Howard A. Mathis v. The City of Lakeland

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12426
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
HOWARD A. MATHIS,
Reverend,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
THE CITY OF LAKELAND,
a Florida municipality,
MAYOR, CITY OF LAKELAND,
SCOTT FRANKLIN,
Former Commissioner,
STEPHANIE MADDEN,
Commissioner, Individual Capacity,
SARA ROBERTS MCCARLEY,
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Commissioner, Individual Capacity, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
THE CITY OF LAKELAND RED LIGHT
CAMERA ENFORCEMENT AGENCY,
Defendant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cv-00235-SDM-SPF
____________________
Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Howard Mathis, proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s grant of the twelve defendants’ motions to dismiss his pro
se amended complaint. The subject of Mathis’s amended
complaint is two traffic violations issued through a red light photo
enforcement system. Mathis’s amended complaint asserted four
Counts against the twelve defendants: (1) violation of his due
process rights brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count 1);
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(2) conspiracy to interfere with his rights on the basis of race in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Count 2); (3) discrimination in
violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d (Count 3); and (4) unjust enrichment in violation of Fla.
Stat. §§ 316.0083(1)(b)(4), 318.121, and 560.204 (Count 4). The
district court dismissed Counts 1–3 on shotgun pleading grounds
and Count 4 for failure to state a claim. On appeal, Mathis argues
that the district court erred by dismissing each Count of his
amended complaint with prejudice. After careful review, we
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Original Complaint, Dismissal, and Leave to Amend
On February 1, 2021, Mathis, proceeding pro se, sued (1) the
City of Lakeland (“City”), (2) Mayor William Mutz, (3) Former
Commissioner Scott Franklin, (4) Commissioners Stephanie
Madden, Sara McCarley, Chad McLeod, Bill Read, and Phillip
Walker, (5) the “City of Lakeland Red Light Camera Enforcement
Agency,”1 (6) “Hearing Officers” Joshua Brown and Matthew
Vaughn, and (7) American Traffic Solutions, Inc. (“ATS”).
All defendants moved to dismiss. On August 2, 2021, a
magistrate judge issued a report (“report”), recommending that the
1 The named “City of Lakeland Red Light Camera Enforcement Agency” does
not exist.
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motions to dismiss be granted and Mathis be granted leave to
amend his complaint to correct the deficiencies in his complaint.
On August 17, 2021, the district court adopted the report,
granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss, and dismissed Mathis’s
complaint with leave to amend. The district court also “strongly
advised” Mathis to obtain legal advice and assistance before filing
his amended complaint and warned that the amended complaint
would be “subject to final dismissal” if it failed to state a claim.
B. Allegations in the Amended Complaint
On October 20, 2021, Mathis filed his amended complaint,
alleging the following events.
On September 7, 2018, the City issued a “Notice of
Violation” to Judy Nance Mathis (“Judy Mathis”) “for failure to
comply with a steady red signal.” On September 18, 2018, Judy
Mathis signed an affidavit in which she named Howard Mathis as
having “care, custody, or control of the vehicle at the time of the
violation.” So on September 26, 2018, the City reissued the Notice
of Violation (“NOV1”) to Howard Mathis, the plaintiff here.
On December 12, 2018, defendant Vaughn (a City “hearing
officer”) held a hearing and upheld the NOV1. Vaughn allegedly
told Mathis to “redress his disagreements to the Circuit Court or
the City Council.” Plaintiff Mathis alleges he did both.
With respect to the City Council, Mathis attempted to
“redress the violation . . . with the City” but “Assistant City
Attorney Romona Sirianni gave out wrong information trying to
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streamline the process away from the City Commission.” Attorney
Sirianni allegedly “conspir[ed] with Police Officer Franz” by
“summoning him to” a meeting to “give . . . false and misguided
information to the [City] Commission.”
With respect to the Circuit Court, Mathis appealed his
NOV1 conviction to the Tenth Judicial Circuit Court, in and for
Polk County, Florida, which reversed and remanded for a new
hearing.
On remand, defendant Brown (another City “hearing
officer”) presided over Mathis’s hearing. According to Mathis,
even though the “normal[] practice” is to call hearings “in
alphabetical order,” Vicki Wilson (who is white) “went first” before
Mathis (who is black). Mathis alleged that defendant Brown
racially discriminated against him by dismissing the violation
against Wilson yet upholding the NOV1 against Mathis.
