United States v. Terrell Maurice mars

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-12735 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar MARCH 23, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 4:08-cr-00040-CDL-GMF-3
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
TERRELL MAURICE MARS,
a.k.a. Maurice Mars,
Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
________________________
(March 23, 2011)
Before EDMONDSON, PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Terrell Maurice Mars appeals his conviction for bank robbery, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). On appeal, Mars argues that the district court abused its
discretion when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because Mars was
effectively unrepresented by counsel at the hearing regarding this motion.
We review a district court’s decision to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty
plea for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Brehm, 442 F.3d 1291, 1298
(11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). The district court does not abuse its discretion
unless its decision is arbitrary or unreasonable. Id. The district court may allow a
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea after the court has accepted the plea but before
it has imposed a sentence if “the defendant can show a fair and just reason for
requesting the withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). We consider four
factors when reviewing the district court’s decision: “(1) whether close assistance
of counsel was available; (2) whether the plea was knowing and voluntary; (3)
whether judicial resources would be conserved; and (4) whether the government
would be prejudiced if the defendant were allowed to withdraw his plea.” Brehm,
442 F.3d at 1298 (quotation omitted). A guilty plea is knowing and voluntary if
the defendant entered the plea without coercion and with the understanding of the
nature of the charges and the consequences of the plea. United States v. Brown,
586 F.3d 1342, 1346 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2403 (2010).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mars’s motion to
2
withdraw his guilty plea because Mars did not demonstrate that he had a fair and
just reason for the requested withdrawal. First, Mars had close assistance of
counsel leading up to his guilty plea. Second, during his plea colloquy, Mars
stated that he was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily, that he understood the
nature of the charges against him, that he understood the consequences of pleading
guilty, and that he was completely satisfied with his attorney’s advice and
representation. These statements are presumed to be true. See United States v.
Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994) (“There is a strong presumption that
the statements made during the [plea] colloquy are true.”). Third, judicial
resources would not be conserved and the government might be prejudiced if Mars
were allowed to withdraw his guilty plea and go to trial.
Mars’s claim that the district court abused its discretion because he was
unrepresented at the hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea also fails.
The district court explicitly denied Mars’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea
before it granted Mars’s attorney’s motion to withdraw from further
representation. The court also explicitly noted that Mars was represented at the
hearing, and the court gave Mars’s attorney the opportunity to make a statement at
the hearing. Accordingly, we affirm Mars’s conviction.
AFFIRMED.
3