Kelvin Rance v. D.R. Horton, Inc.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-15224 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUGUST 13, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 07-80402-CV-DMM
KELVIN RANCE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
D.R. HORTON, INC.,
CNA INSURANCE,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(August 13, 2010)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, MARCUS and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Kelvin Rance appeals the dismissal of his complaint against D.R.
Horton, Inc. (“Horton”) and CNA Insurance (“CNA”) for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and, to the extent that the district court had jurisdiction over his claims,
the grant of summary judgment in favor of Horton and CNA. On appeal, Rance
contends that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction, abused its discretion
by refusing to reopen discovery prior to ruling on the defendants’ summary
judgment motions, and erred by applying res judicata to bar his claims. He also
reasserts the merits of some of his claims. Because, as discussed below, we
conclude that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Rance’s
complaint, we decline to address his remaining arguments on appeal.
I.
First, Rance argues that the district court erred by concluding that the
exclusivity of remedy afforded by Florida’s workers’ compensation scheme
deprived it of jurisdiction over Rance’s claims. He asserts that there is no Florida
law forbidding a federal district court from setting aside a workers’ compensation
agreement. He also argues that because settlement agreements involve an ADA
release, the agreements raise a federal question, which gives the district court
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
2
“We review de novo a district court’s finding that it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction.” Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009). We have
stated that where Florida courts would refuse to exercise jurisdiction over an
employee’s work-related claims, a district court lacks subject matter “jurisdiction
to consider . . . claims for additional damages over and above the relief that can be
obtained” in the state workers’ compensation proceedings. Connolly v. Maryland
Cas. Co., 849 F.2d 525, 526-28 (11th Cir. 1988).
The Florida workers’ compensation statute provides in part that the liability
of both an employer and an employer’s workers’ compensation carrier under the
act “shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability.” Fla. Stat. §§ 440.11(1)
and (4). Under this system, “the employee relinquishes certain common-law rights
with regard to negligence in the workplace and workplace injuries in exchange for
strict liability and the rapid recovery of benefits.” Aguilera v. Inservices, Inc., 905
So.2d 84, 90 (Fla. 2005). While minor delays in payment and bad faith in claim
handling procedures have been captured within the immunity from liability
afforded to employers and carriers under the act, the workers’ compensation
scheme does not give employers and carriers immunity from liability for
intentional torts against employees. Id. at 90-91.
3
If the employee alleges an intentional tort causing harm subsequent to and
distinct from the workplace injury, then the employee may assert his claims in
Florida’s circuit courts. Id. at 92. Otherwise, the circuit courts lack jurisdiction to
consider the employee’s action for additional damages for injuries covered by the
Act. See, Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Whitworth, 442 So.2d 1078, 1079 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983); see also Sanders v. City of Orlando, 997 So.2d 1089, 1093 (Fla. 2008)
(noting that Florida courts have “uniformly held . . . that Article V courts have no
subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes involving workers’ compensation
issues. . . . Instead, the uniform approach has historically been that [Judges of
Compensation Claims] have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over disputed
workers’ compensation claim matters”). When determining whether it is proper to
exercise jurisdiction over an injured employee’s complaint, Florida courts view the
employee’s complaint in the light most favorable to him, considering all facts and
reasonable inferences in his favor. Aguilera, 905 So.2d at 95-96. The courts will
evaluate whether the employee’s complaint alleges that the employer or carrier
intentionally harmed him and whether the employee sought compensation for an
injury covered by the workers’ compensation statute. Id. at 91-92; Old Republic,
442 So.2d at 1079.
4
We conclude from the record that the district court correctly determined that
because Rance did not sufficiently allege an independent tort, the exclusivity of
Florida’s workers’ compensation scheme deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction.
First, Rance’s breach of contract claims do not allege an intentional tort committed
by either Horton or CNA. Second, his fraud, conspiracy, civil theft, and
conversion claims all arise from his basic contention that he was injured on the job
and that Horton and CNA have not compensated him properly for those injuries.
Despite his characterizations of each of these claims and the various forms of relief
he sought, Rance’s claims sought compensation for an injury covered by the
workers’ compensation statute. See Old Republic, 442 So.2d at 1079.
Finally, Rance’s ADA claims arise under a federal statute, rather than from
Florida law. However, the workers’ compensation settlement agreements contain a
provision prohibiting Rance from seeking reemployment with Horton. Therefore,
in order to prevail on his ADA claim based on Horton’s failure to return him to
work, Rance would have to establish that this provision was not enforceable, and
the enforceability of a provision in a Florida workers’ compensation agreement is
at least initially governed by Florida law. Nothing in federal public policy would
dictate that Rance and Horton could not agree to refrain from any future
employment relationship, so any independent federal interest seems negligible.
5
Rance’s ADA claim thus presents itself first as a contract claim to which the
exclusivity of the workers’ compensation scheme applies.
II.
Rance also argues that the district court erred by concluding that, pursuant to
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine makes clear that federal district courts
cannot review state court final judgments because that task is reserved for state
appellate courts or, as a last resort, the United States Supreme Court.” Casale v.
Tillman, 558 F.3d at 1260. It applies to claims actually raised in the state court as
well as those that are “inextricably intertwined” with the state court judgment, but
it does not apply to claims that the plaintiff did not have a reasonable opportunity
to raise in the state court. Id.We conclude from the record that the district court correctly found that it
lacked authority to set aside orders entered by the Judge of Compensation Claims
in the state workers’ compensation proceedings. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court’s dismissal of Rance’s complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
AFFIRMED.
6