Jens P. Hansen v. Florida Commission of Offender Review

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 20-10761
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:19-cv-00197-AW-HTC
JENS P. HANSEN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
FLORIDA COMMISSION OF OFFENDER REVIEW,
Defendant - Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(November 10, 2020)
Before WILSON, JILL PRYOR and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Jens Hansen, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of his
42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against the Florida Commission of Offender Review.
Because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars his claims, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Hansen filed an amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint alleging that the
Commission arbitrarily and illegally denied him an effective parole release date
(“EPRD”) and delayed his presumptive parole release date (“PPRD”) for another
seven years, all in violation of his due process and equal protection rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The complaint alleged the following facts. In 1989 Hansen began serving a
life sentence with eligibility for parole after 25 years. In April 2013, the
Commission set Hansen’s PPRD to be August 31, 2017. In May 2017, a parole
examiner interviewed Hansen to establish an EPRD—presumably a firmer release
date than the PPRD. The examiner told Hansen he would recommend that his
EPRD be August 31. The following week, the examiner told Hansen that “the
interview was a mistake”; he needed to interview Hansen again. Doc. 20 at 7. 1 At
the second interview, the examiner told Hansen his “release plan was as good as
any he had seen.” Id. at 7–8 (emphasis omitted). Despite this, the examiner
submitted a report calling Hansen’s release plan “unsatisfactory” and
1
“Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.
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recommending that the Commission put off further consideration of Hansen’s
release for seven more years because, the examiner falsely represented, Hansen
had failed to show remorse for his crime. Id. at 8. The complaint alleged that
some unidentified person had ordered the examiner to change his mind.
In July, the Commission held a hearing at which it declined to set an EPRD
and instead ordered an “Extraordinary Review.” Id. Following that review
process, which culminated in a report that allegedly contained a “fabricated
misquotation” about Hansen’s crime of conviction, the Commission “suspend[ed]
the PPRD, and withheld further review for 7 years.” Id. at 8, 11. The complaint
alleged that the Commission’s decision was based on the false assertions that
Hansen lacked remorse for his crime and had only minimally participated in “self-
betterment programs.” Id. at 9. The complaint further alleged that the
Commission ignored or destroyed evidence that Hansen was remorseful and in fact
had participated in several self-improvement programs. The complaint alleged that
the Commission’s decision ran afoul of its own rules and Florida law.
The complaint asserted 10 numbered “claims” for relief, all of which were
framed as Fourteenth Amendment due process or equal protection violations. Id.
at 11 (capitalization omitted). The claims were based on allegations of: (1) the
examiner’s misrepresentations to Hansen and the Commission; (2) the
Commission’s destruction of or failure to consider evidence favorable to Hansen’s
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timely release; (3) the Extraordinary Review report’s misquote of Hansen’s role in
the crime of conviction; (4) the cumulative impact of the first three claims; (5) the
Commission’s numerous arbitrary decisions; (6) the Commission’s failure to
provide an evidentiary basis for its decision to deny Hansen timely release; (7) the
Commission’s “recycled prejudice of previous objective standards” that prejudiced
Hansen in this proceeding; (8) the Commission’s unlawful decision to set Hansen’s
next parole review for 7 years later rather than 1 year—an “ex post facto prejudice
of law” in addition to a due process violation; (9) Hansen’s “protected liberty
interest” in parole; and (10) the Commission’s failure to inform Hansen of
accusations against him and reliance on secret information to prejudice him. Id. at
11–13. The complaint requested declaratory and injunctive relief. In the section of
the complaint form that asked whether he had filed an action in state court “dealing
with the same or similar facts/issues involved in this action,” Hansen indicated that
he had filed a petition for writ of mandamus in state court that involved the “same
facts and claims raised here.” Id. at 5.
The district court ordered Hansen to show cause as to why his complaint
should not be dismissed for a lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, given his concession in his complaint that he had filed a petition for writ
of mandamus in state court that involved the same facts and claims as the instant
case. Hansen responded that his complaint should not be dismissed. He
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acknowledged that he had filed a petition for writ of mandamus in state court
challenging the Commission’s decision and attached the state court’s order
denying his petition but argued that the petition did not bar federal review of his
claims because: (1) he raised factual and legal issues in the district court that he
did not raise in state court; (2) the state-court petition was against the Commission,
whereas his federal complaint was against the Commissioners; (3) the state court
failed to address or resolve the claims Hansen presented to it; and (4) the state
court “essentially ‘rubber-stamped’” the Commission’s proposed order and did not
hold a full hearing on the matter. Doc. 23 at 3.
