Girard H. Rodgers, Jr. v. Costa Crociere, S.P.A.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DEC 13, 2010
No. 09-15247
JOHN LEY
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 08-60233-CV-WPD
GIRARD H. RODGERS, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COSTA CROCIERE, S.P.A.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
(December 13, 2010)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, FAY, Circuit Judge, and GOLDBERG,* Judge.
PER CURIAM:
*
Honorable Richard W. Goldberg, United States Court of International Trade Judge, sitting
by designation.
Plaintiff-Appellant Girard Rodgers appeals the jury verdict and the partial
grant of summary judgment by the district court finding that Costa Crociere,
S.P.A. (“Costa”) was not liable for injuries sustained when he slipped and fell
down a flight of stairs while on a cruise ship operated by Costa. Rodgers argues
that summary judgment was inappropriate as to his claims that the vessel, the
MAGICA, was improperly designed and the flight of stairs in question improperly
installed. He further argues that the district court abused its discretion by
excluding two work orders issued subsequent to his accident that he claims
impeached the testimony of two of Costa’s witnesses. Rodgers also claims that
the jury verdict was against the great weight of the evidence and that the district
court erroneously permitted a peremptory challenge of a juror made on the basis of
that juror’s race.
On March 5, 2007, Rodgers was attending a gala reception in the Urbino
theater on the MAGICA cruise ship. Rodgers was wearing a pair of expensive
Gucci loafers with a protruding front lip. Because he had a flute of champagne in
hand and camera slung over his shoulder, he was not using the stair handrails as he
descended into the theater. At some point Rodgers slipped and fell. According to
him, the front lip of his shoe caught on the raised metal of one of the stairway
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steps. Rodgers suffered five broken ribs, a punctured and collapsed lung, and a
back injury.
The MAGICA was constructed by an Italian shipyard, Fincantieri Cantier
Navali Italiana. The ship was inspected by Carnival Corporation Shipbuilding
before being turned over to Costa. Neither of these companies was joined as
defendants.
Rodgers filed suit against Costa on February 20, 2008, alleging negligence
in failing to maintain the subject staircase in a reasonably safe condition. He
amended his complaint to also allege that Costa had created a hazardous condition
by improperly designing and installing the staircase. Following Costa’s motion
for summary judgment, the district court allowed the negligence claim to go to
trial. On the design and installation claim, however, the court found that Rodgers
had failed to present any evidence showing that Costa was responsible for the
ship’s design or the stairs’ installation and granted summary judgment on that
claim.
During voir dire, one potential juror, Willie Royal, disclosed that he had
50% hearing loss in one ear. Costa exercised a peremptory challenge on Royal.
Rodgers raised a Batson1 challenge, but the district court found that Costa’s
1
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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asserted race-neutral basis for striking Royal – his hearing problem – was
sufficient to overcome that challenge.
Following a seven-day trial, a verdict was returned in favor of Costa.
Rodgers moved for a new trial, claiming errors had been committed by the district
court. The motion was denied, and this appeal followed.
The issues before this court are as follows:
(1) Did the district court abuse its discretion by refusing to admit
subsequent remedial measures for the purpose of impeaching testimony offered by
Costa?
(2) Was summary judgment properly granted on Rodgers’s claim that Costa
was responsible for the negligent design and installation of the stairwell and
handrails in the theater where his fall occurred?
(3) Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Rodgers’s motion
for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was against the great weight of the
evidence, and did the district court clearly err in finding that Costa had provided a
non-discriminatory reason for striking an African-American juror?
Determinations of admissibility are within the trial court’s discretion and
will not be disturbed absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. United States
v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1513 (11th Cir. 1994).
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This court reviews de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment,
and will construe all the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136 (11th Cir. 2007).
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), a motion for summary judgment is properly granted
when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986).
A motion for new trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard,
Insurance Company of America v. Valente, 933 F.2d 921, 923 (11th Cir. 1991),
whereas the court’s resolution of a Batson challenge is reviewed under the clearly
erroneous standard. United States v. Blackman, 66 F.3d 1572, 1575 (11th Cir.
1995).
After reviewing the record, reading the parties’ briefs, and having the
benefit of oral argument, we first conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by not admitting the information contained in the work orders produced
after Rodgers’s accident because they did not directly contradict and impeach the
testimony of Costa’s witnesses. The district court based its decision not to admit
the work orders on two key points: (1) The work orders were not generated by the
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witnesses; and (2) the work orders may have been based on customer complaints
rather than a defect actually witnessed by one of Costa’s staff members.
Second, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
granting summary judgment on Rodgers’s negligent design theory of liability,
where there was no evidence whatsoever that Costa actually designed the stairs or
the hand rails. Because neither the facts nor the law support Rodgers’s negligent
design theory, we conclude the district court properly disposed of this
unsubstantiated claim prior to trial.
Third, we conclude that the great weight of the evidence supports the jury’s
verdict in this case. The evidence presented at trial indicate that Rodgers was
walking down the stairs, not holding the hand rails, with a flute of champagne in
his hand, rushing to attend a gala he was late for, while looking for somewhere to
sit. Apparently, the jury determined that Rodgers was simply the victim of his
own inattention.
Finally, we conclude that Rodgers’s Batson challenge is without merit. The
record demonstrates that juror Royal had difficulty hearing. Clearly, this is a
valid, non-discriminatory reason for striking a juror. For the aforementioned
reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment and the
judgment entered on the jury’s verdict in favor of Costa.
AFFIRMED.
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