United States v. Thomas Joe Obregon

USCA11 Case: 22-12067 Document: 24-1 Date Filed: 03/15/2023 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12067
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
THOMAS JOE OBREGON,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 3:22-cr-00005-MCR-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12067
Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Thomas Obregon appeals his 210-month sentence for pos-
session with the intent to distribute heroin, possession with the in-
tent to distribute more than 100 grams of heroin, possession of a
firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, and possession
of a firearm as a convicted felon. Obregon asserts the district court
erred in attributing narcotics seized during uncharged conduct to
him as “relevant conduct” for his two counts of conviction for pos-
session with intent to distribute, because the evidence was insuffi-
cient to connect those drugs to him. He also contends the district
court erred in attributing the drugs to him because they were not
part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as
the offense of conviction. After review, 1 we affirm.
I. DISCUSSION
A. The connection between charged and uncharged conduct
Where a defendant objects to a factual finding that is used to
calculate his guideline range, the Government bears the burden of
establishing the disputed fact by a preponderance of the evidence.
United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2005).
“The preponderance of evidence is a relaxed evidentiary standard,
however, it does not grant the court a license to sentence a defend-
ant in the absence of sufficient evidence when that defendant has
1 We review for clear error the district court’s application of the relevant-con-
duct guideline in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 to the facts of a case. United States v. Val-
ladares, 544 F.3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir. 2008).
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22-12067 Opinion of the Court 3
properly objected to a factual conclusion.” United States v.
Agis-Meza, 99 F.3d 1052, 1055 (11th Cir. 1996).
The district court may consider uncharged conduct in deter-
mining an appropriate sentence. United States v. Rushin, 844 F.3d
933, 942 (11th Cir. 2016). In determining the applicable base of-
fense level for a given offense, the Guidelines dictate that a court
shall consider any relevant conduct, including, among other things,
“all acts and omissions . . . committed by the defendant that oc-
curred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in prep-
aration for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid de-
tection or responsibility for that offense.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A).
The district court did not clearly err in finding, under the
preponderance of the evidence standard, the evidence was suffi-
cient to attribute the drugs found at Laurie Drive to Obregon for
the purpose of sentencing under the relevant-conduct guideline of
§ 1B1.3. First, Obregon’s cell phone contained text messages from
July 2020 in which he discussed the distribution of both heroin and
fentanyl with Jessica Stepp, who lived at Laurie Drive. The phone
also contained text conversations between Obregon and other peo-
ple directing them to Laurie Drive, referencing drugs, and telling
them when he would be at Laurie Drive. One conversation he had
with Stepp referenced a person named “Rock,” whose name then
appeared on the “owe sheet” that was found near the drugs recov-
ered from the living room in Laurie Drive.
As to the drugs themselves, the blue pills seized at Laurie
Drive were consistent with the photograph of blue pills found on
Obregon’s cell phone, and the pills that were bought from him dur-
ing a controlled buy at the Long Lake Drive residence. Addition-
ally, two of Obregon’s counts of conviction were for possession
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12067
with intent to distribute heroin, and heroin was also seized from
Laurie Drive.
Obregon had also stayed at Laurie Drive, as personal docu-
ments of his were found in the bedroom occupied by Kathryn Day,
specifically a state of Florida search warrant from 2016 that named
Obregon, an account sheet from the Florida Department of Cor-
rections from when Obregon was incarcerated, and a dry-cleaning
receipt with Obregon’s name and phone number, dated June 24.
Further, Officer Landis testified that Obregon was living at Laurie
Drive until numerous people from his distribution network were
arrested, after which he moved.
Thus, the district court did not clearly err in finding, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that this evidence was sufficient to
connect the drugs seized at Laurie Drive to Obregon as relevant
conduct and attribute those drug quantities to Obregon for the pur-
poses of sentencing.
B. Same course of conduct or common scheme or plan
Section 1B1.3(a)(2) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides
that, for offenses grouped under U.S.S.G § 3D1.2(d), the defendant
must be held accountable for all acts and omissions “that were part
of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the
offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2). The commentary
following § 1B1.3 makes clear that relevant conduct may include
uncharged conduct:
Conduct that is not formally charged or is not an ele-
ment of the offense of conviction may enter into the
determination of the applicable guideline sentencing
range. . . . [I]n a drug distribution case, quantities and
types of drugs not specified in the count of conviction
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22-12067 Opinion of the Court 5
are to be included in determining the offense level if
they were part of the same course of conduct or part
of a common scheme or plan as the count of convic-
tion.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, comment. (backg’d). “The commentary also
makes clear that § 1B1.3 is designed to take account of ‘a pattern of
misconduct that cannot readily be broken into discrete, identifiable
units that are meaningful for purposes of sentencing.’” United
States v. Maxwell, 34 F.3d 1006, 1010 (11th Cir. 1994). However,
when illegal conduct exists in discrete, identifiable units apart from
the offense of conviction, the Sentencing Guidelines anticipate a
separate charge for that conduct. Id. at 1010-11.