As he conceded in response to the district court’s show-cause order,
Hansen’s state-court petition for writ of mandamus challenged the Commission’s
decision regarding his release. See Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Hansen v. Fla.
Comm’n on Offender Rev., No. 2018-CA-373 (2d Fla. Cir. Ct.) (“Mandamus
Petition”).2 In his Mandamus Petition, Hansen acknowledged that he had no right
to parole but asserted that he nonetheless had “Florida and U.S. Constitutional
rights to due process and the equal protection of the law in consideration for
2
Hansen’s motion to take judicial notice is GRANTED to the extent that this Court takes
judicial notice of his state court proceedings in Case No. 2018 CA 373 from the Circuit Court of
the Second Judicial Court, in and for Leon County, Florida. Hansen’s mandamus petition is
found at
https://cvweb.leonclerk.com/public/online_services/search_courts/process.asp?report=full_view
&caseid=2866603&jiscaseid=&defseq=&chargeseq= under the docket number above.
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parole.” Id. at 13. Among other things, Hansen alleged that the examiner (called
the Investigator in the Mandamus Petition) focused wrongly on and misrepresented
Hansen’s remorse, erred in considering old information, and erred by telling
Hansen he had a good case for release but later opining that the release plan was
unsatisfactory. Hansen argued that the examiner and the Commission failed to
follow Florida procedure and to properly state the reasons for their findings,
instead ignoring and misrepresenting favorable evidence. He challenged the
Commission’s use of a “libelous misquote” relating to his involvement in the
crime. Id. at 29. And, he argued, the Commission defied Florida law by delaying
his next release-date determination for seven years.
The state court denied Hansen’s petition. Put succinctly, the court
determined that Hansen had failed to present evidence to cast doubt on the integrity
of the examiner’s review, the Commission was within its legal authority to take the
actions it took, and the Commission’s decision was supported by evidence.
Hansen appealed the order to Florida’s First District Court of Appeal; that court
denied certiorari without opinion and denied rehearing. See Hansen v. Fla.
Comm’n on Offender Review, 266 So. 3d 1239, 1240 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019),
reh’g denied. Hansen thereafter filed his complaint in federal district court.
The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge, who issued a report
and recommendation (“R&R”). The R&R recommended that the district court
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dismiss the case under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because a ruling in favor of
Hansen necessarily would require a finding that the state court’s decision was
erroneous. Over Hansen’s objection, the district court adopted the R&R and
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. This is Hansen’s appeal.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo a district court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 713 F.3d 1066, 1069 (11th Cir. 2013).
III. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Hansen argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar his
claims because his § 1983 complaint does not challenge the state court’s merits
decision but rather attacks the process the Commission used in determining his
eligibility for release. Hansen further argues his federal complaint, unlike his
state-court petition, alleged violations of due process and the Ex Post Facto Clause;
thus, Rooker-Feldman does not bar these two new constitutional law claims
because he did not raise them in state court, nor did the state court address them.
He also makes passing reference to a First Amendment violation, which he did not
raise in his state petition. We disagree with Hansen and hold that the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine deprives this Court of jurisdiction.
“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine eliminates federal court jurisdiction over
those cases that are essentially an appeal by a state court loser seeking to relitigate
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a claim that has already been decided in a state court.” Target Media Partners v.
Specialty Mktg. Corp., 881 F.3d 1279, 1281 (11th Cir. 2018).3 The doctrine
“ensure[s] that the inferior federal courts do not impermissibly review decisions of
the state courts—a role reserved to the United States Supreme Court.” Id. Under
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal court is barred from adjudicating a claim
that was “either (1) one actually adjudicated by a state court or (2) one inextricably
intertwined with a state court judgment.” Id. at 1286 (internal quotation marks
omitted). A claim is inextricably intertwined “if it asks to effectively nullify the
state court judgment, or it succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly
decided the issues.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim that at its
heart challenges the state court decision itself—and not the statute or law which
underlies that decision—falls within the doctrine because it complains of injuries
caused by state-court judgments and invites review and rejection of those
judgments.” May v. Morgan Cty., 878 F.3d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 2017)
(alterations adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine bars as-applied challenges to state courts’ application and
interpretation of constitutionally valid state law procedures. Alvarez v. Att’y Gen.
for Fla., 679 F.3d 1257, 1262–64 (11th Cir. 2012).
