United States v. Andre Jamaal Guyton

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10984
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ANDRE JAMAAL GUYTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 4:10-cr-00093-WTM-CLR-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10984
Before WILSON, LUCK, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Andre Guyton, pro se, appeals from the district court’s de-
nial of his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) and the denial of his motion for reconsideration.
He asserts he is more susceptible to severe symptoms should he
contract COVID-19 because of his race and because he still suffers
complications from the first time he had COVID-19. After review, 1
we affirm the district court.
I. TIMELINESS
The Government contends Guyton’s appeal is untimely as
to the underlying motion for compassionate release. Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure 4(b) provides a 14-day period to file a notice
of appeal in criminal cases. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i). The
14-day period provided in Rule 4(b) applies to Guyton’s appeal be-
cause his motion for compassionate release is an extension of the
underlying criminal case.
Guyton signed his motion for reconsideration on January 18,
2022, which was 14 days after the district court denied his motion
1We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction
under § 3582(c)(1)(A). United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1251 (11th Cir.
2021), cert. denied 142 S. Ct. 583 (2021). However, we review a district court’s
denial of a prisoner’s § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for an abuse of discretion. United
States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021).
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22-10984 Opinion of the Court 3
for compassionate release on January 4, 2022. See Jeffries v. United
States, 748 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating we consider a
pro se prisoner’s filings as filed on the date he delivers them to
prison authorities for mailing and absent evidence to the contrary,
we assume a prisoner provided his filing to prison officials on the
date he signed it); United States v. Vicaria, 963 F.2d 1412, 1414 (11th
Cir. 1992) (explaining a motion for reconsideration in a criminal
case must be filed within the period of time allotted for filing a no-
tice of appeal in order to extend the time for filing the notice of
appeal). The filing of the motion for reconsideration tolled the
time Guyton had to file a notice of appeal, and the 14-day period
did not begin to run again until the district court denied his motion
for reconsideration on February 22, 2022. See United States v.
Glover, 686 F.3d 1203, 1205 (11th Cir. 2012) abrogated on other
grounds by Amendment 780 (stating the filing of a motion for re-
consideration tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal and the time
begins to run anew following disposition of the motion). Guyton’s
notice of appeal was filed on March 23, 2022, which was more than
14 days after the district court’s denial of his motion for reconsid-
eration, but within the 30-day period where an extension for good
cause or excusable neglect may be granted by the district court. See
United States v. Ward, 696 F.2d 1315, 1317 (11th Cir. 1983) (stating
in criminal cases, we treat a late notice of appeal, filed within 30
days during which an extension is permissible, as a motion for ex-
tension of time that should be decided by the district court); see
also Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(4) (providing, upon a showing of excusable
neglect or good cause, a district court may extend the time to file a
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10984
notice of appeal for a period not to exceed 30 days from the expira-
tion of the original appeal period). Nevertheless, the Government
has assumed Guyton would receive such an extension for good
cause or excusable neglect, and it has not requested this Court dis-
miss Guyton’s appeal for untimeliness to the extent he appeals
from the district court’s order on February 22, 2022. See United
States v. Lopez, 562 F.3d 1309, 1311-14 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining
the 14-day deadline for filing a notice of appeal in criminal cases is
a non-jurisdictional claims-processing rule, but when the govern-
ment asserts timeliness as an issue on appeal, we must apply the
time limits of Rule 4(b)).
Because Guyton’s appeal from the denial of his motion for
compassionate release was tolled by the motion for reconsidera-
tion, and the Government has assumed Guyton’s untimeliness in
appealing from the denial of the motion for reconsideration was
due to excusable neglect or good cause, the Government has not
moved to enforce the timeliness claims-processing rule and we ad-
dress the merits of Guyton’s appeal.
II. COMPASSIONATE RELEASE
District courts lack the inherent authority to modify a term
of imprisonment but may do so as permitted by statute. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c); United States v. Puentes, 803 F.3d 597, 605-06 (11th Cir.
