James D. Steffens v. Christopher Nocco

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10482
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
JAMES D. STEFFENS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CHRISTOPHER NOCCO,
in his Official Capacity as Pasco County Sheriff,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cv-01940-KKM-AAS
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10482
____________________
Before LUCK, BRASHER, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
James Steffens appeals the grant of summary judgment to
his former employer Sheriff Christopher Nocco, in his official ca-
pacity as Pasco County Sheriff. Steffens is biracial and worked as a
Captain in the Pasco County Sheriff’s Office. Steffens asserts the
district court erred by applying a single-intent analysis, rather than
a mixed-motive analysis, to his race discrimination case, and that
his claim would have survived summary judgment under a mixed-
motive analysis. Additionally, Steffens asserts the district court
erred by failing to find he had presented a “convincing mosaic” of
evidence of discrimination. After review, 1 we affirm the district
court’s grant of summary judgment.
I. MIXED-MOTIVE
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual’s race . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Discrimination claims
brought under Title VII are categorized as either mixed-motive or
1 We review a district court’s order granting summary judgment de novo,
“viewing all the evidence, and drawing all reasonable inferences, in favor of
the non-moving party.” Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 767
(11th Cir. 2005).
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22-10482 Opinion of the Court 3
single-motive claims. Quigg v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d
1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2016); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), (m).
The district court analyzed Steffens’ claim under the McDonnell
Douglas analysis as Steffens pled and litigated his case under a sin-
gle-intent theory. E.E.O.C. v. Joe’s Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d
1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2002) (explaining a plaintiff can prove a single-
motive employment discrimination claim through circumstantial
evidence, which we generally analyze using a three-step, burden-
shifting framework identified in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
Steffens failed to argue a mixed-motive discrimination case
before the district court and we do not consider it. 2 See Access
Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331-32 (11th Cir.
2004) (stating an issue not raised in the district court and raised for
the first time on appeal in a civil case will not be considered absent
extraordinary circumstances). Steffens’ amended complaint failed
to allege the actions taken against him resulted from mixed mo-
tives or that his interracial relationship was only a motivating factor
for these actions. In his response to Nocco’s motion for summary
2 Even if we considered Steffens’ mixed-motive claim, it would fail as Steffens
failed to show an adverse employment action, as discussed in Part II of this
opinion. See Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1239 (stating for a Title VII claim presented
under a mixed-motive theory to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must
introduce evidence sufficient to support a jury finding that: “(1) the defendant
took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff; and (2) a protected
characteristic was a motivating factor for the defendant’s adverse employment
action” (quotation marks, alterations, and emphasis omitted)).
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judgment, Steffens failed to make any arguments that a mixed-mo-
tive analysis applied to his claim. Rather, he chose to argue his case
under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Steffens asserted “there
were zero grounds for [his] termination, all of the ‘Mercado’ re-
lated issues having been resolved properly, and the only remaining
reason being racially motivated.” Also, while Steffens alleged both
race discrimination and retaliation, these claims were separated
into distinct counts. To the extent Steffens argues his claims were
inherently mixed-motive, as he alleged both racial discrimination
and retaliation, this argument fails as a party may allege multiple
separate single-intent claims under Title VII. A claim does not be-
come a mixed-motive claim merely because multiple unlawful
causes for an action are alleged. See e.g. Johnson v. Miami-Dade
Cnty., 948 F.3d 1318, 1324-26 (11th Cir. 2020) (evaluating a retalia-
tion claim under the McDonnell Douglas framework despite the
plaintiff alleging both race discrimination and retaliation).
As Steffens never pled or litigated his case under a mixed-
motive theory before the district court, the district court did not
err in evaluating the case under the single-intent framework in
McDonnell Douglas. Additionally, in his initial brief, Steffens fails
to challenge the district court’s finding that he did not establish a
prima facie case of race discrimination under McDonnell Douglas
because he failed to identify a similarly situated comparator treated
more favorably than him, thus abandoning any challenge on this
basis. United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir.) (en
banc), petition for cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 95 (2022) (stating issues
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22-10482 Opinion of the Court 5
not raised in an appellant’s initial brief are deemed abandoned and
will not be addressed absent extraordinary circumstances);
Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir.