Completely separate from NOV1 discussed above, it
appears that Mathis ran another red light and was issued a different
Notice of Violation (“NOV2”). In Florida, the civil penalty for
running a red light is $158.00. See Fla. Stat. § 316.0083(1)(b)3.b.
Mathis paid the penalty for NOV2 electronically with a Visa card
and attached a receipt to the amended complaint. Mathis’s receipt
shows a total charge of $162.00.
In his amended complaint, Mathis sued (1) the City,
(2) Mayor Mutz, (3) Former Commissioner Franklin,
(4) Commissioners Madden, McCarley, McLeod, Read, and
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Walker, (5) the City’s Police Department, (6) “Hearing Officers”
Brown and Vaughn, and (7) ATS. Thus, the only change in the
defendants from the original complaint to the amended complaint
is that Mathis sued the City’s Police Department instead of “[t]he
City of Lakeland Red Light Camera Enforcement Agency.”
Mathis’s amended complaint alleged four Counts against the
defendants: (1) violation of his due process rights brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Count 1); (2) conspiracy to interfere with his rights
on the basis of race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Count 2);
(3) discrimination in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Count 3); and (4) unjust enrichment in
violation of Fla. Stat. §§ 316.0083(1)(b)(4), 318.121, and 560.204
(Count 4).
In Count 1, Mathis alleged that (1) Vaughn and Brown acted
under color of state law, (2) Vaughn violated his due process rights,
(3) Attorney Sirianni and Officer Franz conspired to deprive him of
an unspecified right, (4) Brown conspired with Franz by agreeing
to dismiss Vicki Wilson’s violation, (5) ATS conspired with the
City’s Commission “to implement a money grabbing scheme
knowing out right that red light cameras don’t decrease
accident[s],” and (6) “[t]he unlawful actions of the defendants
constitute a violation of due process.”
In Count 2, Mathis alleged that “[t]he unlawful actions of the
defendants” violated § 1985(3) and Brown “granted a white person
a dismissal . . . but upheld his [violation] and the obvious reason
was because he was black.”
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In Count 3, Mathis alleged that (1) the defendants receive
federal financial assistance, (2) the defendants created a policy,
practice, or custom of issuing red light camera citations based on
race or ethnicity, and (3) such “unlawful actions” constituted a
violation of § 2000(d).
In Count 4, Mathis alleged that (1) ATS conspired with the
City “in a money grabbing scheme” that they “disguise[d] . . . as a
safety program regarding traffic accidents,” (2) the convenience fee
extracted by ATS was an “illegal ‘commission,’” and (3) Mathis
“conferred a monetary benefit on the Defendant, some or all of
which was voluntarily retained by Defendant.”
C. Dismissal of the Amended Complaint
On November 2, 2021, all the defendants except ATS moved
to dismiss Mathis’s amended complaint. They argued that
(1) Mathis had not remedied the defects highlighted in the
magistrate judge’s report, (2) each Count failed to state a claim, and
(3) the individual defendants were entitled to immunity.
On November 3, 2021, defendant ATS moved to dismiss
Mathis’s amended complaint, arguing that it was a shotgun
pleading and that each Count failed to state a claim. As to Count
4, defendant ATS argued that the alleged illegality of the
convenience fee did not make its retention of that fee unjust and
that Mathis received the convenience he paid for.
On June 29, 2022, the district court granted the defendants’
motions to dismiss and dismissed Mathis’s amended complaint.
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First, the district court found that the amended complaint was a
shotgun pleading because (1) Counts 1–3 asserted multiple claims
against multiple defendants without specifying which of the
defendants was responsible for which acts or omissions and (2) the
amended complaint contained conclusory, vague, and immaterial
facts that did not explain how those facts amounted to unlawful
conduct. Second, the district court determined that Count 4 failed
to state a claim for relief because this Court has held that the
retention of a convenience fee for facilitating an online payment
cannot be the basis of a claim for unjust enrichment. See Pincus v.
Am. Traffic Sols., Inc., 25 F.4th 1339, 1340–41 (11th Cir. 2022).
The district court entered judgment for each defendant.
Mathis timely appealed.
II. COUNTS 1–3
We begin with an overview on shotgun pleadings and then
address why the district court did not err in dismissing Counts 1–3.
A. General Rules on Shotgun Pleadings
A shotgun pleading is a complaint that violates either
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) or 10(b), or both. Weiland
v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir.
2015).
