United States v. James R. Young

USCA11 Case: 22-13106 Document: 15-1 Date Filed: 03/14/2023 Page: 1 of 3
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13106
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JAMES R. YOUNG,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:94-cr-01036-AW-GRJ-1
____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-13106 Document: 15-1 Date Filed: 03/14/2023 Page: 2 of 3
2 Opinion of the Court 22-13106
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and JILL PRYOR and
ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
James R. Young, a former federal prisoner serving a term of
supervised release, appeals pro se the order of the district court
denying his motion for recusal and rehearing. 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(a)-(b). The United States moves for a summary affirmance
and to stay the briefing schedule. Because “the position of [the
United States] . . . is clearly right as a matter of law so that there
can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case,”
Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir.
1969), we grant the motion for summary affirmance and deny as
moot the motion to stay the briefing schedule.
Summary affirmance is appropriate because there is no sub-
stantial question that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying Young’s motion for recusal and rehearing. Id. Young
argued that the district court judge had a “personal interest in pro-
tecting himself from criminal prosecution for aiding and abetting”
his predecessor, who presided over Young’s 1994 trial and who al-
legedly conspired with the government to allow false testimony
against Young. But in his opening brief, Young clarifies that his “in-
tent was not to seek recusal” but to have a court address the merits
of his wrongful-conviction argument. Young’s challenge to the va-
lidity of his conviction must be brought in a motion to vacate, 28
U.S.C. § 2255. See McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast,
USCA11 Case: 22-13106 Document: 15-1 Date Filed: 03/14/2023 Page: 3 of 3
22-13106 Opinion of the Court 3
Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1081 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Young’s initial
motion to vacate was dismissed in 2001, so he must obtain our per-
mission to file a successive motion to vacate. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(h). Because Young failed to obtain our permission, his
wrongful-conviction argument was not properly before the district
court, so the district court did not err by not addressing its merits.
Insofar as Young maintains that the district court judge should
recuse because he denied one of Young’s previous filings, “judicial
rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or par-
tiality motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).
And Young did not point to any portion of the record that suggests
extrajudicial bias or impartiality. See United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d
1317, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 2003).
We GRANT the motion for summary affirmance, AFFIRM
the denial of Young’s motion for recusal and rehearing, and DENY
AS MOOT the motion to stay the briefing schedule.