United States v. Cook

[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
_______________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
07/20/99
No. 98-2581 THOMAS K. KAHN
_______________ CLERK
D.C. No. 3:97-CR-116-03/RV
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MICHAEL ANTHONY COOK,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________
No. 98-2583
________________
D. C. No. 3:97-CR-116-02/RV
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ADRELL FORTHENBERRY,
Defendant-Appellant.
------------------
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
------------------
(July 20, 1999)
Before ANDERSON, Chief Judge, HILL, Senior Circuit Judge, and COOK*,
Senior District Judge.
COOK, Senior District Judge:
Michael Anthony Cook and Adrell Forthenberry present separate,
unconsolidated appeals from the enhancement of their sentences through
application of the reckless-endangerment-during-flight standard under the
Sentencing Guidelines. For the reasons that have been set forth below, we vacate
and remand for resentencing.
I.
The criminal proceedings against Cook and Forthenberry resulted from their
participation, along with Levan Irvin, in a robbery of the Gulf Power Employees'
Credit Union in Pensacola, Florida. The undisputed facts are that Cook and Irvin
entered the Credit Union building and committed the robbery while Forthenberry
waited approximately a block away in the getaway automobile. Cook and Irvin
*
Honorable Julian Abele Cook, Jr., Senior U.S. District Court Judge for the Eastern
District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
2
then ran to, and entered, the vehicle and Forthenberry drove away. A Pensacola
Police Officer, who had been conducting a surveillance of the Credit Union
building at the time of the robbery, saw Cook and Irvin leave the premises and
enter the getaway vehicle. Believing that a crime had been committed, he
proceeded to follow Cook, Forthenberry and Irvin in an unmarked police vehicle.
Shortly thereafter, Forthenberry jumped out of the driver's side door and was
immediately apprehended. Irvin then slid into the driver's seat and drove away.
Cook exited the car soon thereafter. Irvin, as the sole occupant of the getaway
automobile, drove at a high rate of speed until he was arrested after colliding with
another police vehicle.
Subsequent to their arrest, Cook and Forthenberry acknowledged their
respective culpability for the robbery by pleading guilty. As a result, Cook, having
pled guilty to bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), was placed in
custody of the Bureau of Prisons for a period of fifty-one months. Forthenberry
received a sixty-four month term of imprisonment after pleading guilty to one
count of armed robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d) and a second
count of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).
Consistent with the recommendations in each of their Presentence
Investigation Reports, the trial judge imposed the sentences upon them after
3
applying a two-level enhancement for their reckless endangerment during flight
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. Cook and Forthenberry contemporaneously
objected to the application of these enhancements, each of them contending that
they did not directly or actively participate in the high speed chase. In rejecting
these arguments, the trial judge determined that, even if they had voluntarily ended
their participation in the getaway car prior to the commencement of the high speed
chase, the enhancement was still applicable because their disputed conduct was a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the bank robbery.
In their application for appellate review, neither Cook nor Forthenberry
challenge the Government’s contention that they were active participants in the
robbery of the Credit Union. However, it is their joint position that they did not
participate in the high speed chase which was attributed to them by the district
court. In support of his appeal, Forthenberry asserts that he (1) drove the car from
the scene of the bank robbery at a normal rate of speed, (2) immediately stopped
his automobile after noticing that an unmarked police car was following him, and
(3) was forced out by Irvin who had placed a BB gun to his head. Cook also
claims that he had no desire to participate in a high speed chase but was unable to
follow Forthenberry’s lead and exit the car from the backseat because the vehicle
4
had only two doors. None of this evidence was controverted during the
proceedings below.
II.
The standard of review for improper factual findings is clear error, United
States v. Green, 40 F.3d 1167, 1175 (11th Cir. 1994), while the application of the
law to those facts by the trial court, such as its interpretation and application of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines, is reviewed de novo, see United States v.
Carroll, 6 F.3d 735, 743 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v. Burton, 933 F.2d 916,
917 (11th Cir. 1991).
The Sentencing Guideline at issue states that "[i]f the defendant recklessly
created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the
course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer, increase by 2 levels." U.S.S.G. §
3C1.2. On the other hand, Application Note Five to this Sentencing Guideline
provides that "[u]nder this section, the defendant is accountable for his own
conduct and for conduct that he aided or abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
procured, or willfully caused."
