Donnell Mitchell v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration

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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-15318
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 3:12-cv-00095-CAR
DONNELL MITCHELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
________________________
(November 10, 2014)
Before MARTIN, JULIE CARNES and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
BLACK, Circuit Judge:
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Donnell Mitchell appeals the district court’s order affirming the
Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) denial of his application for supplemental
security income (SSI) and the Appeals Council’s decision denying his request for
review. On appeal, Mitchell contends substantial evidence does not support the
ALJ’s credibility determination and that the Appeals Council was required to
discuss the new evidence he submitted to it when it denied his request for review.
After review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, and having had
the benefit of oral argument, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On February 27, 2009, Mitchell filed an application with the Social Security
Administration for SSI, claiming he became disabled in January 1977.1 Mitchell
sought SSI on the basis that he could not stand for long periods of time or walk
long distances because of pain in his back that radiated into his right leg. After the
Commissioner of Social Security (the Commissioner) denied Mitchell’s
application, he requested and received a hearing before an ALJ. At a hearing on
December 7, 2010, both Mitchell and a vocational expert testified. On January 3,
2011, the ALJ issued a decision finding Mitchell was not disabled within the
meaning of the Social Security Act. The ALJ concluded in pertinent part that
Mitchell’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to
1
Mitchell also pursued a claim for child’s insurance benefits, but he specifically waived
that claim and it is not a part of the instant appeal.
2
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cause his alleged symptoms, but his statements concerning the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of those symptoms were not credible to the extent
they were inconsistent with the ALJ’s residual functional capacity assessment.
Mitchell requested review of the ALJ’s decision from the Appeals Council
and submitted additional documents to it, including (1) Progress Notes from a
nurse practitioner; (2) Progress Notes from Dr. James Southerland, Mitchell’s
treating physician; and (3) a document from Dr. Southerland titled “Medical
Opinion Re: Ability To Do Work-Related Activities (Physical).” The Appeals
Council denied Mitchell’s request for review, explaining that it had considered
Mitchell’s reasons for disagreeing with the ALJ’s decision as well as his additional
evidence. According to the Appeals Council, the information did not provide a
basis for changing the ALJ’s decision. The Appeals Council, however, did not
provide a discussion of Mitchell’s new evidence.
Mitchell filed a complaint in the district court challenging the
Commissioner’s denial of SSI. A magistrate judge issued a report and
recommendation, concluding the Commissioner’s decision should be affirmed.
Over Mitchell’s objections, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report
and recommendation and affirmed the Commissioner’s decision. This appeal
followed.
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In social security cases, we review the Commissioner’s decision for
substantial evidence. Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th
Cir. 2011). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted). We also review for substantial evidence the
ALJ’s determination that a claimant’s assertions of pain are not credible. Marbury
v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 837, 839 (11th Cir. 1992). “We may not decide the facts
anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the
Commissioner.” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (quotation and brackets omitted). “If
the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, this Court must
affirm, even if the proof preponderates against it.” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d
1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Mitchell first argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s
credibility determination. We have held that credibility determinations are the
province of the ALJ, Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 2005),
and we will not disturb a clearly articulated credibility finding supported by
substantial evidence, Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1562 (11th Cir. 1995). The
ALJ made a clearly articulated credibility finding and pointed to specific reasons
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for discrediting Mitchell’s subjective complaints of disabling pain. That finding
was supported by substantial evidence in the record. Furthermore, contrary to
Mitchell’s contention that the ALJ ignored evidence favorable to Mitchell, “there
is no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in
his decision, so long as the ALJ’s decision . . . is not a broad rejection which is not
enough to enable [a reviewing court] to conclude that the ALJ considered [the
claimant’s] medical condition as a whole.” Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1211 (quotation and
brackets omitted). The ALJ’s decision in this case was not a broad rejection and
was sufficient to enable the district court and this Court to conclude the ALJ
considered Mitchell’s medical condition as a whole. See id.Next, Mitchell argues that when the Appeals Council denied his request for
review, it was required to provide a discussion of the new evidence he submitted to
it. In support of his argument, Mitchell relies on this Court’s decisions in Mann v.
Gardner, 380 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1967); Epps v. Harris, 624 F.2d 1267 (5th Cir.
1980); and Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629 (11th Cir. 1984).2 Nothing in Mann,
Epps, or Bowen, however, requires the Appeals Council to provide a detailed
discussion of a claimant’s new evidence when denying a request for review.
2
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this
Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior
to the close of business on September 30, 1981.
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Our decision in Mann does not dictate the rule Mitchell desires for two
reasons. First, Mann arose in a different procedural posture than the instant case.
In Mann, a hearing examiner issued a recommended decision denying the
claimant’s application for benefits and the claimant then submitted new
documentary evidence to the Appeals Council. 380 F.2d at 185. The Appeals
Council adopted the recommended decision and issued a decision explaining why
the claimant was not entitled to a period of disability or disability insurance
benefits. Id. Mann is therefore unlike—and not dispositive of—the situation in
this case in which the ALJ issued a decision and the Appeals Council denied a
request for review.
