Yves Santais v. Officer Jones

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 18-15241
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 5:16-cv-00080-LGW-BWC
YVES SANTAIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA, et al.,
Defendants,
OFFICER JONES,
Guard, Coffee Correctional Facility,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
________________________
(October 27, 2020)
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Before GRANT, LUCK, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Yves Santais, a Georgia prisoner, brought suit against a corrections officer
for excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and asserted various state law claims.
Santais appeals the judgment based on the jury’s verdict in favor of the officer,
challenging an evidentiary ruling and the sufficiency of the evidence.
I.
Santais is incarcerated at Coffee Correctional Facility. He filed a pro se
lawsuit against Captain Malcolm Jones, individually and in his official capacity,
alleging excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and asserting state law claims of
battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Santais alleged that on April 7, 2016 Jones, who was monitoring the prison
cafeteria, discharged his pepper spray into the room and locked Santais and 25
other inmates inside. Santais asserts that he sought medical attention for throat and
chest pain and because he was coughing up blood. The day after the pepper spray
incident, he filed a grievance with the prison’s warden and asked him to review the
security camera recordings from the cafeteria. The warden “denied” the
grievance. 1
1
Santais also sued the warden, the prison, and the corporation that owns the prison. The
district court dismissed all claims against those defendants, and Santais does not challenge that
2
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At trial, Santais testified that he was in the prison cafeteria on the day of the
incident and Jones was located three or four tables away from him. He saw Jones
take a pepper spray bottle from Officer Kasonya Johnson, open the bottle, and
discharge the spray in the “cafeteria hall.” Santais testified that he immediately
began having stomach and throat pain and coughing up blood. He filed a
grievance with the warden and asked him to look at the security camera footage
from the cafeteria; in response he was told that Jones had not used any pepper
spray. Santais did not testify that he was locked in the cafeteria during this
incident.
After Santais rested his case, Captain Jones testified that on the day of the
incident he asked an inmate, David Hicks, to exit the cafeteria because his 15-
minute dining period was up. Because Hicks repeatedly refused to do so, Jones
called in security backup. Hicks walked out of the cafeteria into a hallway and
Jones followed him. They walked seven to ten feet away from the cafeteria door.
By that time two other officers, Johnson and Christopher Anguiano, had arrived.
Hicks threw his food tray at the wall and one of those other officers sprayed Hicks
ruling on appeal. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[I]ssues not
briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned.”).
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with the pepper spray. 2 No other inmates were in the hallway, and the inmates in
the cafeteria could not have seen or heard what was going on in the hallway.
On cross-examination Santais questioned Jones about the security cameras
in the cafeteria. Before trial, Santais had moved the court to order Jones to
produce the security camera footage from the cafeteria, and the court had denied
that motion after defense counsel advised the court that the footage did not exist.
But Jones testified at trial that there were at least four security cameras in the
cafeteria and recordings were usually saved for 45 days. Jones was aware that
Santais had filed a grievance after the incident, but he testified several times that he
had no control over or access to the security recordings, and he testified twice that
he didn’t know why the recording had not been preserved. Santais then, for the
third time, asked Jones why the recordings had not been preserved, this time
stating that, “Georgia policy, the [Standard Operating Procedures] say you’re
supposed to keep all of the camera evidence . . . after the incident of a use of force,
so if that’s the case why aren’t they conserved?” Jones objected and asserted that
because the prison was private it was not part of the Georgia Department of
2
Jones’ testimony was not clear about which officer used the pepper spray on Hicks, or if
both of them did. On direct examination he testified that Anguiano took charge and “before
[Anguiano] sprayed [Hicks], he told him to take the tray back.” On cross-examination, Santais
asked Jones if Johnson had used her spray, and he replied, “Yes, [] Johnson did spray.” But
Jones was clear that he himself did not discharge the pepper spray.
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Corrections or subject to its policies. The court sustained the objection without
specifying a ground.
