Lockett v. Bd. of Educ. of Muscogee

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
No. 94-9355.
Jerry LOCKETT, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF MUSCOGEE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, GEORGIA,
et al., Defendants-Appellees.
May 5, 1997.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Georgia. (No. 64-991-COL), J. Robert Elliott, Judge.
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND SUGGESTION OF REHEARING EN BANC
Before COX and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and MOORE*, Senior District
Judge.
PER CURIAM:
The Board of Education of Muscogee County, Georgia ("school
board") petitions for panel rehearing. We grant the petition and
substitute the following opinion for the previous opinion reported
at 92 F.3d 1092 (11th Cir.1996).
I. Overview
Plaintiffs appeal the district court's final dismissal of
their action and declaration that the school board has eliminated
its dual education system, thereby achieving unitary status.
Finding that the district court did not clearly err, we affirm.
II. Background
Plaintiffs, who were black schoolchildren, filed this class
action in 1964 seeking desegregation of Muscogee County schools.
The district court twice denied Plaintiffs relief, and the Fifth
Circuit affirmed both denials. Lockett v. Board of Educ. of
*
Honorable John H. Moore, II, Senior U.S. District Judge for
the Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.
Muscogee County, 391 F.2d 272 (5th Cir.1968); Lockett v. Board of
Educ. of Muscogee County, 342 F.2d 225 (5th Cir.1965).
The district court revisited the case in 1971 after the
Supreme Court decided Green v. School Bd. of New Kent County, 391
U.S. 430, 88 S. Ct. 1689, 20 L. Ed. 2d 716 (1968), and Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S. Ct. 1267, 28 L. Ed. 2d 554
(1971). It ordered the school board to present and implement a
desegregation plan consistent with the Swann principles. Lockett
v. Board of Educ. of Muscogee County, 442 F.2d 1336 (5th Cir.1971).
In response, the school board submitted the following plan:
AMENDED PLAN TO DESEGREGATE THE SCHOOLS OF MUSCOGEE COUNTY,
GEORGIA
The [school board,] in continuation of its effort to
unify its schools to eliminate every vestige of discrimination
because of race or color of its students and to maintain a
fully desegregated system, hereby adopts this Amended Plan of
Desegregation so as to fully comply with the law in such cases
made and provided. The percentage of white and Negro students
attending the school [sic] in this County are approximately
70% white and 30% Negro, and it is the purpose and intent of
this Board to obtain approximate proportionate representation
of each race in each school in the most efficient manner;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED:
. . . . .
STUDENT ASSIGNMENT
All white students, equal in number to 70% of the
capacity of the school to which they have been assigned,
living nearest to said school, and all Negro students, equal
in number to 30% of the capacity of the school to which they
have been assigned, living nearest to said school, shall
attend said school for the year beginning in September, 1971.
All other students assigned to said school shall be
assigned by the Superintendent and his staff to the school
nearest to the residence of said student which does not then
have its quota of white or Negro students as above stated.
All students who have not been assigned to any school for
the current Fall term, or who later enter the School System,
shall be assigned by the Superintendent and his staff to the
school nearest the residence of said student which then has
space available and has less than its quota of white or Negro
students, as the case may be, then assigned to said school.
There shall be no transfer or assignment of any student
during the entire school year, except in case, absent the
consideration of race, a change is educationally called for or
where compelling hardship or other good reason is shown by the
student.
In school years after the school year beginning in
September, 1971, the Board of Education, prior to the end of
such school year, shall determine the approximate percentage
of white and Negro students attending the school in this
District and assignment of students shall be made as above
provided so that the approximate number of white and Negro
students in each school shall be substantially the same as the
percentage of white and Negro students in the entire School
System.
The school board amended this plan in 1972. The amendment
exempted first graders and kindergartners and stated that the
"quota or percentage of white and Negro students in each school in
the next school term shall be substantially the same as is the
percentage of white and Negro students in the entire school system
at the end of the current school term." The district court
approved both the proposed plan and the 1972 amendment by court
order and retained jurisdiction to supervise the school board.
In furtherance of the plan's goals, the school board
implemented student reassignment and attendance zone adjustments.
By 1973, the proportion of majority to minority students in 57 of
the 64 Muscogee County schools was within 10% of the proportion of
the races in the County as a whole, and 5 schools fell within a 20%
range. Roughly the same compositions were maintained through 1977.