Rule 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). Rule 10(b) requires a party to “state its claims or defenses
in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a
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single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Rule 10(b) also
mandates that “each claim founded on a separate transaction or
occurrence . . . be stated in a separate count” if doing so would
promote clarity. Id.“The self-evident purpose of these rules is to require the
pleader to present his claims discretely and succinctly, so that his
adversary can discern what he is claiming and frame a responsive
pleading.” Barmapov v. Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir.
2021) (cleaned up). In other words, “shotgun pleadings are flatly
forbidden by the spirit, if not the letter, of these rules because they
are calculated to confuse the enemy and the court.” Id. (cleaned
up). Accordingly, we have “little tolerance” for shotgun pleadings.
Id. (quotation marks omitted).
“[W]e have identified four rough types or categories of
shotgun pleadings”: (1) “a complaint containing multiple counts
where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts,
causing each successive count to carry all that came before and the
last count to be a combination of the entire complaint”; (2) a
complaint that is “replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial
facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action”;
(3) a complaint that does not separate “each cause of action or
claim for relief” into a different count; and (4) a complaint that
“assert[s] multiple claims against multiple defendants without
specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts
or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought
against.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321–23.
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A district court must give a plaintiff one opportunity to
remedy his shotgun pleading before dismissing his action. Vibe
Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2018). If he
files an amended complaint without substantially fixing the
deficiencies, dismissal with prejudice is warranted. See Jackson v.
Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1358–59 (11th Cir. 2018)
(explaining that “[t]he District Court should have dismissed the
amended complaint with prejudice” where “the [plaintiffs] filed an
amended complaint afflicted with the same defects, attempting
halfheartedly to cure only one of the pleading’s many ailments by
naming which counts pertained to each Defendant”).
We review a dismissal on shotgun pleading grounds for an
abuse of discretion. Barmapov, 986 F.3d at 1324. Although courts
afford liberal construction to pro se litigants’ pleadings, pro se
litigants must adhere to the procedural requirements of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106,
113, 113 S. Ct. 1980, 1984 (1993) (“[W]e have never suggested that
procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so
as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.”);
accord Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007).
B. Mathis’s Amended Complaint Was a Shotgun Pleading
The district court did not err in dismissing Counts 1–3
because Mathis’s amended complaint was a shotgun pleading.
First, Mathis sued twelve defendants, but his amended
complaint largely failed to identify which of them took which
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actions and which claims were raised against which defendants.
Instead, Counts 1–3 lumped the defendants together by alleging
that “the unlawful actions of the defendants constitute a violation
of [federal law].” (Emphasis added.) The lumping of defendants
does not give any defendant fair notice of the allegations brought
against that defendant. Automotive Alignment & Body Serv., Inc.
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 953 F.3d 707, 732 (11th Cir.
2020); see also Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir.
2001) (condemning as a shotgun pleading a complaint that (1) was
“replete with allegations that ‘the defendants’ engaged in certain
conduct” and (2) made “no distinction among the fourteen
defendants charged, though geographic and temporal realities
make plain that all of the defendants could not have participated in
every act complained of”).
Second, Counts 1–3 contain conclusory and vague facts.
Each Count includes a citation to federal law and a conclusory
assertion that “the unlawful actions of the defendants constitute a
violation of [federal law].” But Mathis provided no explanation on
how any of the factual allegations amount to unlawful conduct
under the cited statutes. Est. of Bass v. Regions Bank, Inc., 947 F.3d
1352, 1358 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[A shotgun] pleading is never plain
because it is impossible to comprehend which specific factual
allegations the plaintiff intends to support which of his causes of
action, or how they do so. It is not the proper function of courts in
this Circuit to parse out such incomprehensible allegations[.]”).
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Take Count 2, for example. It consists of five paragraphs.
The first paragraph “repeat[s] and reallege[s] all of the allegations
set forth in” previous paragraphs. The second paragraph quotes
§ 1985(3). The third paragraph states in a conclusory manner that
“[t]he unlawful actions of the defendants constitute a violation of”
§ 1985(3). The fourth paragraph alleges that, as a result of
defendants’ § 1985(3) violation, Mathis (1) lost business income and
earning capacity and (2) suffered “damage to his Christian and
professional reputation, embarrassment, humiliation[,] and other
forms of mental distress.” The last paragraph claims Mathis “came
to redress the harm done to him during an earlier red light camera
hearing by the Josh Brown [sic] where he had granted a white
person a dismissal without a necessary affidavit but upheld his[,]
and the obvious reason was because he was black.” Count 2 alone
embodies three types of impermissible shotgun pleadings.