5
The dispute in this matter as to whether U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 was correctly
applied to Cook and Forthenberry arises from an apparent conflict between
Application Note Five and the relevant conduct provision within the Sentencing
Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, which provides that "in the case of a jointly
undertaken criminal activity (a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise
undertaken by the defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged as a
conspiracy)," guideline ranges are to be determined on the basis of: "all reasonably
foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken
criminal activity, that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction,
in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or
responsibility for that offense." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).
The district court determined that (1) Cook, Forthenberry, and Irvin had
participated in a conspiracy to rob the bank, (2) an ensuing high speed chase was a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of this conspiracy, and (3) even if Cook and
Forthenberry had voluntarily exited the car, this conduct occurred too late for them
to have legally disavowed the conspiracy. Hence, the Court concluded that
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), they could be held accountable for the high
speed chase through the application of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2.
6
The sentencing court agreed with the Government's argument that an
application of the reckless endangerment enhancement was consistent with United
States v. Jones, 32 F.3d 1512 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). There, Jones drove a
getaway vehicle after the robbery of a credit union, while two accomplices in the
robbery rode as passengers. Jones, 32 F.3d at 1514-15. A high speed chase with
law enforcement ensued, during which one of the accomplices brandished a
weapon at the pursuing officer. Id. at 1515. As in this case, the district court
applied the reckless endangerment enhancement against Jones by relying upon the
relevant conduct provision and its reasonable foreseeability standard. Id. at 1520.
This Circuit affirmed. Id.Undoubtedly, Jones could be reasonably read as having accepted the
propriety of a reasonable foreseeability analysis with respect to the reckless-
endangerment guideline, noting that it was reasonably foreseeable that the
passenger would have brandished a gun to facilitate escape. Id. However, the
Jones tribunal neither addressed whether such an analysis was proper nor
questioned its validity. By the same token, the decision in Jones could also be
easily read and interpreted as having concluded that it was the high speed chase
which created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to others. See id.7
However, Jones is distinguishable in an important respect; namely, that the
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 enhancement was applied to the driver of the getaway vehicle,
who had engaged the police in a high speed chase which, in turn, created a
substantial risk of grievous harm to others. Id. This Circuit has not directly
addressed a situation in which the reckless-endangerment guideline was applied to
someone other than the individual who had actually engaged in the endangering
conduct, as appears to have been the case here. See United States v. Gonzalez, 71
F.3d 819, 836-37 (11th Cir. 1996) (upholding reckless-endangerment enhancement
for defendant driving at high speeds in reverse down residential street); United
States v. Bagwell, 30 F.3d 1454, 1456, 1457 n.10 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding no
error in reckless-endangerment enhancement for defendant who accelerated truck
while driving directly toward police officer and attempted to evade a roadblock);
Jones, 32 F.3d at 1520.
Nevertheless, we have intimated that some form of direct or active
participation which is consistent with Application Note Five is necessary in order
for § 3C1.2 to apply. In United States v. Burton, 933 F.2d 916, 917 (11th Cir.
1991), two males, who had been ordered to stop their automobile on the basis of a
tip that they were transporting cocaine, were apprehended when they struck a law
enforcement vehicle in an effort to escape. On the appeal by the passenger, the
8
Court noted that "[a]lthough [the defendant] was not driving the vehicle, there
appears to be some indication in the record before us that [he] may have urged or
directed the driver to take evasive action. If such action could be considered upon
rehearing to have been reckless, an enhancement may be appropriate." Burton, 933
F.2d at 918 n.1. Our reliance upon the possibility that the passenger may have
actively participated in the endangering conduct in a manner which is consistent
with Application Note Five, rather than on his mere participation in criminal
conduct that might foreseeably have resulted in an escape attempt that included
endangering conduct, lends support to the Appellants' positions in the current
appeal.
Every other circuit, which has addressed the applicability of imposing this
standard upon someone other than the person who was directly engaged in the
reckless activity, has required more than evidence of an endangering conduct that
was reasonably foreseeable. Rather, they have demanded the presence of some
form of active participation by the accused within the meaning of the conduct
listed in Application Note Five. See United States v. Conley, 131 F.3d 1387,
1390-91 (10th Cir. 1997) (enhancement may not be based on reasonable
foreseeability alone, but may be based on conduct before, during, or after high
speed chase, such as procuring or encouraging reckless behavior); United States v.
