Robert Joe McBride v. Marcus McMillian

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-15779
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cv-00815-AT
ROBERT JOE MCBRIDE,
WESTERN EXPRESS, INC.,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
versus
MARCUS MCMILLIAN,
Defendant - Appellant,
THE ATLANTA ORTHOPAEDIC SURGERY CENTER, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(February 13, 2017)
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Before MARTIN, JULIE CARNES, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant challenges the district court’s discharge of interpleader Plaintiffs
from action and entry of a permanent injunction in Plaintiffs’ favor. Concluding
that Plaintiffs deposited the proper amount of money with the court and that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in granting Plaintiffs’ request for a
permanent injunction, we AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant Marcus McMillian (“McMillian”) was awarded a $264,600
judgment against Plaintiffs Robert McBride and Western Express (“Plaintiffs”) on
March 4, 2015, following a jury trial. Claiming that lawyers, medical providers,
and others have liens on or competing claims to the judgment, Plaintiffs brought an
interpleader complaint against McMillian and those who assert, or who could
assert, claims to the judgment funds. Plaintiffs brought the claim under both 28
U.S.C. § 1335 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22. They also sought a
permanent injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 2361 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
65 to restrain future proceedings against the judgment funds outside of the
interpleader action.
The district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to deposit the judgment funds
with the court. The district court also issued a temporary restraining order against
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McMillian preventing him from executing on the judgment, and later a preliminary
injunction to preserve the status quo while the court decided how to allocate the
funds. In support of their motion for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs submitted
a supplemental brief, which included a chart with the amount of money claimed
against the judgment by each individual or entity, which amount totaled
$531,970.88. As this was over twice the judgment amount, Plaintiffs argued they
were exposed to multiple liability to those who claimed an interest in the judgment.
In his answer to the complaint, McMillian—acting pro se in this case—
admitted that the complaint arose from a tort judgment of $264,600, and asked the
court to award him the full judgment amount and all accrued interest. Plaintiffs
moved to permanently enjoin proceedings against them concerning the judgment
funds and to be dismissed from the action, arguing that they had deposited the
required amount with the court and had otherwise satisfied the statutory
requirements of an interpleader action.
McMillian subsequently amended his answer, adding a defense that stated he
rejected Plaintiffs’ claims “in the amount of liability exposed and coverage relative
to its policy,” as well as changing his prayer for relief to cover the “entire proceeds
apparent and inherent from the judgment.” McMillian also responded to Plaintiffs’
motion for a permanent injunction and discharge, arguing that Plaintiffs could not
be discharged from the action because they did not post the correct amount with
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the court. McMillian claimed the proper deposit amount is the full limit available
under Plaintiff’s relevant insurance policy, which McMillian claims is $4,500,000,
rather than simply the judgment amount.
On November 4, 2015, the district court found that Plaintiffs had met the
statutory requirements for an interpleader action and were entitled to be dismissed.
The court stated that McMillian had no legitimate claim to any amount of money
beyond the amount of the judgment entered—which was all that McMillian had
initially claimed—so no higher deposit amount was required. The court also
granted a permanent injunction against McMillian and the other claimants,
preventing them from bringing any actions against Plaintiffs concerning the
judgment funds.
McMillian filed a motion to reconsider on November 30, arguing that the
dismissal and injunction were improper because Plaintiffs did not deposit the
correct amount with the court. The district court rejected McMillian’s motion.
The court explained that because this was not a case in which an insurance
company was seeking to determine who was entitled to insurance policy proceeds,
the limits of any insurance policy held by Plaintiffs was irrelevant. The court
further noted that the only pool of money at issue was the judgment, and that the
amount of the judgment was not disputed, so McMillian failed to show why he was
entitled to anything else.
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McMillian appealed the November 4 order on December 29, 2015.
Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely, but a panel of this Court denied
that motion and noted as well that diversity-based subject matter jurisdiction
existed in this case. On appeal, McMillian addresses only Plaintiffs’ action under
statutory interpleader. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 2361.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review the district court’s decision to grant relief to an interpleader
plaintiff for an abuse of discretion. See Zelaya/Capital Int’l Judgment, LLC v.
Zelaya, 769 F.3d 1296, 1300 (11th Cir. 2014) (reviewing under an abuse-of-
discretion standard the district court’s order allowing judgment debtor to deposit
disputed funds into the court’s registry); Auto Parts Mfg. Mississippi, Inc. v. King
Const. of Houston, L.L.C., 782 F.3d 186, 192 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom.
Noatex Corp. v. Auto Parts Mfg. Mississippi Inc., 136 S. Ct. 330 (2015) (“We
review the district court’s grant of injunctive relief in an interpleader action for
abuse of discretion.”).