Toward the end of the 1970s, the school board began reducing
the number of student reassignments and attendance zone
adjustments. At the same time, county demographics began to
change, resulting in racially polarized residential areas, a
decrease in the number of white students, and an increase in the
number of black students. By the mid-1980s, the racial
compositions within many of the schools were disproportionate with
the county-wide student racial composition, and by 1991, several
racially identifiable schools existed.
Plaintiffs therefore moved in 1991 for an injunction and an
order directing the school board to take whatever action necessary
to achieve proportionate student compositions. The district court
denied the motion as moot because the original class of Plaintiffs
were no longer students. This court reversed and remanded for
consideration of the motion on its merits. Lockett v. Board of
Educ. of Muscogee County Sch. Dist., 976 F.2d 648 (11th Cir.1992).
Before the district court decided the motion on remand, the school
board met with black and white citizens and Parent-Teacher
Association representatives from majority black and majority white
schools. With support from these citizens and representatives, the
school board implemented a neighborhood-school plan that eliminated
cross-district busing and called for students to be assigned to
local neighborhood-schools. The school board also proposed magnet
programs and majority-to-minority transfer programs to off-set any
negative impact that the neighborhood assignment plan might have on
racial composition within the schools. Plaintiffs moved to enjoin
the neighborhood-school plan in 1992 and in 1993. The district
court denied both motions, finding no irreparable harm.
The school district then moved for final dismissal of the 1971
order and for a declaration of unitary status in an effort to have
the district court divest itself of jurisdiction. Following an
evidentiary hearing, the district court granted the motion.
III. Standard of Review
We review a district court's declaration that a school system
has achieved unitary status under the clearly erroneous standard.
Jacksonville Branch, NAACP v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 883 F.2d 945,
952 n. 3 (11th Cir.1989). Under this standard, we are not entitled
to "reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply because [we
are] convinced that [we] would have decided the case differently.
[We] overstep[ ] the bounds of [our] duty under Rule 52(a) if [we]
undertake[ ] to duplicate the role of the lower court.... Where
there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's
choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous." Anderson v. City
of Bessemer City, North Carolina, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S. Ct.
1504, 1511, 84 L. Ed. 2d 518 (1985).
IV. Discussion
In Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 495, 74 S. Ct. 686,
692, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954) (Brown I ), the Supreme Court recognized
that state-compelled segregation in schools violates the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. To effectuate Brown I's
mandate, the Supreme Court ordered district courts to supervise
school boards that had practiced de jure segregation in their
desegregation efforts. Brown v. Board of Ed., 349 U.S. 294, 301,
75 S. Ct. 753, 757, 99 L. Ed. 1083 (1955) (Brown II ). District
courts maintained supervision by issuing remedial orders and
asserting jurisdiction over school boards to ensure compliance with
those orders.
The Supreme Court intended this federal supervision of local
school systems to be a temporary measure. Board of Educ. of
Oklahoma City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247, 111 S. Ct. 630, 637, 112
L. Ed. 2d 715 (1991). Since the legal justification for such
supervision is a constitutional violation by local authorities, a
district court must divest itself of jurisdiction when the
constitutional violation has ceased and when local authorities have
operated in compliance with a desegregation decree for a reasonable
period of time. Id. at 248, 111 S.Ct. at 637; see also Freeman v.
Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1445, 118 L. Ed. 2d 108
(1992) ("[T]he ultimate objective [is] to return school districts
to the control of local authorities."). A district court's
decision to divest itself of jurisdiction "recognizes that
"necessary concern for the important values of local control of
public school systems dictates that a federal court's regulatory
control of such systems not extend beyond the time required to
remedy the effects of past intentional discrimination.' " Dowell,
498 U.S. at 247, 111 S.Ct. at 637 (citations omitted).
Counterbalancing this recognition is the acknowledgment that "the
potential for discrimination and racial hostility is still present
in our country, and its manifestations may emerge in new and subtle
forms after the effects of de jure segregation have been
eliminated." Freeman, 503 U.S. at 490, 112 S.Ct. at 1445.
To ensure that local authorities are not continuing to
practice discrimination, a district court's determination of
whether local authorities have complied with a desegregation decree
involves a careful assessment of the facts. Id. at 474, 112 S.Ct.
at 1437. Utilizing sound discretion after a such a careful factual
assessment, a district court must determine (1) whether the local
authorities have eliminated the vestiges of past discrimination to
the extent practicable and (2) whether the local authorities have
in good faith fully and satisfactorily complied with, and shown a
commitment to, the desegregation plan. Lee v. Etowah County Bd. of
Educ., 963 F.2d 1416, 1425 (11th Cir.1992) (citing Dowell, 498 U.S.
at 249-50, 111 S.Ct. at 638).
