United States v. Quincetta Yvonne Cargill

USCA11 Case: 22-13587 Document: 15-1 Date Filed: 03/22/2023 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13587
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
QUINCETTA YVONNE CARGILL,
a.k.a. Queen,
a.k.a. Tonya,
a.k.a. Angela Scott,
a.k.a. Antela Scott,
a.k.a. QuincetTucker,
a.k.a. Quincetta Tucker,
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13587
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 2:17-cr-00356-RDP-JHE-1
____________________
Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Quincetta Cargill, proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s denial of her motion for compassionate release under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). However, in her 80-page brief on appeal,
she addresses only issues related to the validity of her underlying
convictions; she does not address the district court’s denial of
compassionate release. The government in turn moves for
summary affirmance of the district court’s order and to stay the
briefing schedule, arguing that Cargill abandoned any challenge to
the district court’s denial of her § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion by not
briefing it on appeal. In reply, Cargill states that although her brief
does not address the motion for compassionate release, she listed
issues with the district court’s denial in her notice of appeal. She
then reiterates some of the issues that she contends undermine the
validity of her conviction.
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22-13587 Opinion of the Court 3
Summary disposition is appropriate where “the position of
one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can
be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case, or where,
as is more frequently the case, the appeal is frivolous.” Groendyke
Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). 1
Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than
counseled pleadings and, therefore, are liberally construed.
Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
Nonetheless, “[w]hile we read briefs filed by pro se litigants
liberally, issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are
deemed abandoned.” Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th
Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). “Moreover, we do not
address arguments raised for the first time in a pro se litigant’s reply
brief.” Id. Accordingly, by failing to raise the issues related to the
district court’s denial of Cargill’s motion for compassionate release
in her initial brief, Cargill abandoned any challenge to the trial
court’s denial of her motion. 2
1 See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc)
(holding that all decisions from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued before
September 30, 1981, are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit).
2 We note that even if we were to consider the “issues” referenced by Cargill
in her notice of appeal, summary affirmance would still be appropriate. Cargill
did not establish the existence of an extraordinary and compelling reason for
compassionate release as defined in the Sentencing Guidelines. Specifically,
Application Note 1 to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 sets forth four circumstances under
which “extraordinary and compelling reasons exist”: (A) the defendant suffers
from (i) “a terminal illness,” or (ii) a permanent health condition “that
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13587
Thus, because the government’s position is clearly correct
as a matter of law, we GRANT the government’s motion for
summary affirmance and DENY AS MOOT its motion to stay the
briefing schedule. Groendyke Transp., Inc., 406 F.2d at 1162.
substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within
the environment of a correctional facility from which he or she is not expected
to recover”; (B) the defendant is “at least 65 years old,” “is experiencing a
serious [age-related] deterioration in physical or mental health,” and “has
served at least 10 years or 75 percent of his or her term of imprisonment,
whichever is less”; (C) the defendant’s assistance is needed in caring for the
defendant’s minor child, spouse, or registered partner due to (i) “[t]he death
or incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant’s minor child or minor
children” or (ii) “[t]he incapacitation of the defendant’s spouse or registered
partner”; and (D) there exist “other” extraordinary and compelling reasons
“[a]s determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons.” See U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13 cmt. (n.1 (A)–(D)). Cargill’s allegations in her notice of appeal that
she was entitled to compassionate release based on the risk and spread of
COVID-19, “fear of death due to contagion,” concerns over the COVID
vaccine, as well as the ongoing war between Russia Ukraine, and her “growing
fear of HATE RELATED CRIMES/DOMESTIC TERRORISM” do not satisfy
any of the four extraordinary and compelling circumstances defined in
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying
Cargill’s motion.