United States v. Arturo Morales

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-12656 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar MARCH 2, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:91-cr-00839-KMM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllll lPlaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ARTURO MORALES,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(March 2, 2011)
Before HULL, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Arturo Morales appeals his 33-month sentence, imposed upon the
revocation of his supervised release. On appeal, Morales argues that his sentence
was procedurally unreasonable because the district court did not adequately
address his arguments at sentencing or take into consideration the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors. Morales also argues that his sentence was substantively
unreasonable because it was greater than necessary to meet the § 3553(a)
sentencing goals.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse of
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S. Ct. 586, 591,
169 L. Ed. 2d 445 (2007). Under the abuse of discretion standard, the sentence
will be affirmed “unless we find that the district court has made a clear error of
judgment.” United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (en
banc).
In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we conduct a two-step
review, first ensuring that the sentence was procedurally reasonable, meaning the
district court properly calculated the guidelines range, treated the guidelines range
as advisory, considered the § 3553(a) factors, did not select a sentence based on
clearly erroneous facts, and “adequately explain[ed] the chosen sentence.” Gall,
552 U.S. at 51, 128 S. Ct. at 597. When revoking a defendant’s term of supervised
release, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) instructs courts to consider certain 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) sentencing factors in determining an appropriate sentence. Specifically,
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sentencing courts must consider (1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense
and the history and characteristics of the defendant”; (2) the need to adequately
deter criminal conduct; (3) the need “to protect the public from further crimes of
the defendant”; (4) the need “to provide the defendant with educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment”; (5) the
applicable sentencing range; (6) any pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing
Commission; (7) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (8)
“the need to provide restitution to any victims.” See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1),
(a)(2)(B)-(D), (a)(4)-(7), 3583(e).
At the time of sentencing, the court shall state its reasons for imposing the
particular sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). However, the court is not required “to
state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or
to discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324,
1329 (11th Cir. 2005). Rather, it is within the district court’s “own professional
judgment” to determine the detail necessary in its statement of reasons. Rita v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2468, 168 L. Ed. 2d 203
(2007). It may be clear from the circumstances of the case that the district court
rests its “decision upon the Commission’s own reasoning that the Guidelines
sentence is a proper sentence (in terms of § 3553(a) and other congressional
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mandates) in the typical case, and that the [court] has found that the case before
[it] is typical.” Id., 551 U.S. at 357, 127 S. Ct. at 2468. Thus, the court’s
acknowledgment that it has considered the § 3553(a) factors together with the
parties’ arguments is sufficient. See United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786
(11th Cir. 2005).
Once we determine that a sentence is procedurally sound, we must examine
whether the sentence was substantively reasonable in light of the record and the
§ 3553(a) factors. Talley, 431 F.3d at 788. The district court is required to impose
a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the
purposes” listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), including the need to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment
for the offense, adequately deter criminal conduct, protect the public from further
criminal conduct by the defendant, and provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training or medical care. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). In
imposing a particular sentence, the court must also consider the nature and
circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the
kinds of sentences available, the applicable guidelines range, the pertinent policy
statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims. Id.
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§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(3)-(7). We expect a sentence within the guidelines range to be
reasonable. United States v. Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d 720, 735 (11th Cir. 2010).
The party challenging the sentence has the burden of establishing that the sentence
was unreasonable. Talley, 431 F.3d at 788.
Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we
affirm. First, Morales’s sentence was procedurally reasonable. The district court
correctly calculated the guidelines range, gave the parties the opportunity to
address the court, considered the parties’ statements and the violation report, and
determined that a sentence within the guidelines range was appropriate. Morales
argues that the district court erred by not considering his principle arguments.
However, Morales himself chose not to make any arguments at his revocation, and
his attorney merely asked for a sentence at the low end of the guidelines range
because Morales was serving a life sentence in Alabama. Immediately after
Morales’s attorney made that request, the court stated that it had “carefully
considered the statements of all parties.” Therefore, the record indicates that the
court did consider Morales’s principle arguments, and Morales’s sentence was
procedurally reasonable.
Morales’s sentence was also substantively reasonable in light of the record
and the § 3553(a) factors. The court’s 33-month sentence was within the
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guidelines range, and we ordinarily expect such a sentence to be reasonable. See
Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d at 735. The sentence also met the goals encompassed
within 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Morales served twelve years in prison after he
pleaded guilty to nine drug-related counts in this case, and, within a year of his
release, Morales had already violated his supervised release and trafficked cocaine
and marijuana. He has shown a disregard for the laws of the United States, and his
guidelines sentence was necessary to promote respect for the law, provide just
punishment, and deter him from future criminal activity. Furthermore, Morales
has not pointed to any facts to support his claim that his sentence was
substantively unreasonable. Therefore, the district court’s sentence was
substantively reasonable. Accordingly, we affirm Morales’s 33-month sentence.
Morales’s request for oral argument is denied.
AFFIRMED.
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