In determining whether the local authorities have eliminated
the vestiges of de jure segregation as far as practicable, a
district court must examine six facets of school operation:
student assignments, faculty assignments, staff assignments,
transportation, extra-curricular activities, and facilities.
Dowell, 498 U.S. at 245, 111 S.Ct. at 636 (quoting Green, 391 U.S.
at 435, 88 S.Ct. at 1693 (1968)). In its discretion, a district
court may consider other facets. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 492, 112
S.Ct. at 1446.
Here, the district court limited the bulk of its discussion to
student assignments because the parties agreed that the school
system has eliminated the vestiges of de jure segregation as far as
practicable in the areas of faculty assignments, staff assignments,
transportation, extra-curricular activities, and facilities.1 We
do the same.
Where, as here, a school board has a history of practicing
segregation, a district court must presume that substantially
1
The district court, in a proper exercise of its discretion,
did not consider other facets of school operations such as
quality of education, and neither party requested that it do so.
disproportionate racial compositions within the schools is
constitutionally violative. Swann, 402 U.S. at 25, 91 S.Ct. at
1281. To overcome this presumption, a school board must prove that
the imbalances are not the result of present or past discrimination
on its part. Id.
The school board sought to prove through expert witnesses that
the current student imbalances and imbalances during the 1980's
were not the result of present or past discrimination. Those
witnesses testified that the current racial imbalances were the
result of dramatic demographic changes in Muscogee County, such as
an increase in the number of black school-age children and a
decrease in the number of white school-age children. The
demographic change, according to one expert, was a result of
factors over which the school board had no control, such as a
decrease in the white fertility rate, a difference in purchasing
power between white and black families, a preference of white and
black families to live in neighborhoods composed of families of a
similar race, and the location of housing projects. (R2-19-21).
Based on this evidence and the fact that other experts did not
contradict this evidence, the district court concluded that the
school board proved that the imbalances were "the result of
voluntary housing patterns and demographic change." (R2-23).
The district court's conclusion was not clearly erroneous. It
was based on expert opinion "consistent with the mobility that is
a distinct characteristic of our society." Freeman, 503 U.S. at
493, 112 S.Ct. at 1447. And while
[i]n one sense of the term, vestiges of past segregation by
state decree do remain in our society and in our schools....
[as a stubborn fact of history, we must not] overstate its
consequences in fixing legal responsibilities.... It is
simply not always the case that demographic forces causing
population change bear any real and substantial relation to a
de jure violation[,] [a]nd the law need not proceed on that
premise.
Id. at 495-96, 112 S.Ct. at 1448. Further, "[a]s the de jure
violation becomes more remote in time and ... demographic changes
intervene, it becomes less likely that a current racial imbalance
in a school district is a vestige of the prior de jure system. The
causal link between current conditions and the prior violation is
even more attenuated if the school district has demonstrated its
good faith [commitment to a desegregation plan.]" Id. at 496, 112
S.Ct. at 1448.
A good faith commitment to a desegregation plan also
demonstrates to parents, students, and the public that students
will no longer suffer injury or stigma. At the same time, it
"enables the district court to accept the school board's
representation that [the school board] has accepted the principle
of racial equality and will not suffer intentional discrimination
in the future." Id. at 498, 112 S.Ct. at 1449. To determine if a
school board has shown a good faith commitment to a desegregation
plan, a district court should, among other things, consider whether
the school board's policies "form a consistent pattern of lawful
conduct directed to eliminating earlier violations." Id. at 491,
112 S.Ct. at 1446.
Here, the district court concluded that the school board has
in good faith shown a commitment to, and has fully and
satisfactorily complied with, the desegregation plan generally and
in those aspects specifically related to student assignments. The
district court, which has monitored the actions of the school board
for over 30 years, reached this conclusion based on several
findings. First, it found that it has never had to enjoin or
sanction the school board. Second, it found that the school board
never failed to comply with a court order.2 Third, it found that
the school board took actions to further desegregation which went
above and beyond what the 1971 order as amended required. Fourth,
it found that the school board kept desegregation of its schools at
a level not surpassed by any school district in the country for ten
years, even in the face of countervailing demographic factors.
Fifth, it found that the school board implemented magnet programs
which, at least in one instance, helped to racially balance an
otherwise unbalanced school. Sixth, it found that the school board
adopted the neighborhood assignment plan only after listening to
the views of black and white citizens (both groups favored the
plan) and PTA representatives from majority white and majority
black schools (both groups opposed an alternative plan).3 Seventh,
2
As part of this finding, the district court interpreted its
1971 order as amended to require the school district only to
achieve proportionate representation for the 1972-73 school year.
