Ruth Maricela Flores Garmendia v. U.S. Attorney General

USCA11 Case: 20-13707 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 03/28/2023 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 20-13707
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
RUTH MARICELA FLORES GARMENDIA,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
____________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Agency No. A208-448-330
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 20-13707
Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Ruth Maricela Flores Garmendia and her son, Noe Rodri-
guez Flores (as a derivative beneficiary of her asylum application)
seek review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) final order
affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of her application for
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the United Na-
tions Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).
After careful review, we dismiss Garmendia’s petition in
part as to her asylum and withholding-of-removal claims and deny
it in part as to her CAT claim.
The facts are known to the parties, and we repeat them here
only as necessary to resolve the case.
I
Garmendia first asserts that the IJ improperly denied her
claims for asylum and withholding of removal.
In denying her application for asylum, the IJ concluded, in
relevant part, that Garmendia did not establish a nexus to a pro-
tected ground. The IJ also separately denied her application for
asylum because she failed to identify a particular social group to
which she belonged. Because the IJ determined that Garmendia
failed to meet the burden of proof for asylum, it concluded that she
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20-13707 Opinion of the Court 3
also necessarily failed to meet the higher burden required for with-
holding of removal.
We typically review only the final decision of the BIA, but
when the BIA expressly adopts the IJ’s decision on an issue, we will
review the IJ’s decision on that issue, as well. Jeune v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 810 F.3d 792, 799 (11th Cir. 2016). Review of the BIA’s de-
termination of legal questions is de novo. Id. Factual findings by
the BIA, however, are reviewed for substantial evidence. Sanchez
Jimenez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 492 F.3d 1223, 1230 (11th Cir. 2007).
We review our own subject-matter jurisdiction de novo.
Amaya-Artunduaga v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th
Cir. 2006). We do not consider issues not decided by the BIA. Gon-
zalez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 820 F.3d 399, 403 (11th Cir. 2016).
We may review a final order of removal only if the petitioner has
exhausted her administrative remedies. INA § 242(d)(1), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(d)(1). When a petitioner fails to assert an error before the
BIA and then attempts to raise that error before this Court, she has
failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and we lack jurisdiction
to consider the issue. Jeune, 810 F.3d at 800. It is not enough that
the petitioner “merely identif[y]” an issue or make “passing refer-
ence” to it before the BIA—she must both raise the “core issue” and
set out any discrete arguments relied on in support of her claim.
Id. Moreover, when the issue is not purely a legal question, the
petitioner must “provid[e] her argument’s relevant factual under-
pinnings.” Indrawati v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 779 F.3d 1284, 1298 (11th
Cir. 2015).
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4 Opinion of the Court 20-13707
A
The Attorney General may grant asylum to an alien who
meets the INA’s definition of a “refugee.” INA § 208(b)(1)(A),
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). A refugee is defined as follows:
any person who is outside any country of such per-
son’s nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling
to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail him-
self or herself of the protection of, that country be-
cause of persecution or a well-founded fear of perse-
cution on account of . . . membership in a particular
social group.
INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (emphasis added).
The applicant bears the burden of proving that she is a refu-
gee. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). To do so, the
applicant must demonstrate that she (1) was persecuted in the past
on account of a protected ground or (2) has a well-founded fear that
she will be persecuted in the future on account of a protected
ground. Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1257 (11th Cir.
2006).
“To establish asylum based on past persecution, the appli-
cant must prove (1) that [s]he was persecuted, and (2) that the per-
secution was on account of a protected ground.” Kazemzadeh v.
U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1351 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation
marks and brackets omitted). To establish a well-founded fear of
future persecution, the applicant must show a reasonable possibil-
ity that she will be singled out for persecution on account of a
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20-13707 Opinion of the Court 5
protected ground and that her fear is both “subjectively genuine
and objectively reasonable.” Id. at 1352 (quotation marks omitted).
A showing of past persecution creates a rebuttable presumption of
a well-founded fear of future persecution. Id. at 1351–52.
