Carlton Smith v. Attorney General, State of Georgia

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12950
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
CARLTON SMITH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF GEORGIA,
JOHN TURNER,
Superior Court Judge, Bullock County,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12950
D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-01233-CAP
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Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Carlton Smith, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals
the sua sponte dismissal of his civil suit against the defendants
because it amounted to an unauthorized successive habeas petition
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and, to the extent it was a proper civil rights
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it was untimely. 1 Smith argues that
his claim is distinguishable from a habeas petition because he seeks
“injunctive relief for a procedural due process violation of a state-
created right by state actors” in the state postconviction process,
and he is not challenging the legality of his conviction or sentence.
Additionally, he asserts that his claims were timely. After review,
we vacate and remand for further proceedings.
I. Background
On March 15, 2022, Smith, proceeding pro se, filed the
underlying § 1983 complaint in the Northern District of Georgia
against Georgia’s Attorney General Christopher Carr and Superior
Court Judge John Turner, alleging that they violated his due
process rights during a May 2019 hearing in his state postconviction
1 Smith has filed a “motion to submit appeal” requesting that his appeal be
submitted to the court for a decision. We DENY this motion as moot.
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proceedings.2 Specifically, he alleged that Attorney General Carr
failed to respond adequately to his petition and “failed to produce
and submit the trial transcripts” that would have supported Smith’s
claims. Likewise, Smith alleged that Judge Turner “failed to
require the production and submission of the trial transcripts as
required by statute” and violated various other unspecified
statutory provisions in denying Smith relief. As relief, Smith
requested that the defendants “be held liable for these procedural
due process violations” and that “the ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests
protections given by created state law rules be restored.”
Prior to any appearance by the defendants, a magistrate
judge issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”),
recommending that the complaint be dismissed sua sponte for two
reasons. First, the magistrate judge determined that Smith’s § 1983
complaint was “the functional equivalent of a habeas petition” over
which it lacked jurisdiction because Smith had already completed
his federal habeas proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and he had
not requested leave to file a second or successive petition. Second,
even if Smith’s claims were proper under § 1983, they were time-
barred because they were filed outside the applicable two-year
statute of limitations period.
Smith objected to the R&R, arguing that he was not
bringing a habeas claim. Instead, he asserted that his claim was for
2 Smith is serving a life sentence plus 20 years’ imprisonment following his
1993 convictions for kidnapping, robbery, and aggravated sodomy.
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a procedural due process violation, which is proper under § 1983.
He also maintained that his claims were timely because, although
the violation occurred in May 2019, the state court’s habeas
decision was not final until June 2020. He also noted that he filed
a writ of mandamus in state court seeking a remedy for this
violation, which was denied on January 27, 2022, and his § 1983
claim did not arise until the state court declined to provide a
sufficient remedy.
The district court conducted a de novo review and adopted
the R&R over Smith’s objections. 3 Smith timely appealed.
II. Discussion
Smith argues that the district court erred in concluding that
his complaint was an improper second or successive federal habeas
petition or an otherwise untimely § 1983 action.
The district court is required to screen any “civil action in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). “On review, the court
shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any
3 In adopting the R&R the district court addressed the magistrate’s judge’s
determination that the complaint was in essence a second or successive habeas
petition, but it did not address the determination that the claims were
otherwise untimely under § 1983. However, we read the district court’s
statement that it adopted the R&R “as the order and opinion of th[e] court,”
as implicitly adopting the magistrate judge’s alternative determination that the
claims were also untimely because they were filed more than two years after
the hearing during which the alleged due process violation occurred.
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portion of the complaint, if the complaint . . . is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. . . .” Id. § 1915A(b). In conducting this review, the court
must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and “construe
them in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff].” Danglar v.
Dep’t of Corr., 50 F.4th 54, 55 n.1 (11th Cir. 2022).
We review de novo whether a petition is an unauthorized
second or successive habeas petition. Patterson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t
of Corr., 849 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Likewise,
we review de novo a district court’s determination that a complaint
would be time-barred. Leal v. Ga. Dep’t Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1279
(11th Cir. 2001) (reviewing de novo a sua sponte dismissal of a
§ 1983 action for failure to state a claim based on a determination
that the claim was time-barred).
We begin with the district court’s determination that
Smith’s complaint effectively constituted an unauthorized second
or successive federal habeas petition under § 2254. Federal courts
have an obligation to look behind the label of a motion filed by a
pro se inmate and determine whether a filing is cognizable under a
different statutory framework. See Spivey v. State Bd. of Pardons
& Paroles, 279 F.3d 1301, 1302 n.1 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Jordan, 915 F.2d 622, 624–25 (11th Cir. 1990). If a civil rights action
requests relief that would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his
conviction or sentence,” it must be brought in a habeas proceeding.