We should give effect to that interpretation. See Cornist et al.
v. Richland Parish School Board, 495 F.2d 189, 191 (5th Cir.1974)
(stating that in a desegregation case, the district judge
"construed his own order, as he was entitled to do"); Vulcan
Tools of Puerto Rico v. Makita USA, Inc., 23 F.3d 564, 566 (1st
Cir.1994) ("[W]e are loathe to upset a district court's
interpretation of its own order.").
3
We should not treat the adoption of the neighborhood
assignment plan as a breach of good faith on the part of the
school board. In Lockett v. Board of Educ. of Muscogee County,
No. 93-8966 (11th Cir. July 21, 1994), we affirmed the district
court's decision allowing the school district to continue the
plan as consistent with the underlying desegregation plan. Cf.
Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249 n. 1, 111 S. Ct. at 638 n. 1 ("The Court
of Appeals viewed the Board's adoption of [a particular plan] as
it found that the school board implemented a majority to minority
transfer program in 1992 to offset any racial impact that the
neighborhood assignment plan could have. (R2-40). In addition to
these specific findings, the district court noted generally that
"[e]very expert who testified in this case expressed praise in
varying degrees for the desegregation efforts of the [school
board]." (R. 2-55.) The district court's findings were based on
uncontradicted evidence and fully support the district court's
conclusion that the school board has shown a good faith commitment
to and compliance with the desegregation plan. This conclusion was
not clearly erroneous.
V. Conclusion
The district court's conclusions that the school board has
eliminated the vestiges of de jure segregation as far as
practicable and that the school board has shown a good faith
commitment to and compliance with the desegregation plan were not
clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's
final dismissal and declaration that the school board has attained
unitary status.
AFFIRMED.
BARKETT, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Although I believe this is a very close case and guidance in
this area of the law is vague, I respectfully differ from the
court's decision to rehear this case because I am concerned about
a violation of its obligation under the injunction, and
technically it may well have been. But ... we do not think that
the Board should be penalized for relying on the express language
of that order.").
the Muscogee County School District's actions, and inaction, during
the last fifteen years that it was subject to the desegregation
decree.
Regardless of the age of a desegregation decree, such a decree
may only be terminated upon a showing that a school district has
eliminated all vestiges of prior de jure segregation to the maximum
extent practicable and has complied in good faith with both the
decree and the spirit of Brown 's mandate.1 Board of Ed. of
Oklahoma City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-50, 111 S. Ct. 630, 638,
112 L. Ed. 2d 715 (1991); Lee v. Etowah County Bd. of Educ., 963
F.2d 1416, 1425 (11th Cir.1992).
No one disputes that de facto segregation now exists in the
school district. It is also clear that prior de jure segregation
resulted from unconstitutional practices by the school district.
The school district had the burden of demonstrating that the
current imbalances are not vestiges of those past policies or
practices. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 402 U.S. 1, 25, 91
S. Ct. 1267, 1281, 28 L. Ed. 2d 554 (1971). The district court
determined that the racial imbalances were not caused by the school
1
In its Petition for Rehearing, the School Board repeatedly
suggests that a school district satisfies its obligations once it
adopts a racially neutral system of student assignment. See
Petition for Rehearing at 7 ("federal courts simply have no
authority to enforce orders solely to achieve racial balance once
a racially neutral system of student assignment has effectively
been adopted") & 12 ("there is no affirmative duty [to remedy
racial imbalances] after a school system has successfully
implemented a school desegregation plan"). However, I believe
Petitioner confuses the means of its remedial obligations with
the ends. Although implementing a racially neutral attendance
pattern is a necessary remedial device, "[a] remedy is
justifiable only insofar as it advances the ultimate objective of
alleviating the initial constitutional violation." Freeman, 503
U.S. at 489, 112 S.Ct. at 1445 (emphasis added).
system but, in doing so, focused only on demographic changes in the
county. The court failed to consider whether the school board's
total curtailment of any desegregation efforts after about 1980
helped preserve or perpetuate the effects of its prior
unconstitutional policies. The district court's narrow approach
erroneously assumed that as long as a school district can point to
some force not directly related to a school district's overt
actions which is causing or exacerbating racial imbalances, then
the resulting imbalance is not traceable to past practices. I do
not believe that this approach comports with the proper burdens of
proof or the analytic framework set out in Freeman v. Pitts, 503
U.S. 467, 494, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1447, 118 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1992).