9
Lipsey, 62 F.3d 1134, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting § 3C1.2 enhancement
where district court relied solely on reasonable foreseeability of high speed
getaway by defendant-passenger who participated in armed bank robbery with
co-defendant-driver); see also United States v. Hall, 71 F.3d 569, 571-72 (6th Cir.
1995) ("reasonable foreseeability" may be insufficient for § 3C1.2 enhancement
when defendant was under control of co-defendant who drove getaway vehicle).
Unlike Jones, we are now squarely faced with the issue of whether the
application of a reasonable foreseeability analysis under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) is
appropriate when considering whether the reckless-endangerment-during-flight
enhancement standard under § 3C1.2 should be applied. It is our conclusion that
the approach of our sister circuits should be adopted because it, rather than that
used by the district court, is more consistent with the plain language of the
Sentencing Guidelines. The approach of the district court of correlating
§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) with § 3C1.2 appears to have violated the Sentencing Guidelines,
which direct that the adjustments in Chapter Three, such as § 3C1.2, are to be
consistent with § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) "[u]nless otherwise specified." U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.3(a) (emphasis added). Application Note Five to § 3C1.2 qualifies as an
instance in which the Sentencing Guidelines have specified that § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)
does not apply. Application Note Five expressly states that, under § 3C1.2, a
10
defendant is responsible for (1) his own conduct, and (2) the conduct of others, but
only if he "aided or abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or
willfully caused" it. By limiting the responsibility for another's actions to those
instances when the defendant "aided or abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
procured, or willfully caused" that person's conduct, Application Note Five
establishes an exception to the general rule in § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). Thus, Application
Note Five to § 3C1.2 constitutes an instance in which the Guidelines have specified
that § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) is not to apply.1
This reading is not only justified by the plain language of the Sentencing
Guidelines but also by the realization that the approach by the district court renders
Application Note Five a nullity. Under the reasoning by the court below, the
reckless-endangerment-during-flight enhancement standard could apply to Cook
and Forthenberry without regard to whether they entered the getaway vehicle or
1
The Government points out that Illustration (b)(1) to § 1B1.3 is similar to the facts in
this case and supports its position. Illustration (b)(1) provides:
Defendant C is the getaway driver in an armed bank robbery in which $15,000 is
taken and a teller is assaulted and injured. . . . Defendant C is accountable for the
injury to the teller under subsection (a)(1)(B) because the assault on the teller was
in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity (the robbery) and was
reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity (given the nature
of the offense).
However, this Illustration is not instructive, in that it does not address the enhancements based
on flight, as does § 3C1.2. Thus, it does not speak to the issue in question; namely whether
Application Note Five is an instance in which the Guidelines have "otherwise specified" that
§ 1B1.3 does not apply.
11
made any attempt to flee from police.2 This rationale would transform U.S.S.G.
§ 3C1.2 from a factually-specific enhancement to a standard that would become
universally applicable to virtually everyone whose co-conspirators fled from law
enforcement immediately following the commission of a crime, resulting in a
substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person.
III.
Consequently, the sentences imposed upon Cook and Forthenberry are
VACATED and their cases are REMANDED for a resentencing. The trial judge is
instructed to assess whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, the Government
can establish that either or both of them directly engaged in, or actively "aided or
abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused" another to
engage in, conduct that satisfies the recklessness standard in § 3C1.2. See United
States v. Matthews, 168 F.3d 1234, 1247 (11th Cir. 1999). Further, in order to
apply § 3C1.2 to either Appellant, the district court "must make a specific finding,
based on the record before it, that the defendant actively caused or procured the
reckless behavior at issue." Conley, 131 F.3d at 1390.
2
This assumes that the failure to get into the vehicle or flee from police would be legally
insufficient to constitute a withdrawal from the conspiracy, which would appear to be the only
basis for avoiding an application of the relevant conduct provision under the analysis of the
sentencing court.
12
Chief Judge Anderson concurs specially.
13
ANDERSON, Chief Judge, concurring specially:
I concur in the result only. Because the district court was clearly erroneous
in finding that the high speed chase was reasonably foreseeable, it is not necessary
to address the difficult question of law which the majority resolves.
In this case, the government conceded at oral argument that both defendants
got out of the car as soon as there was any forewarning of a high speed chase.
Thus, any inference that a high speed chase was reasonably foreseeable was
removed by the evidence in this case.
14