United States v. Christopher Jacob Rankins

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 18-12991
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 3:17-cr-00121-MCR-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHRISTOPHER JACOB RANKINS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
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(February 4, 2019)
Before WILSON, GRANT, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Between his sentencing for tax fraud and his self-surrender date to serve
time for that offense, Christopher Jacob Rankins lied to a gun dealer about his
criminal history. The district court assessed two criminal history points because it
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determined that Rankins committed the lying-to-a-gun-dealer offense “while under
any criminal justice sentence.” Because our precedent makes clear that a person
who has been sentenced is “under” a criminal justice sentence—even if he has not
yet begun to serve it—we affirm.
I.
On November 3, 2017, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Florida sentenced Rankins for twelve counts of tax fraud and set a self-surrender
date of January 3, 2018. On November 5—after Rankins had been sentenced, but
before his self-surrender date to begin serving that sentence—Rankins attempted to
purchase a pistol from a firearms dealer in Pensacola. In doing so, he falsely
represented that he had never been convicted of a felony. Rankins was rearrested
and ultimately pled guilty to one count of making a false statement to a firearms
dealer.
In calculating the Guidelines range for Rankins’s second offense, the district
court—over Rankins’s objection—assessed two criminal history points under
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d), which applies “if the defendant committed the instant offense
while under any criminal justice sentence, including probation, parole, supervised
release, imprisonment, work release, or escape status.” This bumped his
Guidelines range from 12–18 months’ to 15–21 months’ imprisonment. The
district court sentenced Rankins to 10 months’ imprisonment, and Rankins now
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argues that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court
erred in concluding he was “under any criminal justice sentence” during his period
of release between sentencing and his self-surrender date.
II.
We review the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de
novo. United States v. Ellis, 419 F.3d 1189, 1192 (11th Cir. 2005).
III.
Although our review of the district court’s decision is de novo, our review of
the guideline at issue is not. Our analysis here is controlled by our decision in
United States v. Martinez, 931 F.2d 851 (11th Cir. 1991).
In Martinez, the defendant was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment for
conspiracy to distribute cocaine and was released pending his self-surrender date.
He absconded, and after being recaptured over two years later, he pled guilty to
failure to surrender for service. The district court assessed two criminal history
points under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d), and we affirmed because we concluded that the
defendant “was ‘under [a] criminal justice sentence’ from the time he was
sentenced by the district court, regardless of when he was expected to begin
serving that sentence.” 931 F.2d at 852–53.
Rankins contends that our rule statement in Martinez was dicta because
Martinez’s failure to surrender for service was a continuing offense that stretched
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beyond his self-surrender date—that is, beyond the date on which (according to
Rankins) Martinez was placed “under” his “criminal justice sentence.” It is true
that we are bound only by prior holdings, and “not the reasoning behind the
holding.” United States v. Murphy, 306 F.3d 1087, 1090 (11th Cir. 2002). But we
have twice characterized Martinez’s rule statement as the holding of that case. See
United States v. Phillips, 413 F.3d 1288, 1292 n.4 (11th Cir. 2005); United States
v. Rayborn, 957 F.2d 841, 844–45 (11th Cir. 1992). A number of our sister circuits
have done the same. See, e.g., United States v. Damon, 127 F.3d 139, 147 (1st Cir.
1997); United States v. Kipp, 10 F.3d 1463, 1467 n.3 (9th Cir. 1993). We follow
that approach again today.
Rankins raises textual arguments that would merit careful consideration in a
case of first impression. But this is not such a case, and we are not free to
disregard our precedent. United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1236
(11th Cir. 2008). Following the path that Martinez marked and Phillips and
Rayborn tracked, we conclude that Rankins was “under” his sentence for tax fraud
when he lied to a gun dealer about it.
AFFIRMED.
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