Christopher E. Huminski v. Commissioner of IRS

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-11677
Non-Argument Calendar
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Agency No. 002396-10
CHRISTOPHER E. HUMINSKI,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF IRS,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Petition for Review of a Decision of the
U.S.Tax Court
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(February 15, 2017)
Before MARCUS, MARTIN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Christopher Huminski, proceeding pro se, appeals from the U.S. Tax Court’s
denial of: (1) his “motion for leave to vacate” the Tax Court’s November 2012
order accepting the Commissioner’s deficiency calculations following Huminski’s
petition for a redetermination of tax deficiencies for tax years 2005 through 2008;
and (2) his related motions for reconsideration thereof.1 On appeal, Huminski
argues that the Tax Court construed his “motion for leave to file a motion to
vacate” as a “motion to vacate,” and this construction deprived him of access to the
Tax Court, and precluded him from litigating his claim that the November 2012
judgment resulted from fraud on the court. He asserts that he raised his fraud-on-
the-court argument in his initial motion for reconsideration, but the Tax Court
declined to consider it. Finally, Huminski contends that the Tax Court’s orders
denying his motions for reconsideration contain insufficient factual or legal
findings to allow appellate review.
We review the Tax Court’s denial of a motion to vacate for abuse of
discretion. Romano-Murphy v. C.I.R., 816 F.3d 707, 714 (11th Cir. 2016).
Likewise, we review the Tax Court’s denial of leave to file a motion to vacate for
abuse of discretion. Davenport Recycling Associates v. C.I.R., 220 F.3d 1255, 1258
(11th Cir. 2000). The Tax Court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration is also
1
Huminski’s appeal in this case is related to his appeal in Case No. 16-12400, which
concerns the U.S. Tax Court’s orders: (1) granting the Commissioner’s motion for summary
judgment and sustaining its proposed levy to collect Huminski’s unpaid tax liabilities for tax
years 2005 through 2010; and (2) denying Huminski’s related motion to vacate or revise.
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reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Byrd’s Estate v. C.I.R., 388 F.2d 223, 234
(5th Cir. 1967). Accordingly, we will reverse the Tax Court’s decision only if we
are left with a “definite and firm conviction that the Tax Court committed a clear
error of judgment in the conclusion it reached.” Id. We liberally construe briefs
filed by pro se litigants. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008).
However, we may affirm the Tax Court’s decision “on any ground that finds
support in the record.” Long v. Commissioner of IRS, 772 F.3d 670 (11th Cir.
2014).
The Internal Revenue Code provides that a decision of the Tax Court
becomes final 90 days after entry if no party files a notice of appeal. 26 U.S.C.
§§ 7481(a), 7488. Additionally, Tax Court Rule 162 provides that a motion to
vacate must be filed “within 30 days after the decision has been entered, unless the
Court shall otherwise permit.” Tax Ct. R. 162. Thus, as a general rule, the Tax
Court lacks jurisdiction to vacate a decision once it becomes final. Davenport, 220
F.3d at 1259. However, there are certain narrowly circumscribed exceptions to this
rule, and the Tax Court may vacate an otherwise final decision if the decision was
procured by fraud on the court. Id. at 1259. In the context of a motion to vacate a
final Tax Court decision, “fraud upon the court” is narrowly construed and will
only be found in those instances where an “unconscionable plan or scheme which
is designed to improperly influence the court in its decision prevent[s] the
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opposing party from fully and fairly presenting his case.” Id. at 1262 (quotations
and citation omitted).
Tax Court Rule 161 governs motions for reconsideration, which can be filed
to challenge the Tax Court’s opinion or findings of fact. Tax Ct. R. 161. Outside
the context of the Tax Court, we have held that a motion for reconsideration cannot
be used to relitigate old matters, raise arguments or present evidence that could
have been raised prior to the entry of judgment. See Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village
of Wellington, Fla., 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005) (addressing a motion for
reconsideration labeled as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion to alter the judgment); see
also Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 957 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting
that this prohibition extends to “new arguments that were previously available, but
not pressed”); Tax Ct. R. 1(b) (noting “[w]here in any instance there is no
applicable rule of procedure, the Court . . . may prescribe the procedure, giving
particular weight to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the extent that they are
suitably adaptable to govern the matter at hand”).
