
6
We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, resolving all reasonable inferences
in favor of the jury’s verdict. United States v. Medina, 485 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2007).
The evidence must be sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the government has proven the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1296-97.
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States v. Moore, 525 F.3d 1033, 1048 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that “this Court
has held that the term ‘thing of value’ unambiguously covers intangible
considerations” for other federal bribery statutes); see also McNair, 605 F.3d at1186 n.38 (treating the $5,000 value requirement in § 666(a)(1)(B) and § 666(a)(2)
the same). We conclude that under § 666(a)(2) “anything of value” includes
intangibles. In this case, the intangible thing of value was Leggs’s freedom from
jail.
To determine the value of an intangible obtained, or sought, through bribery,
this Court uses a “market approach,” in which “the value of an intangible in the
black market of corruption is set at the monetary value of what a willing bribe-
giver gives and what a willing bribe-taker takes in exchange for the intangible.”
Townsend, 630 F.3d at 1012; see also McNair, 605 F.3d at 1186 n.38 (“Where the
bribe-giver receives an intangible benefit, some courts have used the bribe amount
as a proxy to stand for the value of the business or transaction.”).
The district court did not err in denying defendant Ryans’s motion for
judgment of acquittal because there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Ryans aided and abetted Leggs and
Officer Hall’s offering a police officer (Officer Green) a bribe in connection with
anything of value of $5,000 or more. Leggs, the bribe-giver, told Ryans that he
could not put a price on his freedom. Leggs even agreed to a total bribe of
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$18,000, which indicates how much he values the intangible benefit of staying out
of prison. In any event, Ryans paid Officer Hall $8,000, which is itself over the
$5,000 threshold. The fact that Officer Green actually received only $1,000 is
immaterial to determining the market value of the intangible benefit.
C. Constitutionality of § 666(a)(2)
Defendant Ryans contends that § 666(a)(2) is unconstitutionally vague and
exceeds Congress’s powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause of the
Constitution. Here, we review defendant Ryans’s challenge to the constitutionality
of § 666(a)(2) for plain error because he raises it for the first time on appeal.
United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 2010). 7 There can be no
plain error “[w]ithout precedent directly resolving” the claim. United States v.
Humphrey, 164 F.3d 585, 588 (11th Cir. 1999).
Defendant Ryans has neither provided any explanation for how § 666(a)(2)
is vague nor cited any controlling precedent addressing § 666(a)(2). Indeed, this
Court previously rejected an as-applied vagueness challenge to the materially
similar § 666(a)(1)(B). United States v. Nelson, 712 F.3d 498, 508 (11th Cir.
2013). A criminal statute is only void for vagueness “if it fails to provide people of
7
Plain error occurs where “there is: ‘(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects
substantial rights.’” United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting
United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1297 (11th Cir. 2005)). If these three conditions are
met, an appellate court then has “discretion to notice a forfeited error” if “the error seriously
affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quoting
Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1297).
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ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it
prohibits.” United States v. Wayerski, 624 F.3d 1342, 1347 (11th Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, a person of ordinary intelligence would
understand that § 666(a)(2) prohibits bribing a police officer to lie about an
investigation and a search.
Defendant Ryans does not cite any binding precedent directly resolving
whether § 666(a)(2) exceeds the scope of Congress’s constitutional authority,
instead relying on a concurring Supreme Court opinion and a district court case
from another circuit. On that basis alone we would find no plain error occurred.
More significantly, however, the Supreme Court has directly addressed the
constitutional challenge raised by defendant Ryans and rejected it. Sabri v. United
States, 541 U.S. 600, 124 S. Ct. 1941 (2004). In Sabri, the Supreme Court upheld
§ 666(a)(2) as a valid exercise of Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause
and the Necessary and Proper Clause. Id. at 605-607, 124 S. Ct. at 1945-47.
Justice Thomas’s dissent in that case does not permit us to ignore binding Supreme
Court precedent or to find plain error. Defendant Ryans’s constitutional challenge
under those clauses therefore fails.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant Ryans’s convictions.
AFFIRMED.
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