Officer Kasonya Johnson testified that she and Jones were in the hallway
near the cafeteria when inmate Hicks was pepper sprayed, and that neither Santais
nor any inmate other than Hicks was in the hallway. Johnson also testified that
when Hicks was sprayed in the hallway outside of the cafeteria, no other inmates
were present, and the inmates inside the cafeteria could not have been affected by
the spray because the door to that room was closed and locked, which was required
when an incident like this was occurring in the hallway. Finally, she testified that
Jones did not discharge any pepper spray during the incident. The defense then
rested.
The court conducted a charge conference and considered Santais’ request for
a jury instruction on spoliation of evidence. The court ruled that the evidence did
not support giving the instruction because Jones did not have access to the security
camera recordings. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Jones on all claims.
II.
Santais raises two issues on appeal. First, he challenges the district court’s
ruling prohibiting him from further questioning Jones about the preservation of the
security camera recordings, specifically about whether the Georgia Department of
Corrections’ policies required it. In fact, the district court entered no such ruling.
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Instead of preventing any further questions about the recordings, it sustained the
objection to his third question to Jones, who had already testified twice that he had
no control or access to the recordings. That is the only ruling about the recordings
that is before us.
“We review a district court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for
abuse of discretion, and evidentiary rulings will be overturned only if the moving
party establishes that the ruling resulted in a substantial prejudicial effect.” Piamba
Cortes v. American Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1305 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotation
marks omitted).
The key point is that Jones had already testified that he had no control over
or access to the security camera recordings and that he did not know why they had
not been preserved. Santais put forth no evidence at trial to contradict or otherwise
call into question that testimony. There was no evidence that Jones had any
personal knowledge of the Georgia Department of Corrections’ video preservation
policy or whether it was followed in this case. See Fed. R. Evid. 602. The court
did not abuse its discretion when it sustained the objection to the third question
asking essentially the same thing he had already asked.
Second, Santais challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
verdict. He contends that a reasonable jury would have found that Jones used
excessive force in violation of § 1983 and committed battery, false imprisonment,
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and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Santais contends that the fact that
the jury did not enter a verdict in his favor shows that it “was not attentive.”
We ordinarily review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
verdict at a civil trial, inquiring whether, viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party, “no legally sufficient evidentiary basis exists for
a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.” Rossbach v. City of Miami,
371 F.3d 1354, 1356 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted). But we have no
authority to consider a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence unless the
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) are satisfied in the district
court. See Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 400–01,
407, 126 S. Ct. at 985, 989 (2006); Hi Ltd. P’ship v. Winghouse of Fla., Inc., 451
F.3d 1300, 1301–02 (11th Cir. 2006) (explaining that appellate review of the
sufficiency of the evidence is barred where a party moves before the verdict for
judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a), but fails to file a Rule 50(b) or Rule
59(b) motion after the verdict).3
Although we construe pro se filings liberally, “procedural rules in ordinary
civil litigation should [not] be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who
3
Rule 50(a) permits a party to move for judgment as a matter of law before a verdict has
been returned. A party may then renew its motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule
50(b) after the jury has returned its verdict. Rule 59(b) permits a party to move for a new trial
within 28 days after entry of the judgment.
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proceed without counsel.” McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113, 113 S. Ct.
1980 (1993). Because Santais failed to make a motion in the district court under
Rule 50(a) and (b), we will not consider his challenge to the jury’s verdict.4
AFFIRMED.
4
Santais also argues that Jones unfairly prejudiced him at trial by referring to his felony
conviction for false imprisonment, for which he was serving a sentence. He raised that argument
for the first time in his reply brief, and as a result it is waived. See Egidi v. Mukamai, 571 F.3d
1156, 1163 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Arguments not properly presented in a party’s initial brief or
raised for the first time in a reply brief are deemed waived.”). In any event, contrary to Santais’
contention, he was the party who first raised the fact of his felony conviction when he referred to
it in his opening statement. And, of course, the jury almost certainly was not surprised to learn
that an inmate in a prison was there because he had been convicted of committing a crime.
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