United States v. Letrenton Napoleon Nickles

Case: 15-14542 Date Filed: 07/08/2016 Page: 1 of 3
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-14542
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cr-00014-CB-C-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
LETRENTON NAPOLEON NICKLES,
Defendant - Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
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(July 8, 2016)
Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Letrenton Nickles appeals his 264-month sentence, challenging the district
court’s ruling that he was a career offender under the sentencing guidelines. He
also contends that the residual clause of the career offender guideline is
unconstitutionally vague. After review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we
affirm.
Mr. Nickles plead guilty to three counts: carjacking, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2119 (count one); brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime
of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (count two); and being a
felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (count three).
Based on the career offender guideline, his advisory sentencing range was 161–180
months’ imprisonment. See generally U.S.S.G. § § 4B1.1, 4B1.2. The district court
sentenced Mr. Nickles to 180 months in prison, the top end of the advisory
guideline range. The district court also imposed a mandatory consecutive term of
84 months for count two under § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Mr. Nickles’ total prison
sentence was 264 months.
On appeal, Mr. Nickles first argues that neither his prior Alabama
manslaughter conviction nor his federal carjacking offense constitute crimes of
violence under the “force” clause of § 4B1.2. Mr. Nickles acknowledges that he
did not raise this argument in the district court, so we review it for plain error. See
Appellant’s Br. at 8.
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We need not decide whether Mr. Nickles’ assertion of procedural sentencing
error under the advisory guidelines is correct. The district court stated that, even if
it had mistakenly found Mr. Nickles to be a career offender, it would have still
imposed the same 264-month sentence. D.E. 67 at 25. See United States v. Keene,
470 F.3d 1347, 1349-50 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that because defendant’s
sentence was reasonable in light of his prior convictions, and because the district
court stated that it would have imposed the same sentence even if it had misapplied
the sentencing guidelines, it would make no sense to set aside the sentence and
remand the case back to the district court). Because Mr. Nickles does not challenge
the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, there is no reversible error. See,
e.g., United States v. Dean, 517 F.3d 1224, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Keene, 470 F.3d 1347, 1350 (11th Cir. 2006).
Mr. Nickles’ other argument—that the residual clause of the career offender
guideline is unconstitutionally vague—is foreclosed by circuit precedent. In United
States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1193-94 (11th Cir. 2015), we held that the
vagueness principle articulated in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015),
does not apply to the advisory guidelines.
We affirm Mr. Nickles’ sentence.
AFFIRMED
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