3
The doctrine takes its name from two Supreme Court cases, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
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The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not, however, apply where “the plaintiff
had no reasonable opportunity to raise his federal claim in state proceedings.”
Powell v. Powell, 80 F.3d 464, 467 (11th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks
omitted). 4
We conclude that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Hansen’s claims in this
case because his federal claims improperly invite review and rejection of the state
court judgment on his Mandamus Petition. Hansen argues that the doctrine is
inapplicable because he attacks the Commission’s process, not the state court
judgment. But he seeks to attack the Commission’s process as to his case, not
generally. And his argument overlooks that the state court judgment upheld the
4
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply if the federal action was commenced
before the state proceedings ended. Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1274–75 (11th Cir.
2009). State proceedings end for purposes of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine when: (1) “the
highest state court in which review is available has affirmed the judgment below and nothing is
left to be resolved,” (2) “the state action has reached a point where neither party seeks further
action,” such as when the losing party allows the time for appeal to expire, or (3) “the state court
proceedings have finally resolved all the federal questions in the litigation, but state law or
purely factual questions (whether great or small) remain to be litigated.” Id. at 1275 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Here, neither Hansen nor the Commission asserts that the state
proceedings were ongoing when Hansen filed suit. The Florida District Court of Appeal denied
Hansen rehearing on April 2, 2019. When he filed his original complaint in the district court on
April 25, Hansen technically had a few days remaining to seek further review of his appeal in the
Florida Supreme Court. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.120(b) (requiring a party to seek review in the
Florida Supreme Court within 30 days of the day of rendition of the order to be reviewed); Fla.
R. App. P. 9.020(h)(1)(B) (providing that a timely filed motion for rehearing tolls the date of
rendition of a final order). But Hansen never sought review in the Florida Supreme Court. And
his amended complaint—the operative complaint here—was filed well outside that 30-day
window. For all of these reasons, we are convinced that “the state action ha[d] reached a point
where neither party seeks further action,” and therefore the proceedings had ended for purposes
of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Nicholson, 558 F.3d at 1275.
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lawfulness of the Commission’s process in his case. Asking the federal courts to
determine that the Commission’s process in his case was unlawful “invites review
and rejection of” the state court judgment upholding the Commission’s process;
thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars our review. May, 878 F.3d at 1005
(alterations adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Target Media
Partners, 881 F.3d at 1286; Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 1262–63.
Hansen’s argument that his federal complaint raises new constitutional
claims not addressed in the state-court litigation does not change this result. As an
initial matter, Hansen did allege violations of equal protection and due process in
his petition for writ of mandamus; thus, they are not new here. Hansen did not
expressly allege a violation of the First Amendment in his state-court petition, but
he did not do so in his amended federal complaint either. The one arguably new
claim in Hansen’s federal complaint is one under the Ex Post Facto Clause. Even
so, Hansen had a reasonable opportunity to raise any and all federal constitutional
challenges to his 2017 parole eligibility determination in his state court litigation,
and his failure to do so does not give this Court jurisdiction. See Casale v.
Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that litigants have a
reasonable opportunity to raise claims under federal law in state court because “a
state court’s interpretation of federal law is no less authoritative than that of the
corresponding federal court of appeals” (alterations adopted) (internal quotation
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marks omitted)); Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm’n v. Dornau, 534 So. 2d 789, 792–93
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (permitting a Florida prisoner to raise federal
constitutional claims when challenging parole eligibility in a petition for writ of
mandamus); Tuff v. State, 732 So. 2d 461, 461–66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(addressing a challenge based in part on the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S.
Constitution). Moreover, for any of Hansen’s federal claims to succeed they
would have to effectively nullify the state court’s judgment that the Commission
followed the proper parole procedure under Florida law; the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine bars such review. May, 878 F.3d at 1005.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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