Matthew Case v. Karen Riley

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
-------------------------------------------U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 07-11489 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
March 25, 2008
Non-Argument Calendar
-------------------------------------------- THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 07-00292-CV-T-17-TGW
MATTHEW CASE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
KAREN RILEY,
Jail Administrator,
GRADY JUDD, Sheriff,
DR. STAN ZEMANKIEWICZ,
DR. PEDRO ENRIQUEZ,
SEBRING HEARTLAND HOSPITAL, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
-------------------------------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
--------------------------------------------
(March 25, 2008)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellant Matthew Case, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se,
appeals the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint
against seven defendants about medical care he received. The district court
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).1 No reversible error has been shown;
we affirm.
In his complaint, Case claimed that defendants were deliberately indifferent
to his medical needs by failing to provide him with timely and adequate medical
care after he broke his hand in an altercation at the Polk County Jail while he was
a pretrial detainee.2 Case filed his complaint against (1) Jail Administrator Karen
Riley; (2) Sheriff Grady Judd; (3) Dr. Stan Zemankiewicz, a bone specialist; (4)
Dr. Pedro Enriquez, the jail physician; (5) Sebring Heartland Hospital; (6) Bartow
Memorial Hospital; and (7) Correctional Medical Services (“CMS”).
1
The district court did not explicitly note under what statutory authority it dismissed the
complaint. But the record makes clear that section 1915(e) was the authority relied on.
2
Claims of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need of a pretrial detainee, such as Case,
are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause instead of the Eighth
Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, which applies to similar claims by convicted
prisoners. See Lancaster v. Monroe County, Ala., 116 F.3d 1419, 1425 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997).
2
Case alleged these things: (1) he was taken to Sebring Heartland Hospital,
where his hand was placed in a cast without first being set; (2) he was told by an
attending doctor that he would see a bone specialist within 24 to 48 hours, but he
did not see the specialist within this time frame; (3) Enriquez saw him only once
about his hand and did not abide by follow-up procedures as ordered by the
emergency room doctor and surgeon; (4) Bartow Memorial Hospital failed to
ensure that a qualified surgeon practiced at the hospital3; and (5) Riley, Judd and
CMS failed to ensure that he was provided with timely and proper medical care.
As a result of this inadequate medical care, Case alleged that his hand permanently
was damaged.
We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state
a claim under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), accepting the allegations in the complaint
as true. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1159-60 (11th Cir. 2003).4 On appeal,
Case argues that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint without first
giving him an opportunity to amend it to provide “a more definite state[ment] to
support relief.” We have concluded that “[w]here a more carefully drafted
3
It is unclear from the complaint if and when Case was treated at Bartow Memorial Hospital.
4
In addition, we liberally construe pro se pleadings. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d
1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
3
complaint might state a claim, a plaintiff must be given at least one chance to
amend the complaint before the district court dismisses the action with prejudice,”
unless the plaintiff has indicated that he does not wish to amend his complaint or if
a more carefully drafted complaint could not state a valid claim. Bank v. Pitt, 928
F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991), overruled in part by Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy
Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc).5
For medical treatment to rise to the level of a constitutional violation, the
care must be “so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the
conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Harris v. Thigpen, 941
F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991) (quotations omitted). To state a Fourteenth
Amendment (Due Process) claim, Case had to show that he had an objective
medical need and that a government official acted with deliberate indifference to
that need. See Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2005). To show
deliberate indifference, Case had to show that (1) defendants knew of a risk of
serious harm to him, (2) they disregarded this risk, and (3) their conduct amounted
to more than gross negligence. See id. And the plaintiff must demonstrate that
5
In Wagner, we determined that a district court is not required to sua sponte grant a counseled
plaintiff leave to amend when plaintiff never filed a motion to amend or requested leave to amend
before the district court. But we “decide[d] and intimate[d] nothing about a party proceeding pro
se.” 314 F.3d at 542 n.1. So, because Case is proceeding pro se, we will apply the rule in Bank to
him.
4
defendants’ response to a medical need was more than “merely accidental
inadequacy, negligence in diagnosis or treatment, or even medical malpractice
actionable under state law.” Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir.
2000) (citation and quotations omitted).
Here, the district court correctly dismissed Case’s complaint for failure to
state a claim. And allowing him to amend the complaint would have been futile
because his claim fails as a matter of law. Case’s allegations against Riley, Judd,
and CMS clearly were premised on a theory of respondeat superior. And claims
against supervisory personnel who did not personally participate in the acts
complained of are not actionable under section 1983. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2036 (1978). Thus, an amended complaint against these
defendants would have been unavailing.
About the remaining defendants,6 Case’s allegations do not rise to the level
of a constitutional violation; the conduct he complains of amounts to, at most,
negligence. And an amended complaint with a more definite statement would not
change this conclusion. From the complaint, it is clear that Case received prompt
6
The district court dismissed some defendants as improper parties, and alternatively, determined
that Case’s allegations did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Though we doubt the
correctness of the district court’s reasoning about certain defendants, we need not address these
doubts because we agree with the district court that Case did not state a constitutional violation.
5
medical treatment for his broken hand. That Case may have desired more or a
different course of treatment does not amount to a constitutional violation. See
Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1545 (11th Cir. 1995) (whether defendants’ “should
have employed additional diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment ‘is a classic
example of a matter for medical judgment’ and therefore not an appropriate basis
for grounding” constitutional liability.); Hamm v. Dekalb County, 774 F.2d 1567,
1575 (11th Cir. 1985) (when a plaintiff receives adequate medical care, but desires
different modes of treatment, the care provided does not amount to deliberate
indifference).
Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed Case’s complaint for
failure to state a constitutional claim and did not err in failing to sua sponte grant
him leave to amend his complaint because an amendment would have been futile.
AFFIRMED.
6