Vrain Scott v. Department of Corrections State of Florida

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-11873 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar JAN 19, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:07-cv-23034-FAM
VRAIN SCOTT,
lllllllllllllllllllll Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS STATE OF FLORIDA,
Walter A. McNeil, Secretary,
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FLORIDA,
lllllllllllllllllllll Respondents-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(January 19, 2011)
Before BLACK, PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This is the second time we have reviewed the denial of a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus sought by Vrain Scott. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Scott petitioned for
relief on the ground that a Florida court resentenced him based on a finding of fact
not made by the jury at trial, in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,
120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). The district court denied Scott’s petition as successive
and untimely, but we vacated that decision and remanded for further proceedings.
Scott v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr, No. 08-10471 (11th Cir. Jan. 13, 2009). On remand,
the district court ruled that the decision of the state court was not contrary to or an
unreasonable application of federal law. We affirm.
Scott argues that the state court violated his right to a trial by jury by
adjudicating him guilty of robbery with a weapon without a specific finding to that
effect by a jury, but this argument fails. Under the Florida statute, a defendant is
guilty of robbery in the first degree whether he “carried a firearm or other deadly
weapon,” Fla. Stat. § 813.12(2)(a), or “carried a weapon,” id. § 813.12(2)(b). The
jury found Scott guilty of “armed robbery,” but the jury did not make a special
finding that he carried a firearm. After collateral review, Scott was resentenced as
guilty of robbery with a weapon instead of robbery with a firearm. See Mashburn
v. State, 745 So. 2d 453, 454 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). We will not review how
the state courts reconciles the robbery statute and jury verdicts. See Marshall v.
Sec., Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 610 F.3d 576, 583 (11th Cir. 2010) (“‘[F]ederal courts do
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not sit to revisit a state supreme court’s judgment as to whether the trial court
complied with state law.’” (quoting Bolender v. Singletary, 16 F.3d 1547, 1570
(11th Cir. 1994)).
The district court correctly denied Scott habeas relief because the state court
reasonably concluded that Scott’s sentence did not violate Apprendi. The
Supreme Court held in Apprendi that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction,
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
530 U.S. at 490, 120 S. Ct. at 2362–63. The state court reasonably relied on the
verdict of the jury that Scott committed armed robbery to adjudicate Scott guilty of
robbery with a weapon.
We AFFIRM the denial of Scott’s petition.
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