Steven Jacob Seibert v. Commissioner, Georgia Department of Corrections

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-10501
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 6:14-cv-00042-BAE-RSB
STEVEN JACOB SEIBERT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER, GEORGIA DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
COASTAL SP WARDEN, JOHN DOE,
COASTAL SP WARDEN, JANE DOE,
JANE DOES, Prison Intake Computer Input
Personnel at Coastal S.P. Diagnostics (2007),
COSTAL STATE PRISON, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
________________________
(February 23, 2017)
Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Steven Jacob Seibert, a prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the sua sponte
dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. He brought suit against Brian Owens, Commissioner of the
Georgia Department of Corrections (“GDOC”); Cynthia Nelson, Warden at
Central State Prison (“Central”); Betty Lance, Deputy Warden at Central; Brad
Hooks, Warden at Rogers State Prison (“Rogers”); Captain Jones; Milton Smith;
Steven DuPree; James Deal; John/Greg Brown; Lieutenant Anderson; Lieutenant
Wimberly; Sergeant Phillips; Ms. Dees; Mr. Sikes; Mrs. Ford; André Bateman;
and various unnamed John/Jane Doe prison officials, employees and volunteers at
Central, Rogers and Coastal State Prison (“Coastal”). According to the complaint,
the defendants had engaged in a conspiracy to harass him, falsely imprisoned him,
destroyed his business interests and personal and business property, and restricted
his access to the courts in violation of his constitutional rights and federal, Georgia,
Florida, and Ohio law. On appeal, Seibert argues that the district court: (1) erred in
finding that the statute of limitations barred his claims; (2) erred in finding that his
claims against supervisory defendants were conclusory; and (3) abused its
discretion in failing to appoint Seibert counsel. After careful review, we affirm. 1
We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state
a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), using the same standards that govern
1
Nevertheless, we GRANT Seibert’s motion for leave to correct and supplement his existing
brief.
2
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dismissals under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Leal v. Georgia Dep’t of Corr., 254 F.3d
1276, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2001). We accept as true the facts alleged in the
complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Randall v.
Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). We likewise review de novo a district
court’s application of a statute of limitations. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v.
Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2006). We liberally construe a pro se
party’s pleadings. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.
1998). But we generally do not allow fictitious-party pleadings, even pro se ones.
Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010).
First, we are unpersuaded by Seibert’s argument that the district court erred
by dismissing his claims on statute-of-limitations grounds, by failing to apply the
continuing violation doctrine, and by failing to toll the statute of limitations until
his release. Constitutional claims brought under § 1983 tort actions are subject to
the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which, in
Georgia, is two years. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33; Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181, 1182
(11th Cir. 2003). The statute of limitations does not start to run “until the facts
which would support a cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a
person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.” Lovett, 327 F.3d 1182
(quotation omitted). In considering whether a continuing violation analysis
applies, we ask if the plaintiff is complaining of “the present consequence of a one-
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time violation, which does not extend the limitations period, or the continuation of
that violation into the present, which does.” Id. at 1183 (quotation omitted). We
deem a pro se prisoner’s § 1983 complaint filed when it has been delivered to a
prison official for mailing, and assume it was delivered to prison authorities on the
day he signed it. United States v. Glover, 686 F.3d 1203, 1205 (11th Cir. 2012).
We look to state law for statutory tolling rules in § 1983 actions. Wallace v.
Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 394 (2007). Georgia law tolls the limitations period for
certain disabled individuals, but excludes prisoners from the list of persons entitled
to statutory tolling. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-90; Giles v. Garwood, 853 F.2d 876, 877-78
(11th Cir. 1988). Equitable tolling may be used when the plaintiff shows that “an
inequitable event prevented a plaintiff’s timely action.” Booth v. Carnival Corp.,
522 F.3d 1148, 1150 (11th Cir. 2008). For § 1983 claims that “necessarily imply
the invalidity of [a] conviction or sentence,” plaintiffs have no cause of action and
cannot file suit until that conviction or sentence has been invalidated. Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).
Seibert’s § 1983 complaint, filed on May 2, 2014, contained all but two
claims barred by the statute of limitations. For instance, his original complaint
alleged that state and county employees harassed him and caused damage to his
business interests and theft of his property from 1997-1999, well outside the two-
year statute-of-limitations period. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. To the extent Seibert
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alleged ongoing harassment from 1997 to 2005, these instances are also outside the
statute of limitations, as is his allegation that his one-time transfer to Rogers State
Prison in 2009 was done in retaliation and to harass him. Id. He did not provide
any specific dates for the mail and other items he alleged were stolen in prison, but
he says these violations took place at Rogers before and during his time in
segregation. He adds that after he left segregation, he was housed in Building A,
and then, on May 3-4, 2012, he was transferred to Hays State Prison. Drawing all
reasonable inferences in the complaint in favor of the plaintiff, we are compelled to
conclude that all of the theft occurred sometime before May 2, 2012, the operative
cut-off date for purposes of the two-year statute-of-limitations period. And Seibert
has never argued otherwise. Thus, the district court did not err in concluding that
his theft-related claims fell outside the two-year statute of limitations. See Hughes
v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1163 (11th Cir. 2003) (“To dismiss a prisoner’s complaint
as time-barred prior to service, it must ‘appear beyond a doubt from the complaint
itself that [the prisoner] can prove no set of facts which would avoid a statute of
limitations bar.’”). Moreover, because Seibert is a prisoner, Georgia’s tolling
provisions do not apply to him and he does not allege that equitable tolling based
on an inequitable event is warranted. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-90; Booth, 522 F.3d 1150.
Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed Seibert’s complaint for failure to
state a claim as to the time-barred claims.
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As for Seibert’s false imprisonment claim, his original complaint alleged
numerous false imprisonments from 1997 until the present date. But even if these
false imprisonments could somehow be construed as continuing violations, his
claims turn on the validity of his conviction and he has no cause of action because
that conviction has not been invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. To the extent
Seibert has also raised an ongoing false imprisonment based on incorrect
information in his file, Seibert alleges this claim against unnamed and unidentified
individuals. Fictitious party pleading is not proper in federal court, so the district
court did not err in dismissing this claim. Richardson, 598 F.3d at 738.
Next, while Seibert’s claim based on his alleged retaliatory transfer to Hays
State Prison was not barred by the statute of limitations, we find no merit to
Seibert’s argument that the district court erred in dismissing this claim and others
against the supervisory defendants as conclusory. A § 1983 claim against a
supervisor must show the supervisor participated in the “alleged constitutional
violation or when there is a causal connection between actions of the supervising
official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d
667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff must allege grounds for relief other than
“labels and conclusions” devoid of facts and a complaint containing “conclusory
allegations” will not survive dismissal for failure to state a claim. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss . . . [t]hreadbare
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recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice . . . . A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ . . .
will not do.” (quotation omitted)); Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d
1283, 1293 (11th Cir. 2010) (dismissing a claim where the allegations were
“conclusory”).
Of the claims Seibert alleged against specific, discernable, supervisory
defendants, the original complaint was almost entirely comprised of conclusory
allegations. In his original complaint, Seibert alleged that Commissioner Owens
failed to enact, enforce or maintain sufficient training and supervision to prevent
mistakes when inputting prisoner information in the GDOC system, without
putting forth specific facts about Owens’s alleged involvement. In his amended
complaint, Seibert alleged that from 1997 to 2005, Owens personally directed
some of the harassment, encouraged it, and did not stop it. But Seibert otherwise
did not add anything related to Owens and the failure to properly supervise GDOC
employees, nor did he assert any specific facts about Owens’s involvement or any
causal connection between his actions and alleged constitutional violations.
Brown, 906 F.2d at 671. Additionally, Seibert’s allegations against “GDOC
supervisors” were properly dismissed since they are fictitious-party names.
Richardson, 598 F.3d at 738.
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As for Seibert’s claim about his alleged retaliatory transfer to Hays State
Prison, he alleged in his original complaint that defendants Hooks, DuPree and/or
Brown were responsible for the transfer. In his amended complaint, Seibert added
additional injuries stemming from the transfer, but he did not elaborate on the
allegations against Hooks, DuPree and Brown. Because Seibert did not include
any facts and instead stated mere conclusions about the defendants’ responsibility,
his complaint was too conclusory to survive the motion to dismiss stage. Thus, for
all of the reasons we’ve discussed, the district court did not err in dismissing
Seibert’s claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Finally, we reject Seibert’s claim that the district court abused its discretion
by failing to appoint him counsel. Prisoners raising civil rights claims have no
constitutional right to counsel. Kilgo v. Ricks, 983 F.2d 189, 193 (11th Cir. 1993).
Appointment of counsel in civil cases must be justified by “exceptional
circumstances,” such as the presence of “facts and legal issues [which] are so novel
or complex as to require the assistance of a trained practitioner,” and may be
warranted if the pro se litigant needs help presenting the merits of a claim to the
court. Id. (quotation omitted). The district court has broad discretion in making
this decision, and the fact that a plaintiff would be helped by counsel does not
alone require the appointment of counsel. Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1320
(11th Cir. 1999).
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As a civil litigant, Seibert was not entitled to counsel for his claims. Kilgo,
983 F.2d at 193. He did not file a separate motion in the district court requesting
counsel, but rather requested counsel as a form of relief in his complaint.
Although the district court did not address the request, that omission was harmless
because this case does not present exceptional circumstances that necessitate the
appointment of counsel. Id. Seibert presents no reasons that appointment of
counsel would have been necessary other than to restate the facts in his complaint,
presumably to highlight either the density or magnitude of his claims. Although
appointment of counsel may have been helpful to Seibert, that is true for many pro
se litigants and does not constitute an exceptional circumstance. Bass, 170 F.3d at
1320. Therefore, any error committed by the district court in failing to address
Seibert’s request for counsel was harmless because the appointment of counsel was
not warranted.
AFFIRMED.
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