2015). As amended by § 603(b) of the First Step Act, that section
now provides, in relevant part, that:
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22-10984 Opinion of the Court 5
the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau
of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the
defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights
to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a
motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30
days from the receipt of such a request by the warden
of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier, may
reduce the term of imprisonment . . . , after consider-
ing the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent
that they are applicable, if it finds that . . . extraordi-
nary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduc-
tion . . . and that such a reduction is consistent with
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
As we have recently explained, to grant a reduction under
§ 3582(c)(1)(A), district courts must find three necessary conditions
are satisfied, which are: “support in the § 3553(a) factors, extraordi-
nary and compelling reasons, and adherence to § 1B1.13’s policy
statement,” and the absence of any one of those conditions fore-
closes a sentence reduction. United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234,
1237-38 (11th Cir. 2021). District courts do not need to address
these three conditions in any particular sequence. Id. at 1237.
The policy statement applicable to § 3582(c)(1)(A) is found
in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. The commentary to § 1B1.13 states that ex-
traordinary and compelling reasons exist under any of the circum-
stances listed, provided the court determines the defendant is not a
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-10984
danger to the safety of any other person or to the community.
See id., comment. (n.1). The commentary lists a prisoner’s medical
condition as a possible extraordinary and compelling reason war-
ranting a sentence reduction if he: (1) has a terminal disease; or
(2) is suffering from a physical or mental condition that substan-
tially diminishes his ability to provide self-care in prison and from
which he is not expected to recover. Id., comment. (n.1(A)). The
commentary also contains a catch-all provision for “other reasons,”
which provides a prisoner may be eligible for a sentence reduction
if the Director of the Bureau of Prisons determines there is an ex-
traordinary and compelling reason. Id., comment. (n.1(D)).
The policy statement in § 1B1.13 is applicable to all motions
filed under § 3582(c)(1)(A), including those filed by prisoners, and
district courts thus cannot reduce a sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A)
unless it would be consistent with § 1B1.13. Bryant, 996 F.3d at
1262. Accordingly, district courts are precluded “from finding ex-
traordinary and compelling reasons within the catch-all provision
beyond those specified” in § 1B1.13. United States v. Giron, 15
F.4th 1343, 1347 (11th Cir. 2021). We held “the confluence of [a
prisoner’s] medical conditions and COVID-19” did not constitute
an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting compassionate
release when the prisoner’s medical conditions did not meet the
criteria of § 1B1.13, comment. (n.1(A)). Id. at 1346.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Guyton’s motion for compassionate release because he did not
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22-10984 Opinion of the Court 7
show an extraordinary and compelling reason for his release. 2
First, Guyton’s claim he established an extraordinary and compel-
ling reason for his release because he is unable to receive the vac-
cine against COVID-19 is foreclosed because the district court can-
not find extraordinary and compelling reasons beyond those speci-
fied in § 1B1.13. See Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1262; Giron, 15 F.4th at
1347. Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in de-
termining Guyton’s heart palpitations, shortness of breath, and
numbness in his arm and leg, along with other symptoms that Guy-
ton attributed to long-haul COVID-19 did not constitute an ex-
traordinary and compelling reason for his release because Guyton
did not show these conditions impair his ability to care for himself
while in prison. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 comment. (n.1(A)); Bryant,
996 F.3d at 1249-50; Giron, 15 F.4th at 1346-47. Instead, the record
reflects that Guyton has seen medical staff in prison multiple times,
the staff has determined that anxiety may be causing a number of
his symptoms, and Guyton has been seen for psychological help
while in prison.
Guyton’s argument his race and current symptoms create an
extraordinary reason for release because they increase the likeli-
hood he will experience severe COVID-19 symptoms if he con-
tracted it again is too speculative to warrant a reduction of his
2 We need not consider whether the § 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of grant-
ing Guyton relief because his failure to show an extraordinary and compelling
reason for his release is dispositive. See Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237-38.
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-10984
sentence. Section 1B1.13 offers relief to inmates who are suffering
from a physical or mental condition that diminishes their ability to
provide self-care while in prison, but Guyton seeks relief based on
speculation that he will contract COVID-19 again, and if he does,
that he will suffer severe symptoms. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, com-
ment. (n.1(A)). Accordingly, Guyton has not shown his medical
conditions warrant relief because he has not shown he is suffering
from a condition that limits his ability to care for himself in prison.
See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13; Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1262.
Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Guyton’s motions for
compassionate release and for reconsideration.
AFFIRMED.