2014) (stating an appellant must clearly and specifically identify in
his brief any issue he wants the appellate court to address).
II. CONVINCING MOSAIC
A plaintiff will “survive summary judgment if he presents
circumstantial evidence that creates a triable issue concerning the
employer’s discriminatory intent.” Smith v. Lockheed-Martin
Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011). “A triable issue of fact
exists if the record, viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff,
presents a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that
would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the deci-
sionmaker.” Id. (quotation and footnote omitted). A plaintiff may
establish a “convincing mosaic” by pointing to evidence that
demonstrates (1) suspicious timing, ambiguous statements, or
other information from which discriminatory intent may be in-
ferred, (2) systematically better treatment of similarly situated em-
ployees, and (3) pretext. Lewis v. City of Union City, 934 F.3d
1169, 1185 (11th Cir. 2019).
As to a “convincing mosaic” argument, Steffens failed to
provide sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer discrimi-
natory intent on the part of the decisionmaker. Steffens has not
identified an adverse employment action onto which a jury could
infer discriminatory intent. Steffens argues he suffered multiple ad-
verse employment actions, including multiple failures to promote.
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However, the district court did not err in finding Steffens only al-
leged a single adverse employment action within his EEOC charge,
namely that he was “coerced into resigning . . . because he main-
tained a relationship with [his] fianc[eé].” Further, these alleged
actions, which occurred well before his resignation, are not actions
which could reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of
discrimination. Gregory v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 355 F.3d
1277, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 2004) (explaining a plaintiff’s judicial com-
plaint is limited by the scope of the EEOC investigation which can
reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimina-
tion). Therefore, the district court did not err in determining the
only potential adverse employment action was Steffens’ resigna-
tion.
Additionally, the district court did not err in finding Steffens
voluntarily chose to resign rather than “stand pat and fight” an in-
vestigation. See Hargray v. City of Hallandale, 57 F.3d 1560, 1568
(11th Cir. 1995) (stating we presume that resignations are volun-
tary, unless an employer forces the employee to resign by coercion,
duress, deceit, or misrepresentation of a material fact). First, Stef-
fens was aware he was being investigated and Major Ken Gregory
had informed him that it “did not look good.” Later that day, Stef-
fens was told Nocco had lost faith in him, and he was asked if he
would resign effective immediately. Steffens testified he knew he
could choose to resign, leaving the agency in good standing, or to
face the investigation, under which “all options,” including the po-
tential for no disciplinary action to be taken, were available.
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22-10482 Opinion of the Court 7
Steffens requested to speak with Nocco, but when that request was
denied, he did not seek additional time to consider or consult coun-
sel. Rather he stated “[y]ou know what my answer is” and pre-
pared a written resignation. Given this, Steffens knew his options
and, rather than choosing to “stand pat and fight,” facing the inves-
tigation, he chose to voluntarily resign. Thus, considering the to-
tality of the circumstances, the district court did not err in finding,
as a matter of law, that Steffens’ resignation was a voluntary choice
to take what he viewed as the best of two bad options, not a result
of coercion, duress, deceit, or misrepresentation of a material fact.
Id.As such, no reasonable jury could infer that a decisionmaker
acted with discriminatory intent, as the only relevant decision, Stef-
fens’ resignation, was made voluntarily by Steffens. Lockheed-
Martin Corp., 644 F.3d at 1328. Even if we apply the “convincing
mosaic” analysis to Nocco’s decision to request Steffens’ resigna-
tion, Steffens has failed to provide evidence from which a jury
could infer that the decisionmaker, Nocco, acted with discrimina-
tory intent. Steffens has not pointed to any piece of evidence show-
ing Gregory provided inaccurate or biased information to Nocco
which could bias his decision. Rather, the record shows the order
to request Steffens’ resignation came from Nocco through Colonel
Jeffrey Harrington. Steffens has not asserted Nocco made any am-
biguous statements or otherwise showed discriminatory intent to-
ward Steffens. Rather, the record shows Nocco hired Steffens
knowing he was in a interracial relationship, promoted him while
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-10482
he was in a interracial relationship, and filled Steffens’ position after
his resignation with another individual in a interracial relationship.
Given this evidence, no reasonable jury could infer discriminatory
intent. See id.AFFIRMED.