B. McMillian’s Challenge to Discharge and Permanent Injunction
Interpleader allows a party who holds money claimed by multiple adverse
claimants “[to] avoid[] multiple liability by asking the court to determine the
asset’s rightful owner.” In re Mandalay Shores Co-op. Hous. Ass’n, Inc., 21 F.3d
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380, 383 (11th Cir. 1994). The party holding the funds “typically claims no
interest in [the] asset and does not know the asset’s rightful owner.” Id. A
plaintiff can initiate a statutory interpleader action when two or more adverse
claimants of diverse citizenship assert claims to funds worth $500 or more, and the
plaintiff deposits the funds with the court. 28 U.S.C. § 1335. The court can
entertain a interpleader action even if the plaintiff does not deposit the full amount
claimed, so long as “the full amount of the specific ‘fund’” in dispute is deposited
with the court. Murphy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 534 F.2d 1155, 1159 n.2 (5th Cir.
1976). 1 Once the plaintiff deposits the funds with the court, “all legal obligations
to the [] claimants are satisfied,” and the court enters “a discharge judgment on
behalf of the [plaintiff].” In re Mandalay Shores, 21 F.3d at 383; see 28 U.S.C.
§ 2361. The district court also has the authority to enter a permanent injunction to
restrain all claimants from instituting any proceeding against the interpleader
plaintiff concerning the res of the interpleader action. 28 U.S.C. § 2361; see also
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 534 (1967) (noting the
purpose of enjoining suits under § 2361 is to protect the interpleader plaintiff from
“vexatious and multiple litigation”).
McMillian contends that the district court erred in discharging Plaintiffs
from the action because Plaintiffs did not deposit enough money with the court.
1
This Court adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions prior to October 1, 1981.
Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
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McMillian also argues that the district court improperly granted the injunction
because it failed in its order to apply the standard four-factor test governing the
granting of permanent injunctions. Neither argument is persuasive.
McMillian has not shown that the amount of the judgment is disputed, nor
that he is entitled to any amount greater than the $264,600 judgment, plus interest,
that has been deposited with the court. Indeed, McMillian himself initially
admitted that he was only seeking the amount of the judgment. By claiming the
full limits available under Plaintiffs’ insurance coverage and calling for that
amount to be deposited with the court, McMillian attacks the underlying judgment
as inadequate and seeks to enlarge his recovery. This he simply cannot do in this
proceeding. To the extent that the amount of the liens and claims against the
judgment exceeds the funds available—which is the case because McMillian
claims entitlement to the entirety of the judgment—it is an issue between
McMillian and the other claimants, because it is McMillian who is liable to those
individuals. That McMillian may owe money to these claimants does not warrant
increasing the amount of money awarded to him in the judgment against Plaintiffs,
the extent of which already has been established as the judgment amount.
Plaintiffs have deposited with the court the correct amount of funds, and so were
properly discharged from this action. See In re Mandalay Shores, 21 F.3d at 383.
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Though McMillian argues the district court erred by not laying out the four-
factor test for applying a permanent injunction, 2 he only specifically argues that
Plaintiffs’ “poor claims handling, misconduct[,] and misrepresentation[] would
prevent a showing of success on the merits.” The district court considered
Plaintiffs’ allegedly unsavory behavior towards McMillian in his efforts to collect
on the judgment when declining to award Plaintiffs their attorney’s fees, but
recognized that the undisputed existence of attorney’s and physician’s liens on the
judgment nevertheless permitted an interpleader action under the statute. We
therefore find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s grant of a permanent
injunction in Plaintiffs’ favor.
III. CONCLUSION
An interpleader plaintiff is entitled to discharge from the interpleader action
if he meets the statutory requirements for interpleader under 28 U.S.C. § 1335,
which includes depositing the disputed funds with the court. The district court also
has the discretion to enter a permanent injunction against any interpleader
defendants to restrain them from taking further actions against the plaintiff.
Because Plaintiffs met the statutory requirements for interpleader by properly
2
It is questionable whether we should even consider this argument. This Court generally will
not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal, except under special circumstances,
Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004), which we conclude
do not apply in this case. McMillian did not attack the district court’s application of the
permanent injunction standard in his motion for reconsideration, and so he raises this issue for
the first time on appeal.
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depositing the full amount of required funds, the district court had the authority to
discharge Plaintiffs from this action and to enter a permanent injunction restraining
further actions against Plaintiffs regarding the judgment proceeds in dispute. The
district court did not abuse its discretion in discharging Plaintiffs or granting the
injunction, so the district court’s order is AFFIRMED.
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