Second, the facts in Mann, unlike the facts in this case, enabled us to
determine the Appeals Council perfunctorily adhered to the decision of the hearing
examiner. See id. at 187. Specifically, the new evidence in Mann related to an
entirely new condition which could have caused the claimant’s back pain. See id.
at 185-86. In issuing its decision, however, the Appeals Council failed to
satisfactorily explain that new evidence. Id. at 185. Accordingly, we held the
Appeals Council’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence and stated
that “[a]lthough the decision of the Appeals Council indicates that this new
evidence was examined by it and refers to its inclusion in the record, it was not
adequately evaluated.” Id. In reversing and remanding, we stated “[w]e [were]
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left with the firm conviction that the Appeals Council perfunctorily adopted the
recommended decision of the Hearing Examiner without adequate evaluation of
the newly discovered medical evidence.” Id. at 187. Mitchell’s new evidence, in
contrast to the new evidence in Mann, did not demonstrate the existence of a new
medical condition but, instead, was additional evidence of his degenerative disc
disease. There is thus no affirmative indication in this case, like there was in
Mann, that the Appeals Council perfunctorily adhered to the ALJ’s decision. To
the contrary, the Appeals Council expressly stated in its letter to Mitchell that it
had considered his additional evidence, and we have no basis on this record to
second-guess that assertion.
Mitchell’s reliance on Epps is similarly unavailing. As in Mann, Epps arose
in a different procedural context than the instant case. In Epps, an ALJ denied the
claimant’s application for disability benefits and the Appeals Council affirmed.
624 F.2d at 1269. Epps therefore does not speak to or control the instant case,
which involved the Appeals Council’s denial of a request for review.
Epps, moreover, involved a very different set of facts than the present case.
As in Mann, the record in Epps provided us with an affirmative basis for
concluding the Appeals Council failed to evaluate the claimant’s new evidence.
Specifically, the ALJ’s denial of benefits in Epps was premised on the claimant’s
lack of radical treatment. Id. at 1273. It was therefore apparent from the record
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that when the Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ’s decision, it failed to consider
the claimant’s post-hearing evidence demonstrating he had recently been referred
for consideration of radical intervention. See id. We explained that “[t]he
rationale for the ALJ’s determination was not expanded or revised by the Appeals
Council. In affirming the hearing decision, the Appeals Council merely noted that
it had considered the additional evidence submitted by Epps and found the ALJ’s
decision to be ‘correct.’” Id. at 1272-73. Citing Mann, we stated:
Although the Appeals Council acknowledged that Epps had submitted
new evidence, it did not adequately evaluate it. Rather, it
perfunctorily adhered to the decision of the hearing examiner. This
failure alone makes us unable to hold that the Secretary’s findings are
supported by substantial evidence and requires us to remand this case
for a determination of Epps’ disability eligibility reached on the total
record.
Id. at 1273. On the record before us, we do not have a similar basis for doubting
the Appeals Council’s statement that it considered Mitchell’s additional evidence.
Bowen v. Heckler also does not require the Appeals Council to discuss new
evidence submitted to it when it denies a claimant’s request for review. In Bowen,
we concluded the record established that the Appeals Council did not adequately
evaluate additional evidence submitted to it because it viewed each of the
claimant’s impairments in isolation and did not consider their combined effect.
748 F.2d at 634-35. We explained the Appeals Council instead “perfunctorily
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adhered to the decision of the administrative law judge.” Id. at 634 (quotations and
brackets omitted).
Bowen requires the Appeals Council to apply the correct legal standards in
performing its duties; it does not require the Appeals Council, when denying a
request for review, to give a detailed rationale for why each piece of new evidence
submitted to it does not change the ALJ’s decision. Our reading of Bowen
naturally follows from the fact that the Appeals Council in that case discussed all
of the new evidence submitted to it, and the error we identified was the Appeals
Council’s perfunctory adherence to the ALJ’s decision, which itself failed to view
the claimant’s impairments in combination and thus failed to conduct the
appropriate analysis. See id.As we have explained, nothing in Mann, Epps, or Bowen requires the
Appeals Council to provide a detailed discussion of a claimant’s new evidence
when denying a request for review. Those cases arose in different procedural
contexts and involved different facts. Instead, this case is controlled by our
decision in Ingram v. Commissioner of Social Security, 496 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir.
2007).
In Ingram, the claimant argued the Appeals Council failed to consider her
new evidence of mental disability. Id. at 1262. We held the record contradicted
the claimant’s argument, explaining that the Appeals Council accepted the new
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evidence but denied review because, even in light of the new evidence, there was
no error in the ALJ’s decision. Id. We are confronted with the same situation in
this case. Mitchell contends the Appeals Council failed to evaluate his new
evidence, but the record demonstrates otherwise. As in Ingram, the Appeals
Council accepted Mitchell’s new evidence but denied review because the
additional evidence failed to establish error in the ALJ’s decision. See id. On this
record, we are confident the Appeals Council adequately evaluated Mitchell’s new
evidence. The Appeals Council, moreover, was not required to provide a detailed
rationale for denying review. We note that our conclusion that the Appeals
Council is not required to explain its rationale for denying a request for review is
consistent with the holdings of other circuits that have considered this issue. See,
e.g., Meyer v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 700, 705-06 (4th Cir. 2011); Taylor v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 659 F.3d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 2011); Martinez v. Barnhart, 444 F.3d
1201, 1207 (10th Cir. 2006); Higginbotham v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 332, 335 n.1
(5th Cir. 2005); cf. Damato v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 982, 989 (7th Cir. 1991).
Furthermore, the new evidence Mitchell submitted to the Appeals Council
did not render the Commissioner’s denial of benefits erroneous. See Ingram, 496
F.3d at 1262 (“[W]hen a claimant properly presents new evidence to the Appeals
Council, a reviewing court must consider whether that new evidence renders the
denial of benefits erroneous.”). The additional evidence was either cumulative of
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the evidence before the ALJ or was not chronologically relevant, and none of it
undermined the substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.1470(b); see also Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210 (explaining this Court must affirm
under the substantial evidence test even if the proof preponderates against the
Commissioner’s decision).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude substantial evidence supported the
ALJ’s decision denying Mitchell’s application for SSI, and we hold that the
Appeals Council is not required to explain its rationale when denying a request for
review.
AFFIRMED.
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