The commentary also provides that, “[f]or two or more of-
fenses to constitute part of a common scheme or plan, they must
be substantially connected to each other by at least one common
factor,” such as a common purpose, common victims, common ac-
complices, or similar modus operandi. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, comment.
(n.5(B)(i)). The commentary also provides offenses may qualify as
part of the same course of conduct if they are sufficiently connected
or related to each other so as to draw the conclusion they are part
of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses. Id., com-
ment. (n.5(B)(ii)). While we have never specifically held a court
must look to the similarity, regularity, and temporal proximity be-
tween the offense of conviction and the uncharged conduct, as
other circuits have, our cases “are in accord with such a holding.”
Maxwell, 34 F.3d at 1011. Thus, we have analyzed these factors in
a case involving the connection between the counts of conviction
involving the distribution of drugs and an uncharged drug offense.
Id. (citations omitted). The commentary provides where one of
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-12067
the above factors—similarity, regularity, and temporal proxim-
ity—is absent, a stronger presence of at least one of the other fac-
tors is required. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, comment. (n.5(B)(ii)).
We do not “think that two offenses constitute a single
course of conduct simply because they both involve drug distribu-
tion,” because:
to describe [the defendant’s] conduct at such a level
of generality as to eviscerate the evaluation of
whether uncharged criminal activity is part of the
‘same course of conduct or common scheme or plan’
as the offense of conviction. With a brushstroke that
broad, almost any uncharged criminal activity can be
painted as similar in at least one respect to the
charged criminal conduct.
Maxwell, 34 F.3d at 1011 (quoting United States v. Mullins, 971
F.2d 1138, 1145 (4th Cir. 1992)). For example, we have held the
distribution of an additional 546 grams of cocaine was not relevant
conduct under § 1B1.3(a)(2) to counts of conviction involving a di-
laudid distribution scheme. Id. at 1011-12.
Regardless of the applicable standard of review, 2 Obregon’s
argument the attributed drugs were not part of the same course of
2 The Government asserts this claim should be reviewed under plain-error
review, as Obregon did not raise an argument before the district court regard-
ing the same course of conduct. Obregon contends the same course of con-
duct argument is another argument in support of the same legal challenge to
the application of the relevant-conduct guideline, and his argument is pre-
served. We need not decide which standard of review applies because
Obregon’s argument fails even under a higher standard of review. See Max-
well, 34 F.3d at 1011 (stating we will reverse only if we determine the district
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22-12067 Opinion of the Court 7
conduct or a common scheme or plan is meritless, as there was a
clear connection between the drugs seized during the two traffic
stops underlying his counts of conviction and the drugs seized from
a stash house that he and other individuals used to traffic narcotics.
Obregon argues that, while his counts of conviction and the un-
charged Laurie Drive conduct share a common purpose of the in-
tent to distribute heroin, they do not share common victims, ac-
complices, or modus operandi. Although the specific circum-
stances of the offense conduct underlying his two counts of convic-
tion—the discovery of heroin in his vehicle during two traffic
stops—is distinct from the circumstances of the uncharged con-
duct—the seizure of various narcotics from a stash house—it is
clear from Obregon’s text messages to Stepp and other parties that
he was using the Laurie Drive residence to further his drug-traffick-
ing operation. Obregon also argues only the Laurie Drive conduct
involved fentanyl, but this argument omits the fact that 191.48
grams of heroin were found in the living room and 0.339 grams of
heroin were found in Day’s bedroom, and thus heroin is common
between the counts of conviction and the uncharged conduct.
While this Court does not assume two offenses constitute a single
course of conduct simply because both involve drug distribution,
it is clear from the record the district court was not relying solely
on the fact the counts of conviction involved distribution of heroin,
but rather relied on the text messages between Obregon and other
parties, the “owe sheet” found near the drugs at Laurie Drive, and
Obregon’s personal documents found at Laurie Drive, to establish
court clearly erred in considering conduct that exists as discrete and identifia-
ble units apart from the offense of conviction as part of the same course of
conduct or part of common scheme or plan).
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-12067
a connection between his offense conduct and the attributed rele-
vant conduct. Maxwell, 34 F.3d at 1011.
Obregon also asserts there is no clear temporal connection
between his counts of conviction and the uncharged conduct, with
nearly four months passing between the search of Laurie Drive and
the first search of his car, and nearly a year between the first search
of his car and the next search. The commentary to § 1B1.3, how-
ever, does not provide any requirements for timing of the relevant
conduct, but rather only requires offenses to be sufficiently con-
nected to draw the conclusion they are part of the same series of
ongoing offenses. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 comment. (n.5(B)(ii)). Further,
even if the temporal proximity were absent, the degree of similarity
of the offenses could support a finding the counts of conviction and
uncharged conduct were part of the same course of conduct, as the
record provides evidence Obregon was trafficking drugs on an on-
going basis, specifically heroin, and thus the uncharged conduct
was part of a common scheme with his counts of conviction.3
II. CONCLUSION
The district court did not err in attributing the drugs seized
at Laurie Drive to Obregon for the purposes of sentencing.
AFFIRMED.
3 As Obregon fails to show any error regarding a common scheme, we need
not reach his related contention that the Government cannot show the
claimed error was harmless.