We lack jurisdiction to review Garmendia’s arguments con-
cerning her application for asylum. In denying her application, the
IJ determined that she failed to establish that either her past perse-
cution or her fear of future persecution was on account of a pro-
tected ground, such as membership in a particular social group. In
her appeal brief to the BIA, she failed to challenge this finding, in-
stead asserting only that she had demonstrated past persecution
and a well-founded-fear of future persecution. Accordingly, we
lack jurisdiction to review her current arguments concerning mem-
bership in a particular social group. Jeune, 810 F.3d at 800. And
because a nexus between the alleged persecution, or fear thereof,
and a protected ground is a required element of eligibility for asy-
lum, it is unnecessary for us to consider her other arguments per-
taining to that issue. Kazemzadeh, 577 F.3d at 1351–52.
B
To qualify for withholding of removal under the INA, an al-
ien must show that, if returned to her country, her life or freedom
would be threatened on account of a protected ground, such as her
membership in a particular social group. INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3)(A). As with asylum, if an alien establishes past perse-
cution, a rebuttable presumption arises that her “life or freedom”
would again be threatened upon removal. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b);
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6 Opinion of the Court 20-13707
Tan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1369, 1375 (11th Cir. 2006). Oth-
erwise, the alien must demonstrate that she would more likely than
not be persecuted if returned to the country of removal. D-Mu-
humed v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 388 F.3d 814, 819 (11th Cir. 2004). If a
petitioner is unable to meet the standard of proof for asylum, she
cannot meet the more stringent standard for withholding of re-
moval. Id.As with respect to her asylum claim, Garmendia failed to es-
tablish a nexus between her fear of persecution and a protected
ground. INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). As such, her with-
holding-of-removal claim must suffer the same fate as her asylum
claim.
* * *
Accordingly, we dismiss Garmendia’s petition as to her asy-
lum and withholding of removal claims.
II
Garmendia next asserts that she met her burden to establish
eligibility under CAT. The IJ denied her request for protection un-
der CAT, finding no evidence in the record that she would be tor-
tured upon returning to Honduras.
To obtain CAT relief, an applicant must show that she more
likely than not will be tortured if removed to the proposed country
of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). All relevant evidence must be
considered, including her ability to relocate and human rights vio-
lations within the country. Id. (c)(3)(ii)–(iii). Harm constitutes
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torture solely where it is inflicted by, or with the acquiescence of, a
public official or other person acting in an official capacity. 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.18(a)(1). To show that an official acquiesced in torture, a pe-
titioner must show that, prior to the torture, the official (1) actually
knew of the torture or was aware of its high probability and delib-
erately avoided learning the truth, and (2) breached his legal respon-
sibility to intervene. Id. (a)(7). An official does not acquiesce if he
intervenes but is unsuccessful. Id.Here, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination
that Garmendia failed to show that she more likely than not would
be tortured by or with the acquiescence of the government if re-
moved to Honduras.
First, her abusers—her family members and the members of
the gangs—were not government actors, and she failed to show the
government would acquiesce to her torture, particularly because
she testified that she never reported her family’s abuse to the gov-
ernment. Additionally, when she did report the threats made
against her to the government, she was referred to a special task
force but failed to follow up with them. Thus, the record does not
compel a finding that the government of Honduras would be un-
willing or unable to protect her from future abuses. See id. §
1208.18(a)(7).
Second, Garmendia admitted, while testifying, that after
leaving her father’s home at 16, she was not contacted by her father
or otherwise abused by members of her family before her departure
from the country over a decade later. She also provided no
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8 Opinion of the Court 20-13707
evidence that this abuse was likely to resume if she reentered Hon-
duras.
Third, she admitted that the gang-member abuse was limited
to threats, none of which rose to the level of physical harm, and
there is no indication in the record that it is more likely than not
that this would change, let alone graduate to torture if she were to
return to Honduras.
For all these reasons, we deny Garmendia’s petition as to her
CAT claim.
* * *
In sum, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision af-
firming the denial of Garmendia’s asylum and withholding-of-re-
moval claims, as she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies
by challenging an independent ground for the IJ’s denial—namely
that she failed to demonstrate that any past or future persecution
was connected to a protected characteristic. And her CAT claim is
due to be denied because substantial evidence supports the BIA’s
determination that she failed to show that she more likely than not
would be tortured by or with the acquiescence of the government.
PETITION DISMISSED IN PART, DENIED IN PART