Here, the Tax Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Huminski’s
“motion for leave to vacate judgment.” See Davenport, 220 F.3d at 1258.
Huminski’s motion, filed nearly three years after the Tax Court’s order sustaining
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the Commissioner’s deficiency determinations, 2 was both untimely under Tax
Court Rule 162, and well beyond the date the November 2012 order became final.
See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7481(a), 7488; Tax Ct. R. 162. Thus, although the Tax Court
retained the authority to set aside the November 2012 order based upon fraud, it
could only do so if Huminski demonstrated the existence of an unconscionable
scheme designed to improperly influence the Tax Court and prevent him from fully
and fairly presenting his case. See Davenport, 220 F.3d at 1262. Although
Huminski asserted, without elaboration, that the November 2012 order was
procured through fraud, he did not explain the alleged fraud, his delay in filing his
“motion for leave to vacate,” or how any purported fraud prevented him from
presenting his case. See id. Accordingly, the Tax Court did not abuse its discretion
by denying Huminski’s motion, irrespective of whether it construed the motion as
a “motion to vacate” or a “motion for leave to vacate.” See Romano-Murphy, 816
F.3d at 714; Davenport, 220 F.3d at 1258.
Likewise, the Tax Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Huminski’s
motions for reconsideration. See Byrd’s Estate, 388 F.2d at 234. In his first motion
for reconsideration, Huminski argued, generally, that the IRS committed fraud on
the court when it calculated his tax liabilities. However, in support of this
contention, Huminski simply resurrected the arguments that he raised and then
2
Huminski did not appeal the Tax Court’s decision sustaining the Commissioner’s
deficiencies.
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subsequently abandoned prior to the Tax Court’s November 2012 order sustaining
the Commissioner’s deficiency determinations. Accordingly, because a motion for
reconsideration cannot be used to raise argument or present evidence that could
have been raised previously, before the entry of judgment, Huminski was not
entitled to reconsideration of the November 2012 order. See Michael Linet, Inc.,
408 F.3d at 763.
Regardless, however, Huminski’s underlying contention—that the
November 2012 order was procured by fraud—is without merit. As noted
previously, the Tax Court could only set aside the final order if Huminski
demonstrated the existence of an unconscionable scheme designed to improperly
influence the Tax Court and prevent him from fully and fairly presenting his case.
See Davenport, 220 F.3d at 1262. However, the grounds that Huminski identified
in support of his fraud-on-the-court argument do not implicate his ability to “fully
and fairly” present his case before the Tax Court. See id. Indeed, Huminski
actually presented his various “fraud” arguments—pertaining to the IRS’s
authority to challenge the correctness of a filed tax return or to impose an income
tax on his occupation—to the Tax Court prior to the entry of the 2012 order he
now seeks to vacate. Accordingly, the Tax Court did not abuse its discretion by
denying Huminski’s motions for reconsideration.
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Finally, Huminski’s remaining argument—that the Tax Court’s orders
denying his motions for reconsideration contained insufficient factual or legal
findings to allow appellate review—is unavailing. Although the Tax Court denied
Huminski’s motions for reconsideration in a summary fashion, remand is not
required because a complete understanding of the issues may be had without the
aid of separate findings. See Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1504 n.16 (11th
Cir. 1991) (interpreting the requirement, from Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), that a district
court must make findings of fact and conclusions of law in the record).
Furthermore, even assuming, arguendo, that the Tax Court erred by failing to
explain its reasoning, we may affirm “on any ground that finds support in the
record.” Long, 772 F.3d at 675. As discussed previously, Huminski was not
entitled to reconsideration of the Tax Court’s order denying his “motion for leave
to vacate” the November 2012 order, because the grounds he identified in support
of his fraud-on-the-court argument do not implicate his ability to “fully and fairly”
present his case before the Tax Court.
Accordingly, the Tax Court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Huminski’s motions for reconsideration and leave to vacate, and we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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