Nance v. Ward, 142 S. Ct. 2214, 2222 (2022) (quotations omitted);
Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 533–34 (2011); see also Medberry
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v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049, 1062 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[A] state prisoner
seeking post-conviction relief from a federal court has but one
remedy: an application for a writ of habeas corpus.”).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”) provides that, before a petitioner may file a second or
successive habeas petition, the petitioner first must obtain an order
from this Court authorizing the district court to consider the
petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Absent authorization from
this Court, the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a second
or successive habeas petition. See Farris v. United States,
333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003).
Here, it is clear that Smith’s complaint concerned alleged
defects in his state postconviction proceedings that purportedly
violated his procedural due process rights. We have repeatedly
held that “an alleged defect in a collateral proceeding does not state
a basis for habeas relief.” Quince v. Crosby, 360 F.3d 1259, 1261
(11th Cir. 2004); see also Alston v. Dep’t of Corr., Fla., 610 F.3d
1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2010); Carrol v. Sec’y, DOC, 574 F.3d 1354,
1365 (11th Cir. 2009). Rather, “[f]ederal habeas relief is available to
remedy defects in a defendant’s conviction and sentence,” and “[a]
challenge to a state collateral proceeding does not undermine the
legality of the detention or imprisonment—i.e., the conviction
itself.” Alston, 610 F.3d at 1325–26 (quotations omitted).
Smith did not challenge the validity of his conviction or
sentence in the underlying complaint. Nor did he seek immediate
or speedier release or seek relief that would “necessarily imply the
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invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Nance, 142 S. Ct. at 2222.
Rather, he essentially sought a properly conducted state
postconviction proceeding. Accordingly, because the gravamen of
Smith’s claims did not fall within the ambit of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the
district court erred in holding that Smith’s § 1983 complaint was an
unauthorized second or successive § 2254 petition.
We now turn to the district court’s determination that the
complaint was untimely under § 1983. “Section 1983 broadly
authorizes suit against state officials for the deprivation of any
rights secured by the Constitution.” Nance, 142 S.Ct. at 2221.
There is no federal constitutional right to a direct appeal or to
postconviction review by the states, but once such a remedy is
granted, its operation must conform to the due process
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 See Evitts v. Lucy,
469 U.S. 387, 400–02 (1985).
A procedural due process violation by a state “may form the
basis for a suit under [§] 1983.” McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550,
1555 (11th Cir. 1994). Thus, § 1983 is generally the proper vehicle
for state prisoners to challenge alleged constitutional errors in state
proceedings where the relief sought does not “necessarily imply
the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” See, e.g., Skinner v.
Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 529 (2011) (holding § 1983 was proper vehicle
4 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides “nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
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for postconviction claim for access to DNA evidence); Wilkinson
v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81–82 (2005) (holding that § 1983 was
proper vehicle to bring constitutional challenge to state’s parole
hearings and procedures); see also Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d
1538, 1566 (10th Cir. 1994) (explaining that “a petitioner for whom
habeas relief is not available may seek redress from the responsible
parties for any due process violation caused by state appellate delay
through a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”); Franzen v.
Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26, 26 (9th Cir. 1989) (dismissing habeas
petition alleging that errors in state postconviction proceeding
violated due process rights, but noting that “dismissal would not
prejudice [defendant’s] ability to bring a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983”).
All constitutional claims brought under § 1983, however, are
subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury
actions in the state where the § 1983 action was brought. McNair
v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008). In Georgia, the
applicable statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two
years. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33; see also Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181,
1182 (11th Cir. 2003). However, “a procedural due process
violation is not complete unless and until the State fails to provide
due process.” McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1557 (quotations omitted). “In
other words, the [S]tate may cure a procedural deprivation by
providing a later procedural remedy; only when the [S]tate refuses
to provide a process sufficient to remedy the procedural
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deprivation does a constitutional violation actionable under
[§] 1983 arise.” Id.
Here, the magistrate judge concluded that Smith’s
complaint was untimely because Smith alleged that his due process
rights were violated during an evidentiary hearing in May 2019,
and Smith did not file the underlying complaint until March 2022,
more than two years later. But in his objections to the R&R, Smith
alleged that the two-year statute of limitations period did not begin
to run until, at the earliest, the date on which the Georgia Supreme
Court denied Smith a certificate of probable cause in June 2020 5
because, under McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1557, an actionable
procedural due process claim does not arise under § 1983 until “the
[S]tate refuses to provide a process sufficient to remedy the
procedural deprivation.” In its order addressing Smith’s objections
to the R&R, the district court did not address Smith’s contention.
Instead, the district court focused exclusively on the determination
that the complaint constituted an unauthorized second or
successive habeas petition. In light of Smith’s allegations—which
we must take as true at this stage—we vacate the district court’s
5 Smith also asserts that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the
state court denied his petition for a writ of mandamus in which he sought to
remedy the alleged due process violations.
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dismissal and remand for reconsideration of whether the § 1983
claims are timely in light of McKinney. 6
VACATED AND REMANDED.
6 We express no opinion on the merits of Smith’s claims. Furthermore, the
district court is free on remand to consider other issues aside from timeliness
of the claims, including whether other grounds exist that warrant dismissal of
the complaint.