For all these reasons, the amended complaint was a shotgun
pleading, the district court provided Mathis with an opportunity to
fix the deficiencies but Mathis failed to do so, and thus the district
court acted within its discretion in dismissing the amended
complaint with prejudice. Vibe Micro, Inc., 878 F.3d at 1296;
Jackson, 898 F.3d at 1358–59.
III. COUNT 4
In Count 4, Mathis alleged that defendant ATS was unjustly
enriched by his payment of a convenience fee to ATS. For an
unjust enrichment claim under Florida law, a plaintiff must show
that (1) he conferred a benefit on the defendant, (2) the defendant
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voluntarily accepted and retained the benefit, and (3) the
circumstances would make it inequitable for the defendant to
retain the benefit without paying the value thereof. Virgilio v.
Ryland Grp., Inc., 680 F.3d 1329, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012).
The district court dismissed Count 4 for failure to state a
claim because Mathis cannot satisfy the third element. “We review
de novo a district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim, accepting the complaint’s allegations as
true and construing them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.” Newbauer v. Carnival Corp., 26 F.4th 931, 934 (11th Cir.
2022). While a pro se complaint is construed liberally, it will not
be rewritten. Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir.
2006).
The district court did not err in dismissing Count 4 for
failure to state a claim because Count 4 is foreclosed by our binding
precedent.
In Pincus v. American Traffic Solutions, Inc., the plaintiff
received a traffic ticket issued through an ATS red light photo
enforcement system in Florida. 986 F.3d 1305, 1309 (11th Cir.
2021). The plaintiff sued ATS alleging three counts of unjust
enrichment after ATS charged him a fee for processing his credit
card payment for the traffic ticket. Id. This Court certified several
questions to the Florida Supreme Court, including the question:
“Does [the plaintiff’s] unjust enrichment claim fail because he
received adequate consideration in exchange for the challenged fee
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when he took advantage of the privilege of using his credit card to
pay the penalty?” Id. at 1320–21.
In answering that question, the Florida Supreme Court
explained that, even assuming Florida law bars a defendant from
charging a convenience fee, it is not inequitable for the defendant
to retain the fee because it provided the plaintiff value in exchange
for the fee. Pincus v. Am. Traffic Sols., Inc., 333 So.3d 1095, 1097
(Fla. 2022). Specifically, the Florida Supreme Court determined
that the value that the plaintiff received in exchange for the
convenience fee included: (1) not having to procure postage and a
check or money order; (2) being able to pay the balance over time;
(3) avoiding the risk of payment being delayed, stolen, or lost en
route; (4) being afforded more time to make the payment because
it would be received instantaneously; and (5) receiving immediate
confirmation that the payment was received and the obligation to
pay the penalty was fulfilled. Id. For these reasons, the Florida
Supreme Court concluded that “it [was] not inequitable under the
circumstances for ATS to retain the convenience fee because it first
paid the value thereof to the plaintiff.” Id. (cleaned up).
Upon remand to this Court, we concluded that the plaintiff
received adequate consideration for paying a convenience fee to
ATS and thus had failed to state a claim for unjust enrichment
under Florida law. Pincus, 25 F.4th at 1340–41.
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Mathis’s allegations in Count 4 are nearly identical to the
circumstances in Pincus. 2 Like the Pincus plaintiff, Mathis paid the
penalty electronically and alleged it was unjust for ATS to retain
the convenience fee. Mathis received the same benefits the Pincus
plaintiff did in exchange for the convenience fee. Because Mathis’s
Count 4 is foreclosed by Pincus, we conclude the district court did
not err in dismissing Count 4 for failure to state a claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Mathis’s amended
complaint.
AFFIRMED.
2 Mathis’s attempts to distinguish his claim from those present in Pincus are
unavailing. Mathis argues that his “claim differ[s] from the Pincus case
because he married up his allegations as prescribe[d] . . . by the Florida
Supreme Court.” (Italics added.) Mathis then quotes a paragraph from his
amended complaint that alleged Mathis “conferred a monetary benefit on the
Defendant, some or all of which was voluntarily retained by Defendant.” That
argument evidences a misunderstanding of Pincus. The Florida Supreme
Court’s reasoning did not turn on whether the plaintiff conferred a benefit
upon the defendant (i.e., the first element for an unjust enrichment claim in
Florida). Instead, it turned on whether the defendant provided value in
exchange for the benefit conferred by the plaintiff (i.e., the third element). See
Pincus, 333 So.3d at 1097 (reasoning that “ATS’s retention of the fee [was] not
inequitable because ATS gave value in exchange” for the convenience fee).